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

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5th SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE)

1ST SPECIAL FORCES

AD 395430

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OPERATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED
FOR QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDING 31 JULY 1968

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AGAM-P (M) (6 Jan 69) FOR OT UT 683089

10 January 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure that the Army realizes current benefits from lessons learned during recent operations.
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES
APO San Francisco 96240

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15 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for Period Ending
31 July 1968. RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

THRU: Commanding General, United States Army, Vietnam
ATTN: AVHGC-DST, APO San Francisco 96375
Commander-in-Chief, United States Army, Pacific
ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO San Francisco 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (C) Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities.

a. General.

(1) Mission. The missions assigned to the 5th SFGA are as follows:

- (a) To exercise command and control of subordinate detachments.
- (b) To advise and assist the VNSF.
- (c) To act as Sector/Subsector advisors as directed by COMUSMACV.
- (d) To provide intelligence to COMUSMACV.
- (e) To conduct special operations.
- (f) To conduct the MACV Recondo School.

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Inclosure 1

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(2) Organizational Structure. See organizational chart at inclosure 1, troop disposition list at inclosure 3, and CTZ maps at inclosure 4.

(3) Command Relationships. See Annex B (Command Relationship) to study (Synopsis of the CIG Program) found at inclosure 7.

(4) Commanders and Key Personnel. See list at inclosure 2.

(5) Situation at the Beginning of the Reporting Period. At the end of the last quarter, intelligence indicated that enemy forces were probably preparing for another country-wide offensive. Enemy forces in all four Corps Tactical Zones appeared to be avoiding major contacts with friendly forces in an effort to regroup and resupply for this second general offensive. Special Forces camps in southern I CTZ and northwestern II CTZ were in the greatest danger of major attacks by enemy forces. Camp THUAN BUC (A-109) continued to be threatened by the 31st NVA Regiment and KHAM BUC (A-105) was increasingly being threatened by elements of the 2nd NVA Division. Camp TIEN PHUC (A-102) was under threat of attack by the 1st NVA Regiment. Camps BEN HET, DAK TO, DAK PEK, and POLTI KLENG in II CTZ were under pressure from the west, northwest, and north. At the end of the last reporting period, it was still not clear whether the 2nd NVA Division planned to push south down highway 14 toward camp DAK PEK (A-2112) in northwestern II CTZ or swing northwest toward KHAM BUC in southern I CTZ. Increased enemy activity in BINH LONG Province (III CTZ) posed possible threats to HON QUON (B-33) and LOC NINH (A-331); however attacks were really not anticipated since the majority of enemy forces in III CTZ were believed to be marginally to non-combat effective. In IV CTZ, NOC HOA (B-41), MY PHUOC TAY (A-411) and MY DIEN II (A-416) continued to be threatened by several VC local force battalions while CAO LANH continued to be threatened by the 502nd battalion.

(6) Operations. The statistical data on operations conducted during the reporting period are shown at inclosure 5. The most significant action during the quarter occurred at Special Forces camp KHAM BUC. CO III MAF (against recommendations by Special Forces personnel) directed that all assets be withdrawn from KHAM BUC on 12 May after FOB NGOK TAVAF was attacked by an estimated reinforced battalion of the 2nd NVA Division on 10 May. A massive air evacuation was executed while NVA forces directed heavy machine gun fire on the aircraft and mortar and ground attacks against the friendly elements at KHAM BUC. (See After Action Report at inclosure 8 and the LAM SON - KHAM BUC Comparative Study at inclosure 9. The increase in CIG casualties over those suffered during the last quarter is due largely to the attacks on FOB NGOK TAVAF, KHAM BUC and on FOB BA CHUC in IV CTZ. (See reports on this attack found at inclosures 10 and 11.)

(7) Changes in Organization.

(a) The following changes in organization were made effective by 5th SFDA General Order 809 dated 23 May 1968: Special Forces Liaison Detachment

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B-55 (SAIGON) was redesignated the Command Liaison Detachment. Detachment A-503 (NHA TRANG) was redesignated Detachment B-55 and assumed command and control over the 55th Mobile Strike Force Command (MSFC). Detachments B-16 (DAI LANG), B-20 (PLEIKU), B-36 (LONG HAI), and B-40 (CAN THO), were officially activated for command and control of the 16th, 20th, 36th, and 40th MSFC respectively. Detachment B-44 (PHU QUOC) was inactivated and personnel were reassigned to Detachment B-40.

(b) The Special Forces camp at KHAM DUC (A-105) was closed on 12 May 1968. On 24 June, personnel assets from KHAM DUC (A-105) officially opened camp NONG SON. Personnel included 10 USASF, four VNSF, 81 CSF, and 65 MSF.

(c) Camp MAI LOC (A-101) was officially opened on 24 June by the following personnel: 13 USASF, 18 VNSF, 114 CSF, 210 MSF, one engineer platoon with heavy equipment, and one US Marine company. Detachment A-101 was formerly located at LANG VEI.

(d) On 15 June, the CIDG assets on PHU QUOC ISLAND were officially converted to RF/PF. Detachment A-441 relocated to MOC HOA and was redesignated A-404 of the 40th Mobile Strike Force Command.

(e) Camp BEN SOI (A-321) was transferred to VNSF control (A-136) on 2 July.

(8) A special study, "Synopsis of the CIDG Program," was prepared during the reporting period and is contained at inclosure 7. This study discusses the background and development of the CIDG program from 1961 - 1968 and the concept of operations for CY 1967 - 1968.

(9) The May, June and July issues of the Green Beret Magazine are attached as inclosure 11.

(10) A list of VIPs who visited this headquarters during the reporting period is found at inclosure 6.

(11) The command's concept for the employment of CIDG forces and long-range reconnaissance projects is contained in letter dated 21 July 1968, subject: Employment of Civilian Irregular Defense Group and Long-Range Reconnaissance Projects (U). (See inclosure 13)

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b. Intelligence.

(1) I Corps Tactical Zone.

(a) In early May the total enemy strength in I CTZ was between 120,000 and 123,000 troops of which approximately 55,00 were combat troops. Contacts and enemy activity during the period remained light and at a general lull. However, the enemy sustained heavy losses as he attempted to harvest his rice from the fall crop. Increased enemy infiltration, utilizing newly constructed infiltration routes, enabled the enemy to keep his man power strength stabilized. At the end of July, the enemy was estimated to have approximately 125,000 enemy personnel of which 56,000 were combat troops. Throughout the reporting period enemy forces operated with four confirmed NVA divisions, 22 to 24 independent regiments, and a total of approximately 120 maneuver battalion.

(b) Throughout the reporting period enemy forces were generally dispersed throughout the mountain regions along the Vietnam-Lao border. Enemy tactical elements had apparently been ordered to pull back in order to make preparations for a future offensive. Major enemy efforts seemed to have been directed towards unit, personnel and logistical developments. The majority of Special Forces camps in I CTZ were not particularly threatened by enemy build-ups in their TAORs; however, during May, Special Forces camp THUONG DUC, A-109, came under heavy threats of attack by the 31st and 36th NVA Independent Infantry Regiments which were supported by the 368B Artillery Regiment. This threat was relieved, however, by a continued Marine operation which encompassed the camp's TAOR. During this period all contact with the 304th NVA Division was lost. The 304th was last reported being deployed along the DMZ area, northern QUANG TRI Province. It is believed that the 304th returned to NVN in order to regroup and resupply. During June the 126th Naval Sapper Regiment (NVA) was introduced and is now deployed in the area of the CUA VIET River. Although plans for a July offensive in I CTZ never materialized, there were numerous reports and indications that a general offensive was to have taken place in I CTZ in order to strengthen the North Vietnamese bargaining power at the Paris peace talks which commenced in mid-May. Intelligence indicated that enemy goals were to have been the cities of DANANG, QUANG TRI City and HUE, the old provincial capital. Hopefully, a NVN victory would have a psychological effect on the presidential election in the United States. A severe defeat and heavy friendly losses could possibly sway the voting to a candidate who would be in favor of ending the Vietnam conflict as fast as possible (i.e. by pulling US Forces from Vietnam). Throughout the period the enemy continued to improve his lines of communications as evidenced by new road construction and the improvement of others. A new road was reported being built through the DMZ and reports indicate that the enemy is

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attempting to connect this road with Highway #9, QUANG TRI Province. Intensive widening and improving of roads to allow for all-weather and all vehicle usage was noted throughout the A SHAU Valley. This construction was probably accomplished by the 83rd NVA Engineer Regiment which was last deployed and utilized in the KHE SANH area, QUANG TRI Province. Further enemy road construction was evidenced by the improving and reopening of an old French road, route #534, from KHAM DUC to HIEP DUC. The majority of all regular combat troops during this time were well trained, politically indoctrinated and well equipped NVA troops. Morale has remained high as cadre on all levels have promised their troops a major NVA victory and liberation of the oppressed SVN in the next offensive. Another factor which contributed to high morale within the NVA was our strategic withdrawal from Special Forces camp KHAM DUC, A-105. On 10 May, KHAM DUC came under mortar and recoilless-rifle fire and FOB NGON TAVAK was evacuated after surviving a battalion size attack. After 5 days of heavy contact with the 1st NVA Infantry Regiment of the 2nd NVA Division, KHAM DUC was evacuated.

(c) Confirmed use of new weapons and equipment was not reported in I CTZ although reports have indicated that the enemy intends to introduce several new weapons within the corps. On the CUA VIET River a 300 pound watermine was deactivated by the U.S. Navy. This mine and numerous other reports of large watermines shows that the enemy is developing a waterway interdictory skill which could minimize our usage of the CUA VIET River. Increased enemy accuracy with the RPG-2 and the RPG-7 against friendly ships on the CUA Viet River could possible mean that the enemy has an infrared capability. In northern QUANG TRI Province along the DMZ there were numerous reports of "airborne lights" buzzing the area, landing and taking off. The majority of these reports have come from the CON THIEN area. The enemy could have an aircraft capability, possibly helicopters. No significant material was received concerning the construction or defense of enemy fortifications.

(d) At the end of the reporting period tactical elements, which were deployed in the mountains for the rice harvest and retraining, were beginning to deploy themselves for the next offensive in I CTZ. Plans to stage a country-wide offensive of 20 July and then on 5 August did not materialize probably because of friendly operations around his probable major goals, DANANG, QUANG TRI City and possibly HUE. Special Forces camps MAI LOC, A-101, and MONG SON, A-105, are still in the construction stage and are still vulnerable to ground attacks by battalion sized units. The 62nd NVA Regiment of the 3rd NVA Division and the 27th Independent Regiment are presently located near MAI LOC, TAOR. As of yet, these units have only interdicted the roads leading to and from the camp with mines. The 3rd Sapper Battalion, the 11st Independent Local Force Regiment and the 103rd Battalion of the 31st Regiment are deployed

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near Camp NONG SON's TAOR. DANANG has the equivalent of three regiments near its TAOR; the 36th Independent Regiment, the V.25, the D.7 and the R.20 Local Force Battalions, plus T.69 and T.87 NVA Sapper Battalions. QUANG TRI City could be attacked by the 812th NVA Independent Regiment, the 52nd Regiment of the 320th NVA Division, the 814th NVA Independent Battalion and by the 808th Independent Main Force Battalion. With elements of enemy forces deployed near the major cities in I CTZ, Special Forces operations are likely to note increased engagement with large size enemy units. No threat is seen to any Special Forces camp at this time in I CTZ. By mid-August a general corps offensive will probably take place with such far reaching goals as the control of I CTZ, bargaining power at the Paris peace talks, and psychological influence on the US presidential election. The next enemy offensive could conceivably be the final enemy drive of the Vietnam conflict.

(2) II Corps Tactical Zone.

(a) In early May the total enemy strength in II CTZ was between 45,000 and 50,000, of which approximately 23,000 were combat troops. Though the enemy suffered many losses in contacts during the first part of the period, increased infiltration and resupply activities kept the enemy strength relatively level. At the end of July the enemy had approximately 26,000 combat troops and again about 50,000 total personnel. During this period the enemy operated with four divisions, five independent regiments and a total of approximately 26 separate maneuver battalions. At the end of the reporting period there were three divisions, three independent regiments and 26 separate maneuver battalions.

(b) During the reporting period in II Corps, two major phases in the enemy's offensive plans became evident. During the first phase, from mid-April to mid-May, the enemy employed new units and new weapons on a scale never before observed in the western highlands. The 325C NVA Division, along with the 101D and 95C NVA Regts, deployed to the western highlands from the DMZ. By early May, Special Forces camp BEN HET was being subjected to almost constant battalion size probes and heavy attacks by fire. At this time major elements of the US 4th Division moved to the DAK TO - BEN HET - POLEI KIENG to gain control of highway 14 and KONTUM city. Continuous B-52 strikes and operations by the 4th Division probably forestalled enemy plans for an offensive in this area. In other areas of the corps, enemy activity was at a lower level as most major NVA units remained under strength. It was during this time that the 2nd and 22nd NVA Regiments moved north into the HA TAY area and engaged CSF troops in several heavy contacts. Throughout the corps, Special Forces continued to experience light to moderate contacts with infiltrating NVA units and VC resupply units. With the initiation of the Paris peace talks in May, it became evident

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that enemy actions were becoming more dependent on political rather than military consideration. This probably was the reason the NVA units remained in the BEN HET - POLEI KLENG area even though daily he was suffering heavy losses to the US 1st Infantry Division and B-52 airstrikes. Early June began the second phase of the enemy's two phase offensive in II CTZ. Enemy activity declined sharply and all major NVA units close to the border areas withdrew to Cambodian base camps, leaving behind harassment elements to conduct attacks by fire and raids and ambushes. During this period the enemy began a major redeployment of his units and reorganization of his command structure. In the southern Provinces enemy activity remained at an extremely low level. Local Force and Main Force VC units continued their tactics of ambushing and harassing attacks as the enemy resupplied and redeployed for a major offensive activity.

(c) In II CTZ the enemy is capable of deploying 122mm rockets, 140mm rockets, 100mm field guns, 105mm howitzers, 82mm mortar, and 60mm mortar. Tanks have been sighted west of BEN HET by CIDG troops who had escaped from the NVA.

(d) At the end of the period the major enemy threat existed in DARLAC Province. SF camps TIEU ATAR, TRANG PHUC, and DUC LAP were threatened by elements of the 66th, 24th, 209th, and possible the 174th NVA Regiments. The deployment of these units of the 1st NVA Division into DARLAC Province indicates a major shift in the enemy's emphasis in II Corps. The movement of major elements of the 3rd NVA Division into I Corps and 32nd and 33rd NVA Regiments into III Corps could indicate a lessening of enemy activity in II Corps; however, as NVA units move back into II Corps from base areas in Cambodia, all Special Forces camps engaged in the border surveillance role will probably experience an increase in contact.

(3) III Corps Tactical Zone.

(a) In early May, the total enemy strength in III CTZ was between 45,000 and 50,000, of which approximately 30,000 were combat troops. Although heavy losses were sustained in scattered contacts during the period, increased infiltration kept enemy strength figures at a relatively stable level. At the end of July, the enemy was estimated to have approximately 48,000 men, of which 29,000 were combat troops. Throughout the entire period, enemy forces consisted with three confirmed divisions, four to six independent regiments, and a total of approximately seventy maneuver battalions.

(b) During the beginning of the reporting period, enemy forces were generally dispersed in areas west and north of GIA DINH Province, within striking distance of the capital. Special Forces camps were not particularly

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threatened by an enemy build-up within their TAORs. Detachments in HAU NGHIA Province began to make increased contacts as enemy units, generally VC, moved eastward from Cambodian base areas towards the Capital Military District. On 5 May, enemy forces entered the city of SAIGON with the equivalent of three regiments, to include: DONG NAI Regiment, a possible CUU LONG II Regiment, plus VC Main Force and Local Force Battalions operating in the southern regions of the Corps. Enemy elements encountered more organized resistance among Free Will Forces and the people than during the Tet offensive. Newly organized battalions, such as the 306th and 308th VC Main Force Battalions, were tentatively identified in contacts throughout the Capital Military District. In other regions of the Corps, enemy initiated activity was at a low level, including operations near Special Forces camps. In renewing ground activity in the capital in early May, the enemy hoped to achieve some sort of psychological victory to be able to influence the forthcoming Paris peace talks which commenced in mid-May. In every major confrontation within the capital, enemy forces were either forced to withdraw or were practically annihilated by better prepared and equipped ARVN units. In addition, a high ranking NVA official had revealed information which compromised the majority of enemy plans. Attempting to effect a piecemeal withdrawal, combat elements broke into platoon and squad size units to exfiltrate the city. Scattered contacts continued into the month of June with dispersed troops who were unable to break through the ring thrown around the Capital Military District by allied forces. The ensuing low morale was evidenced by the rallying of 18 company level or higher cadre prior to mid-June. The enemy rumored plans to stage massive rocket attacks on installations and population centers in the Saigon area were never realized. PWs indicated that the enemy suffered severe logistical and replacement problems which forced the termination of operations in the city and also hindered plans for heavy indirect fire attacks, probably by elements of the 84A and 208th NVA Artillery Regiments. In PHUOC LONG Province Special Forces operations continued to make contact with rear service personnel of the 86th Group which was attempting to avoid US and GVN forces. Renewed use of the SONG BE road was noted by secondary explosions which resulted from repeated airstrikes, as well as reports of large base camps in areas not far from BUNARD, A-344, and DUC PHONG, A-343. In northeastern and mid-western BINH LONG Province, infiltration increased although no statistics could be determined. Airborne personnel detectors and agents indicated a major build-up in proximity to LOC NINH, A-331, where heavy contacts were made by operations during the early weeks of July. The 7th NVA Division apparently moved its headquarters across the Cambodian border, just east of Highway #13. A reorganization of this unit resulted in three subordinate regiments, the 1st, 165th, and 32nd, being located in northern BINH LONG Province, include: Elements of the 9th VC Division, previously reported in central HAU NGHIA Province, were identified in the southern and western regions of TAY NINH Province at the close

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of the reporting period. In central War Zone C a Mobile Strike Force operation ran into extremely heavy resistance from enemy forces which appeared to have knowledge of the entire operation. When the friendly forces converged on KATUM, A-322, the camp received a heavy barrage of mortar fire from elements of the 69th VC Artillery Command. Another Mobile Strike Force operation in mid-July contacted a battalion plus in western War Zone C in areas where BEN SOI, A-136, also made heavy engagements with large enemy forces. These elements were later identified as the 271st and 272nd VC Regiments of the 9th VC Division. Agent reports and airborne personnel detector readings also indicated the deployment into south-eastern TAY NINH Province of the 5th VC Division with the 275th VC and 88th NVA Regiments. Detachments in HAU NGHIA Province experienced an unusually low level of activity, especially considering that these camps are located along enemy routes of resupply to and from GIA DINH Province. At least two enemy regiments, 273rd VC plus Local Force elements, were dispersed southwest of DUC HUE, A-351, in the BA THU base complex in Cambodia.

(c) The confirmed use of new weapons and equipment was not reported in the corps, although agents and PWs have indicated that the enemy intends to introduce several new weapons to its III CTZ arsenal. A questionable PW report stated that a "top secret" weapon was to be utilized in future attacks by fire. This weapon, identified as a rocket, has been reported to be either the Soviet 200mm or 240mm rocket. Both are multi-barreled, truck-launched, and have never been confirmed in use in Vietnam. Southeast of Saigon a 250 pound watermine was de-activated by US Navy personnel along the Song Dong Nai. This is the largest such mine reported to date in III Corps. In western TAY NINH Province agent reports from various sources have indicated the probability of enemy employment of helicopters, possibly of Czech or East German manufacture, for reconnaissance and or troop movements. In northern War Zone C THIEN NGON, A-323, and KATUM, A-322, reported over-flights by unmarked, small, fixed wing aircraft. No significant material was received concerning the construction or defense of enemy fortifications.

(d) At the present time, the divisional size enemy forces have redeployed from the Saigon area into the western and northern regions of the corps. Plans to stage a country-wide offensive on 20 July, as reported by PWs and agents, did not materialize, and are now believed to have been rumors circulated by VC cadre. With the exception of LOC NINH, A-331, Special Forces camps in the northern border areas are not expected to be likely targets of enemy ground assaults. At the close of the reporting period, the enemy had approximately 4,500 combat troops of the 7th NVA Division in northern BINH LONG Province. In TAY NINH Province the reported use of helicopters in areas between camps THIEN NGON, A-323, and BEN SOI, A-136, gives the enemy a capability of deploying and extracting troops with speed never before experienced. TAY NINH City has been indicated by agents as a likely

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target of a major enemy ground assault to take place on an undesignated date. At the close of the period, the enemy had in excess of 10,000 combat troops dispersed throughout the province where they threaten the security of all Special Forces compounds, in particular Detachment B-32. It is possible that TAY NINH City could be attacked from the west by the 9th VC Division and from the southeast by the 5th VC Division in a multi-divisional assault on the provincial capital. When elements of enemy forces, presently dispersed along the Cambodian border of HAU NGHIA Province, receive word to move on the capital, Special Forces operations are likely to note increased engagements with large size enemy units. By mid to late August a major corps or country-wide offensive push is expected from VC/NVA forces. It is expected to seek a political objective, that of influencing the US presidential elections in November. The enemy has indicated that two-thirds of his forces will be utilized against provincial capitals in order to draw allied forces away from the city of Saigon. The remaining third of his forces are expected to enter the capital, assess the situation, and attempt to take control of the government. With such far-reaching objectives, it may well indicate that the next general, country-wide offensive might be the final enemy initiated drive of the Vietnam Conflict.

(1) IV Corps Tactical Zone.

(a) In early May enemy strength in IV CTZ was approximately 36,000 of which 16,000 were combat troops. Although friendly operations inflicted heavy losses on the enemy, it is believed that he maintained his strength through the infiltration of new personnel. There were numerous reports of new unidentified units in the northern portion of the corps; however, few were confirmed. The enemy is believed to have maintained the same relative strength throughout the reporting period. At present the enemy has two confirmed regiments, and approximately 20 separate independent maneuver battalions.

(b) Toward the beginning of May, Viet Cong units appeared to have moved within striking distance of the major cities in the northern part of the corps. The 510th Local Force Battalion and the 512th Local Force Battalion were located in the vicinity of CHAU DOC; the 504th Local Force Battalion and the 276th Main Force Battalion were in the vicinity of MOC HOA. The 502A Local Force Battalion, the 502B Battalion, and the newly reported 502C Local Force Battalion were located in the vicinity of CAO LANH; the Dong 2 Regiment, 307th Main Force Battalion, 309th and 303rd Main Force Battalions, Tay Do Local Force Battalion, and the 198th Main Force Artillery Battalion were located in the vicinity of CAN THO. Enemy activity was then characterized by a substantial increase in harassment attacks by fire. During the latter part of the month, enemy units showed a withdrawal from these cities with the exception of the units in the CAO LANH area. The enemy continued to operate in small units to avoid contact and detection by friendly units and

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operations. He also continued his harassment in an attempt to divert attention from his resupplying, recruiting, and retraining activities. During the month of June, the enemy avoided contact as much as possible. The contacts that he initiated were merely diversionary tactics to conceal infiltration of personnel and supplies which are to be used in the reported corps wide offensive to be conducted at an unknown date in the future. During the early part of July, the enemy's concentration remained upon his logistical and administrative situation. Ground activity reached the lowest point thus far this year. Friendly operations continued to be the deterring factor in the enemy's efforts to build up supplies and personnel. Terrorism began to increase with minor bombings and booty-trapped vehicles. In mid-July friendly units began large scale sweep operations and employed extensive use of their air capabilities to hamper enemy activity as much as possible. Delta Blackhawk operations in the NUI CO TO Mountain area proved very successful in uncovering a great number of enemy caches. It is also believed that the 502A and the 502B Local Force Battalions suffered up to a 50% loss of personnel in the B-52 airstrikes conducted on 21, 22, and 23 July just north of CAO LANH City. The 201st Main Force Battalion was reported to have suffered heavy personnel and equipment losses due to airstrikes. After the increase of friendly operations, the number of HOI CHANHs showed a notable increase. Their reports told of the low morale in many enemy units due to the threat and losses from airstrikes, as well as the shortage of food, medical supplies and reinforcements. The enemy apparently activated new units and increased the strength of older units and attempted to combine them into regimental size battle groups. The increased unit movements were accompanied by light platoon sized contacts and ambushes and other hit and run tactics. It is also believed that the majority of the units reported infiltrating from Cambodia were moving into the SAIGON area.

(c) During the reporting period numerous reports of the enemy's possession of the 122mm rocket launcher appeared. It was not until late July that this capability was confirmed by the capture of a weapon and several rounds of ammunition. No other significant weapons, vehicles, or fortifications were reported during this period.

(d) The current enemy disposition on 31 July was much the same as it was at the beginning of the period. Movements were noted to the base areas and then back to within striking distance of enemy targets. At the end of the reporting period the major threat to friendly installations was in the CAN THO City area where the enemy has the equivalent of two regiments. In PHONG DINH Province the threatening units are the 303rd, 307th, and 309th Main Force Battalions, TAY DO Local Force Battalion, and the 198th Main Force Artillery Battalion. The city is also threatened by possible reinforcement units of the D567th Local Force Battalion and the 306th Main Force Battalion from VINH LONG Province. It is believed that the reported country-wide offensive will not be conducted at the same level as the TET offensive. The enemy is expected to attack targets of reasonable military value and of high political value in his next offensive in view of the Paris Peace Talks. The offensive is now believed to be planned for the middle part of August.

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C. Operations.

(1) I Corps Tactical Zone (Company C). During the reporting period, Company C assets conducted a total of 254 company size or larger operations, 1180 platoon size, and 4262 squad size operations. Forty-two of these were joint operations with other free world forces. A total of 171 contacts were made with the following results: 390 enemy KIA, 29 enemy CPTR. Friendly losses were: Three USASF, 94 CIDG, and 62 RF/PF KIA; 32 USASF, six VNSF, 231 CIDG, and 12 RF/PF WIA; two USASF, one VNSF and five CIDG are missing in action. The most significant event during the reporting period was the withdrawal of all assets from camp KHAM DUC on 12 May, two days after FOB NGOK TAVAK was attacked and eventually evacuated. The events of 10-12 May are discussed below and a detailed after action report is found at inclosure 9. The following significant activities occurred during the quarter:

(a) KHAM DUC (A-105): At approximately 100245 May 68, Camp KHAM DUC and FOB NGOK TAVAK came under a coordinated mortar and recoilless rifle attack. The attack on NGOK TAVAK was followed by a heavy ground attack by at least an NVA Battalion. The attack was supported by mortars, RPG-7 rockets, heavy machine guns, flame throwers and tear gas (not effective during the attack). The FOB took heavy casualties but held out through the morning. At first light, medevac helicopters began lifting out the wounded. After all the wounded had been evacuated and existing weapons destroyed, which was approximately 101300 hours, the remaining personnel at Ngok Tavak departed for an LZ by foot and from the LZ were lifted by helicopter to KHAM DUC. The extraction was completed by 101850 hours. The initial mortar attack on KHAM DUC lasted for approximately one hour. The rest of the day KHAM DUC received sporadic mortar fire. During the day reinforcements from the Americal Division arrived at KHAM DUC. When the move was completed, units on the ground included Company A, 1/46 Infantry, 2d Battalion, 1st Infantry (LTC Nelson, Commanding) and a 105mm howitzer battery from 3/82 Artillery. The night of 10-11 May was quiet with only 1 or 2 mortar rounds falling in the camp. Early in the morning of 11 May the mortar attack on KHAM DUC was resumed. Patrols were sent out in the immediate vicinity of the camp with negative contacts. They did, however, call in artillery and air strikes on suspected enemy mortar positions spotted during the day. Air strikes were used extensively all day in an effort to neutralize enemy mortar positions and observation posts. On the afternoon of 11 May, the 11th and 12th MSF companies which had been evacuated from FOB NGOK TAVAK were withdrawn to DANANG. Company 137, a CIDG company from HA THANH, started to come in as a replacement for the MSF but only 64 personnel arrived before darkness ended this movement. The mortar attack on KHAM DUC, which had been concentrated on the main compound, shifted in the afternoon to cover the 2/L Infantry positions also, and then stopped again just before dark. At approximately 120000 May 68, Detachment A-105 received a message directing the withdrawal of all assets from KHAM DUC beginning on the morning of 12 May. At 0320 outpost #7 came under a heavy

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ground attack and fell within a few minutes. The other outposts were attacked in the following sequence: 5, 1, and 3. Although these three were reinforced with Americal troops and held for longer periods, they were in enemy hands by 0930 hours. Shortly after 1000 hours, the camp came under ground attack from the northeast, northwest and southwest. These were all attacks of at least company size strength or larger. They were all stopped by a combination of TAC air strikes, artillery, and ground fire. Later in the morning, the enemy employed .50 Cal machine guns on each of the outposts and was observed digging in and erecting radio antennas on the outposts. The relocation started at 1130 hours in spite of the mortar, recoilless rifle, and anti-aircraft fire which was very heavy at the time. Much of the credit for the successful extraction must go to the Army, Air Force and Marine pilots who flew the evacuation aircraft and to the FACs and TAC pilots who provided suppressive fires so that the evacuation could proceed. At 1200 hours a ground attack on the main compound was beginning to form in the gullies and low ground to the east and southeast of camp. Air strikes in the area slowed the enemy's progress and it was not until 1400 hours that the enemy put together a strong ground attack against the main compound. C&C Detachment personnel manning the east and southeast perimeter reported a large ground attack and NVA troops in the outer wire at 1400. This attack was stopped by a combination of ground fire, mortars, and air strikes (which used CBU, napalm, and 750 pound bombs). Even though the attack was stopped for a while, the enemy persisted in other attacks in this same area throughout the afternoon in spite of heavy casualties from the continuous air strikes in the area. The evacuation proceeded throughout these attacks and only faltered briefly during periods of intense anti-aircraft fire from the enemy held posts. The evacuation of all units was complete at 121633 hours with the evacuation of the 15 man USASF and VNSF command group.

Casualties for Kham Duc/Ngok Tavak

	<u>FRIENDLY</u>						<u>ENEMY</u>		
	<u>USASF</u>	<u>USA</u>	<u>USMC</u>	<u>USAF</u>	<u>VNSF</u>	<u>CSF</u>	<u>MSF</u>		
KIA	1	0	12	0	0	0	10	KIA	405
WIA	5	66	21	0	2	16	40	WIA	Unk
MIA/KIA	2	24	0	5	1	48	46	CIA	1
Wpns Lost	8	72	33	5	1	101	156	MBA	350(est)
Acraft Lost	2-C-130, 2 Gunships, 1-O2, 2-CH47								

TIEN PHUOC (A-109) On 8 May - company size operation (U-91) made contact with a company size unit of VC. After the enemy broke contact, patrols

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searched the area and found 20 VC KIA, one WIA, two individual weapons, six grenades, numerous equipment and documents CIA, while suffering negative friendly casualties. On 12 May, operation C-97 and elements of the RF/PF conducted a combined operation as road security for a convoy from TAM KY to TIEN PHUOC. Elements of the RF/PF were ambushed by a estimated VC company. Operation C-97 immediately went into a flanking attack on the enemy ambush site. Due to the outstanding, aggressive attack by the CSF, the enemy broke contact and withdrew. Results were 39 VC KIA, 15 VC KIA (est), 23 individual weapons CIA, four CSF KIA, 18 RF/PF KIA. HAU DUC district HQ was attacked on 27 May. All four OP's withdrew, to the main OP. Enemy elements moved into a portion of the village killing civilians and burning homes. The results of the initial attack were 17 VC KIA, 20 RF/PF KIA, 40 RF/PF WIA, 40 RF/PF MIA, est 50 civ KIA, est 60 civ WIA and 150 houses burned. The district OP was reinforced with a Company of MSF on 30 May. Sporadic mortar fire continued.

(c) BA TO (A-106): Enemy elements conducted a ground, mortar, and satchel charge attack against district headquarters, camp BA TO, and Opns P-96 and P-97 on 23 May. Total results of the attack were 14 VC KIA, 20 VC KIA (est), one flare pistol, two individual weapons, four bangalore torpedoes CIA; the BA TO District Chief, seven CSF and five RF/PF were KIA; four CSF, 14 RF/PF and three National Police were WIA. One 60mm mortar and eight individual weapons were lost.

(d) THUONG DUC (A-109): On 5 May, NVA elements of the 31st Regt began a heavy mortar and recoilless rifle attacks on the camp which continued daily through 23 May. NVA units moved into the village areas around the camp, burning houses, and killing civilians or driving them out. Camp patrols continuously met and engaged enemy units of company size or larger. Ammunition, rations and CA rice were air dropped almost on a daily basis. This was necessary due to mortar fire on the airstrip and helipads. On 20 May, USMC elements in the combined operation "MAMELUKE THRUST" began working west to THUONG DUC and this greatly relieved enemy pressure around the camp. Many joint USMC/CSF-MSF operations were conducted and because of this the camp has regained its effectiveness.

(e) TIEN PHOC (A-102): During the first week of June the mission support site at HAU DUC came under mortar attack. HAU DUC received from four to 20 rounds each day for a period of seven days. During the same period, camp TIEN PHUOC received harassing mortar and 122mm rocket fire. On 5 June, Operation C-115 made contact with an estimated VC company. Artillery and Air Strikes were called in on the enemy position. A sweep of the area revealed three VC KIA, seven VC KBA, one 81mm mortar CIA complete along with assorted small arms and ammo. Four of the KBA were chained to the mortar.

(f) MAI LOC (A-101): Camp MAI LOC, YD 089512, was officially established at 241200 June. On 22 June, a forward supply point was established at DONG HA in preparation for the establishment of the camp. At 240800 CIDG Company 101 conducted a heliborne assault on the future camp site and secured it for the convoy due to arrive from DONG HA later that day. Later in the afternoon the first convoy arrived with barrier material and two mobile strike force companies. During the following four days an engineer company arrived to help with the

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construction of the camp along with the remainder of the supplies for detachment A-101. Preparations were immediately made for the expected arrival of 6,000 Bru Montagnards from the refugee center at CAM LO on the 1st of July.

(g) NONG SON (A-105): At 241300 June camp NONG SON was established at coord AT 813382 on an old RF/PF position. This camp overlooks the entrance to Antenna Valley, the reported base headquarters for the 2nd NVA Division and the NONG SON coal mine which supplies the AN HOA industrial complex. On the 23rd and 24th of June, helicopters moved the supplies for the camp from the airstrip and mission support site at AN HOA to NONG SON.

(h) TRA BONG (A-107): On 26 June a joint CSF/Americal Division Operation found a weapons cache consisting of the following: one M1 Carbine, five carbine barrels, four M-72, LAWS, six B-40 rockets, five 75mm RR Rds, one 82mm Mortar Base Plate, 19 57 RR Rds, one 75mm RR, two Chicom Claymore type mines, five rifle grenades, six 82mm Mortar Rds, six 81mm Mortar Rds, eight 60mm Mortar Sights, one M79 grenade launcher, seven BARS, two H60 MB (helicopter type), one 30 cal MG w/tripod, three bolt action chicom carbines, 10 UI automatic weapons, five burp guns, one chicom LMD, one AK-47, and four barrels for the AR. On 28 June Opn P-98 found the following cache: Two AK-47's, one 60mm mortar complete, two AK-50's, one RPG LMD, one AB 496 rocket launcher, four B-40 rds, one carbine, 10 mortar fuzes. On 30 June Opn P-96 with Americal units discovered a recently abandoned hospital complex with 30 to 40 structures to include surgical rooms, recovery rooms, living quarters and storage rooms.

(i) MINH LONG (A-108): On June 26 Opn P-94 made contact with a VC platoon. The operation was receiving fire from three sides when airstrikes were made on the enemy. The Americal Division assisted by sending a airmobile reaction force to exploit the contact. When the battlefield was swept they found eight VC KIA, one carbine, one M-79 grenade launcher, one M-16, one SKS, one M1 and two BAR's. The CIDG had only four WIA during this contact. Later the same afternoon the detachment commander along with Opn P-96 was wounded in action by enemy fire.

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(2) II Corps Tactical Zone (Company B). During the quarter Company B assets conducted 569 company size or larger operations, 2,486 platoon size and 8,862 squad size operations, all of which resulted in 388 contacts with the enemy. Results of the contacts were: seven USASF, three VNCF, 120 CIDG, and four RF/PF KIA; 20 USASF, eight VNCF, and 153 CIDG WIA. One USASF and 30 CIDG are missing in action. Enemy casualties were 549 KIA and 36 captured. Ten of the operations varying from one company to a battalion in size, were conducted by the 25th Mobile Strike Force Command (MSFC). The most significant contact during the quarter occurred on 7 May and extended for six days. It resulted in 136 NVA KIA, CIDG operations in II CTZ were typified by the platoon size reconnaissance mission. Contacts were made with enemy units which were, for the most part, moving out of the CTZ. In some areas contacts were made with transportation units only. During the reporting period seven camps (A-241, A-242, A-245, A-251, A-253, and A-255) were under the OPCON of CG, 4th Inf Div. for varying lengths of time. Three camps (A-221, A-222, and A-227) were under the OPCON of 173rd Abn Bde (Sep) and two camps (A-232 and A-237) were under OPCON of TF South. It should be noted that once a camp is placed under the OPCON of a FFAAF unit, the Company Commander's authority to direct operations within that particular camp's TAOR is negated. Significant contacts were as follows:

(a) HA TAY (A-227): On 7 May, a company size CSF operation from HA TAY initiated contact with a large NVA force in the 500 valley area southeast of camp HA TAY. Additional CSF companies from HA TAY, DONG TRE (A222), and Det B-22, QUI NHON were committed into the battle. Heavy contacts over a six day period resulted in 136 confirmed NVA KIA. Two separate intelligence reports indicated that at least 250 NVA were WIA. The outstanding artillery and air support received were largely responsible for the success of the operation. One important item of interest is that the newly formed MSF company had just completed an eight-week period of training and was to conduct one final field exercise when the situation dictated that they be committed directly into combat. Friendly casualties during the entire six days were: One USASF, 23 CSF, and one MSF KIA; three USASF, 39 CSF, and six MSF were wounded. Friendly casualties were heaviest during the initial stages of the fighting.

(b) FLEI ME (A-255). During the month of June, Camp FLEI ME made heavy contact with transportation units moving west to east along an infiltration route to the south of the camp. Over a period of one week contacts resulted in 14 enemy killed. The total figure was a result of both ground action and supporting fires in the form of TAC air and gunships.

(c) BUON BIECH (A-233): In June, Camp BUON BIECH, in reaction to an airstrike against an estimated enemy platoon, inserted a company-size operation to conduct

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a bomb damage assessment. Upon insertion contact with an enemy force was made. Results of the operation were three NVA KBA and eight NVA killed in ground contact.

(d) During the month of July a joint operation conducted by the 24th AF with one company from Camp MANG BUK (A-246) and one company from Camp PLATEAU GI (A-243) uncovered three large caches.

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(3) III Corps Tactical Zone (Company A). During the reporting period assets of Company A conducted 522 company size or larger operations, 1496 platoon size, and 5427 squad size operations which resulted in a total of 233 contacts. Results of the contacts were: eight USASF, three VNSF, 138 CIDG, and one RF/PF KIA; 23 USASF, 13 VNSF, 654 CIDG, and five RF/PF WIA. Thirteen CIDG are missing in action. Enemy casualties were 431 KIA and 36 captured. One of the operations conducted in May was extremely significant in that one document captured provided a wealth of intelligence. This document stated the unit designations of some 30 VC units in III CTZ. The CIDG, as in the past, were limited in fire power when engaging a unit of equal size and relied upon artillery and tactical air support for total victories. Artillery and tactical air support were outstanding during the reporting period. This gave the CIDG confidence in their capabilities to overcome many extremely large contacts. Those units that refused to move aggressively once in contact with the enemy had, at one time or another, been routed by the enemy and lacked the confidence to engage as a result. Programs have been established to retrain these units in a hope of refurbishing their confidence. Significant contacts are described in the following paragraphs:

(a) DONG XOAI, A-342: On 040530 May 68, Dong Xoai Opn C-32 discovered a well used trail, vic XU 98762. An ambush was set up 75 feet off the trail utilizing a triangular formation in which each of the sides were occupied by a platoon. Knowing that the NVA used this trail often, the operation remained in the ambush position all through the 4th of May. At approximately 051310 May, an NVA company size unit entered the claymore killing zone of the ambush and the ambush was initiated. Four NVA were immediately killed (USASF BC), and an unknown number were wounded. The enemy element withdrew northeast about 50 meters, formed a skirmish line and attempted to assault the friendly ambush position. The attack was again beaten off with five NVA KIA (USASF BC) and an unknown number WIA. During the counterattack, 105mm artillery was fired along the northern side of the trail to a distance of 100 feet from the friendly ambush position. It is believed the artillery fire inflicted considerable damage to the NVA unit who immediately withdrew from the contact area. The friendly element moved through the area picking up documents and discovered that the NVA company commander and political officer, who were among the KIA. The contact results were: One CSF WIA, 11 NVA KIA (USASF BC), six NVA WIA; one AK47 and one pistol were captured. This operation was a perfect example of a well planned and executed ambush. A good lesson was learned by all on this operation, also a great deal of confidence was gained by the CSF.

(b) BEN SOI, A-321: On 060400 May 68, Opn Ben Soi C-56 departed on its first all VNSF controlled company size operation. Ben Soi is being turned over to complete VNSF control. Since this was the first time an operation had been in heavy contact with no USASF, there were some problems encountered on obtaining combat support. At 070945 May 68, the friendly force moved into an ambush position vic XT 130390 where they were also going to practice adjusting artillery fire without the assistance of the USASF. While preparing ambush positions, the friendly force spotted 30 to 50 VC moving from northeast to southwest at a distance of 200 to 300 meters; they had two Vietnamese PW's with them. The friendly element attempted to encircle the VC force, however several other VC elements of the same approximate size were spotted moving in the same direction behind the first VC unit. It was estimated that the size of the enemy force was two rifle

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companies and one heavy weapons company. Seeing that the friendly force could not encircle the lead VC element, they opened fire on the lead element. The VC reacted very quickly, deploying their heavy weapons (three 82mm mortars and three .50 cal MGs) and assaulted the friendly position which was 112 strong. Artillery, FAC, and reinforcements were immediately requested by the friendly element. Discipline and morale of the CSF was low because the VNSF commanding the operation had been killed in the first VC counterattack. The requested artillery support was very slow in arriving and when it did arrive fell as far as 400 meters away from the desired location. A reinforcement company arrived at 1330 and at 1345 the combined force swept through the recently vacated VC positions, finding only blood trails and no bodies. Total results were: One VNSF KIA, three CSF WIA, and three carbines lost. The VNSF learned a very valuable lesson on this operation, and as a direct result, are paying close attention to their USASF advisors. They know that they soon will be conducting all operations. This is the beginning of a long, slow re-education process.

(c) Operation HET ROI: On 110700 May 68, Company A conducted Opn HET ROI, A multi-company helimobile operation in Hau Nghia Province. The area of operations was the My Thanh Dong/Rock Nune area. The mission of Opn HET ROI was to block enemy movement back into Cambodia and conduct a reconnaissance in force operation. Throughout the operation, only small contacts were made with squad size elements, which were no match for the two 300 MSF elements operating in the areas previously mentioned. Total results of the operation were: 11 enemy KIA, 13 enemy KBA, four enemy captured; one USASF KIA, one USASF WIA, 16 MSF WIA; twenty pounds of documents, one M2 carbine, one minigun, one RPG warhead, seven CBU's, and several hand grenades captured along with two sampans destroyed.

(d) Attack on NUI BA DEN: On 13 May 68, an estimated VC company attacked the radio site located on NUI BA DEN. Contrary to popular belief, NUI BA DEN was not a Special Forces camp. Four USASF, one VNSF, and six CIDG were located on this mountain which served as the radio relay point for Company A, and the 25th Infantry Division held responsibility for the defense of NUI BA DEN. The USASF contingent suffered no casualties in this attack; however they lost all communications equipment in the ensuing battle. There were 24 US KIA, 46 US WIA, two US MIA, and 7 VC KIA in this action. Company A re-established its relay facility the following day after the battle, and resumed signal operations.

(e) KATUM, A-322: On 170500 May 68, KATUM Opn C-43 moved out of camp on a reconnaissance in force operations. At 171700 May, the operation moved into its RON position and established a defensive perimeter. The RON was located at XT313-927. At 171825 May, an estimated VC company attacked the friendly CSF company from three sides with RPG's, semi automatic and automatic weapons, and LMG's. The enemy fire, though extremely intense, was ineffective due to the poor marksmanship of the VC unit. The CSF returned fire with their own organic weapons and gained superiority after ten minutes of engagement. 105mm artillery fire from

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Camp KATUM was brought to bear on the VC positions at 171850, forcing the VC to break contact. One CSF was slightly wounded; VC casualties were unknown. Knowing their position had been compromised, the operation moved 500 meters and established a new RON position. On the morning of the 18th, the operation began moving to a clearing to conduct a Medevac of the CSF wounded the previous evening. At 180800 hours, the operation observed three VC in blue uniforms and opened fire from a distance of 50 meters. The VC immediately broke contact and withdrew east. Artillery concentrations were called in by the USASF along likely withdrawal routes and the CSF continued in pursuit. At 180909 hours, the operations caught up with the VC who had been stopped by the artillery concentrations. At this time, the enemy had one squad of approximately 10 enemy (believed to be NVA) in fixed positions. The CSF deployed on line, assaulted and overran the enemy positions, killing two enemy and capturing two AK-47's. There were no friendly casualties. The operation continued with negative contact on the 18th. At 191030 hours, vic XT 336915, an NVA platoon in fortified positions and armed with semi and full automatic weapons, RPG's and at least one LMG, opened fire on the operation from 75 meters. The CSF again aggressively assaulted the enemy position, forcing them to withdraw. Tactical Air and Light Fire Team support were requested and artillery from KATUM was adjusted on the NVA positions. The contact intensified as larger NVA units moved into the battle. Reinforcements from Camp KATUM were committed and the battle continued for three hours after which the VC broke contact. Results of the contact were: five CSF KIA, eight CSF WIA. Enemy losses were: five VC KIA (USASF BC), three AK-47's, one RPG-2 launcher, one RPD-56 LMG, one Chicom gas mask and five sets of web gear captured. Many blood trails were found in the contact area.

(f) THIEN NGON, A-323: On 200600 May, Camp THIEN NGON Opn C-61 departed with 95 CSF, one VNSF and two USASF on an area search/ambush operation. The operation set up an ambush position vic XT 073833 and after approximately one hour, spotted a reinforced VC company moving north and opened fire. The VC unit immediately assaulted the friendly position, quickly overpowering the friendly unit with small arms and RPG fire. Artillery fire was brought in and the VC withdrew. The initial VC fire was extremely accurate and resulted in immediate friendly casualties. Results were: 11 CSF WIA, three CSF MIA and eight carbines missing.

(g) Attack on DUC HUE, A-351: On 010300 June, Camp DUC HUE came under a mortar and small arms attack from all sides. The camp prepared for a ground attack, however it did not materialize. A total of 70 rounds of 82mm mortar rounds fell into the camp and wire, destroying one generator and wounding five CSF. The camp returned fire with all organic weapons with unknown results. The firing ceased at 010315.

(h) TRA CU, A-352: On 031515 June, TRA CU Opn C-71, while on a search and clear operation, made contact with a VC platoon armed with heavy machineguns, vic XS 495983. Tactical Air was called in and a reinforcing company set out from TRA CU. At 1615 the CSF assaulted the VC positions and overran the area. The VC broke contact and withdrew to the northeast. Results of the contact were: one USASF KIA, one VNSF KIA, three CSF KIA and six CSF WIA. Enemy losses were: six VC

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KIA, three 12.7mm anti-aircraft machineguns, one RPG, two AK-47's and ammunition captured. One of the 12.7mm guns was brought back to TRA CU, but due to weight, the other two 12.7mm guns were destroyed in place.

(i) BUNARD, A-344: On 101650 June, BUNARD Opn C-49 made contact while on a II FFV directed operation. The purpose of the operation was to determine whether the VC were using a road complex in western PHUOC LONG Province. The VC force of approximately company size was moving south on a trail vic YU 290020 when it encountered the friendly force. The CSF immediately opened fire and called in artillery and Tactical Air. The VC rapidly broke contact and headed north. The CSF pursued for approximately 800 meters. Results of this encounter were: one CSF KIA and eight CSF WIA. VC losses were: six VC KIA, five AK-47's and one AK-50 captured.

(j) BU DOP, A-341: On 021435 July, BU DOP Opn C-47 engaged an estimated enemy reinforced platoon. The enemy initiated the contact from a distance of 50 meters with small arms fire. The enemy were wearing brown short pants and green shirts. At 021448, the enemy broke contact and withdrew to the southeast. During this contact, one CSF was WIA. Enroute to a Medevac LZ, the friendly rear security element killed a VC who was following the operation. They searched the area and killed an additional VC. Contact was finally broken at 021457. The results of this contact were: one CSF WIA, two VC KIA, one SKS and one AK-47 captured.

(k) TRANG SUP, A-301: On 130800 July, TRANG SUP Opn C-59 engaged an estimated NVA reinforced company, vic XT 201649. The friendly unit was reinforced with a CSF company from TAY NINH. The contact lasted until 131900 when the friendly element withdrew. The friendly element was assaulted by the NVA on three separate occasions, but were able to consolidate and hold their positions. The final results of the contact were: three CSF KIA, 12 CSF WIA, four MSF WIA; and 11 NVA KIA, one AK-66 was captured.

(1) BEN SOI, A-321: Ben Soi Operation C-114 was conducted jointly with TRANG SUP Opn C-64 on 31 July 1968. At approx 311120 July, these elements made contact with a VC security force. The Trang Sup element initiated contact at 50 to 100 meters and aggressively assaulted the entrenched enemy forces. The enemy base area was honey-combed with tunnels, bunkers and fighting holes, all of which were occupied by VC firing intensive RPG and heavy automatic fire. The TRANG SUP element was forced to hold their position. The BEN SOI element then mounted their assault into the base area and as the TRANG SUP element was forced to stop due to deadly enemy fire. When the rear element of the TRANG SUP unit saw the BEN SOI force stopped, they started pulling away from the contact area. In moving away, the VNSF TRANG SUP Commander was killed. Seeing this, the entire TRANG SUP force broke and ran from the contact. The enemy, seeing this, lost no time in taking advantage of the situation. They fired extremely concentrated fire on both friendly elements. Adding to the building confusion, the BEN SOI element started firing into the fleeing

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TRANG SUP unit. Tactical Air and artillery were called in by the USASF and an attempt was made to reorganize both forces. But control could not be regained. Reinforcements from camp THIEN NGON at 1700 hrs were inserted in the contacted area, and the remaining elements from both operations were linked up. Once linkup was established, a sweep of the battle area was made to rout any remaining VC and police up friendly casualties. The results of this contact were tragic; 33 CSF were KIA, one VNSF KIA, one Interpreter KIA, 34 CSF WIA, two USASF WIA, and four CSF MIA. Enemy casualties were: four VC KIA, and four VC KBA, one AK-50 and miscellaneous medical, clothing and equipment captured. This contact pointed out clearly the lack of training and discipline in these two units. Unless fire superiority is attained at first contact, the CSF loose confidence in their capability to overcome the situation and will withdraw. The only solution to this situation will be constant training and increased leadership once in heavy contact.

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(4) IV Corps Tactical Zone (Company D). During the reporting period, Company D assets conducted 1647 company size or larger operations, 8122 platoon size, and 13385 squad size operations, a total of 277 contacts were made with the following results: 8 USASF, one VNSF, 196 CIDG, and 40 RF/PF KIA; 23 USASF, five UNSF, 325 CIDG, and 183 RF/PF WIA. One VNSF and ten CIDG are missing in action. Enemy casualties were 591 KIA and 168 captured. MSF Operation "SNAKEMAN", which was initiated on 29 February terminated during the reporting period and operation NUI COTO was initiated. Significant successes continued with operation DELTA BLACKHAWK (formerly DELTA FALCON) and one of the largest caches ever discovered in RVN was recovered by camp TUYEN NHON on 28 June 1968. IV CTZ suffered a severe set back when the BA CHUC FCB out of the BA XOAI camp was overrun by the VC. This event is discussed below and in more detail at inclosures 10 and 11. The following significant contacts occurred.

(a) MY PHUOC TAY, A-411: At 060845 May, a company size element was taken under fire by estimated company of VC vicinity XS060845. The enemy was armed with automatic small arms and LMG and were firing from 200 meters North and Northwest of friendly position. Contact was maintained throughout the day until the operation terminated at 1700 hours. Friendly casualties were one CSF WIA. Enemy losses included eight VC KIA, 10 WIA. Friendly element destroyed 20 structures and 27 bunkers.

(b) MY DIEN II, A-416: On 10 May, Company D ran a multi-company operation in the AO between camps TUYEN NHON (A-415) and MY DIEN II. Friendly forces consisted of five companies of CSF and two companies of MSF. There were several contacts during the day; the major one occurred at 1030 hours. One company CSF from MY DIEN II made contact with an estimated two platoons of VC. After a 30 minute fire fight during which the friendly elements were supported by gunships, the VC broke contact in all directions. Final results were one CSF KIA, one US WIA, three CSF WIA. Enemy losses included 20 VC KIA, six VC CIA, and 26 VC KBA. MY DIEN element also captured 7 small arms. The other contacts caused additional results of one CSF KIA, one CSF WIA and five VC KIA. The operation terminated at 102030 when the last of the friendly elements were extracted.

(c) At 160945 May, four MSF companies were inserted into area vicinity coordinates WS688884 as part of DELTA FALCON Operation. They immediately made contact with unknown size VC force armed with automatic small arms. Heavy contact was maintained throughout the day until 1700 hours when the VC broke contact and withdrew south. The operation was supported by gunships throughout the day; LOH's were shot down during the fighting. Final results were 11 MSF KIA, 16 MSF and four USASF WIA. Enemy losses were seven KIA, two WIA and 5 small arms captured.

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(d) MSF and DELTA FALCON again made heavy contact at 181240 hrs vicinity WS917555. They made contact with an estimated two companies VC armed with automatic small arms, MG and 60mm mortars. The friendly element was extracted at 1900 hours; contact was maintained throughout the day until extraction. Results were two MSF KIA, six MSF WIA, and two USASF WIA. Enemy losses were 14 VC KIA, seven small arms were captured along with one PW.

(e) THANH TRI, A-414. At 200900 a multi-company size operation from Camp THANH TRI made contact with a reinforced VC company vicinity coordinates X5140965. Enemy was armed with automatic small arms. The northern friendly element attempted a flanking movement but soon found themselves in heavy contact, receiving machine gun and mortar fire. One USASF and one CSF were killed immediately. Further contacts throughout the day resulted in total losses of one USASF KIA, three CSF KIA, one Interpreter, and 10 CSF WIA. Enemy losses were unknown. The same night an unknown size VC force mortared the THANH TRI base location with 15 rounds of 82mm mortar. There were negative friendly and unknown enemy casualties.

(f) MY DIEN II, A-416. At 221235 May, one company of VC initiated contact with one company CSF vicinity coordinates X5431642. Enemy was armed with automatic small arms, MG and B-40 rockets. After a one hour fire fight, the friendly element broke contact and withdrew southwest. Results were one USASF KIA, one USASF WIA along with nine CSF KIA and seven WIA. Enemy losses were four VC KIA and one WIA.

(g) NUI COTO Operation. During the month of June, five companies of the Mobile Strike Force were committed into the VC base area on COTO Mountain in the Seven Mountains area as part of the IV Corps Tactical plan of base area denial. After 11 days of light contact, the original five companies were replaced with three more Mobile Strike Force companies. The mission of these companies is to operate as a mobile guerrilla force. Current plans call for retaining at least three companies on the mountain indefinitely.

(h) TUYEN NHON, A-415. On 1 June two Combat Reconnaissance Platoons made contact with an estimated VC battalion armed with AW, MG and mortars. The CRPs were working in an combined operation with the US 9th Division. Contact was maintained until 021400 hours when the VC withdrew. There were two CSF KIA. CSF elements making a sweep of the area confirmed seven VC KIA; they also captured weapons and equipment including one M-60 MG, one PRC-10 radio, two homemade CW transmitters, 18 small arms and assorted rocket, mortar and small arms ammo.

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(i) THANH TRI, A-414. Elements from Camp THANH TRI made contact with an estimated VC battalion vic coordinates WS989959. The company of CSF moved out at 061000 hours to aid the CAI DOI FOB which was then under attack. The VC were armed with automatic weapons, Machine Guns, mortars and rockets. At 061330 a reaction force (the 4/11th ARVN) was dispatched from MOC HOA. They made contact with another estimated VC battalion vicinity WS990938. At 061615 another reaction force was mounted from THANH TRI; they made negative contact as they moved to linkup with the original reaction force. Spooky and gunships supported the action; airstrikes were also brought in. The friendly element remained in the area that night and swept the area the following morning. Friendly losses were two USASF KIA, one VNSF KIA, four CSF KIA and five CSF WIA; they also lost eight weapons and three radios. Enemy losses were undetermined.

(j) BA XAOI, A-421: At 112015 June, One platoon CSF from camp BA XAOI was lifted into an area vicinity VS897663 while working with DELTA BLACKHAWK. They made contact with an estimated VC company armed with automatic weapons, machine guns and rockets and engaged in a three hour fire fight during which they were supported by DELTA BLACKHAWK gunships, 155 Artillery from CHI LANG and 4.2 inch mortars from BA XAOI. There were negative friendly losses; VC lost 10 KIA, 40 KBA and seven weapons, two B-40 launchers and assorted ammunition captured.

(k) At 160930 one company of MSF was inserted by DELTA BLACKHAWK into a suspected VC base area vicinity SX373738. Searching the apparently deserted camp, the MSF found seven weapons and one kilo of documents. They also destroyed a gunsmith shop with an additional seven weapons; one LMG, four boxes of tools and one box of booby traps. At 161230 they liberated 19 ARVN PWs while killing the VC guard. At this time the MSF began receiving heavy automatic weapons fire from an unknown number of VC. The friendly troops withdrew west after a 15 minute fire fight; they freed eight more PWs and were extracted at 161610 hours. Total results were one MSF KIA, two WIA, the VC lost seven KIA and 27 ARVN PWs were released.

(l) Early on the morning of the 19th, VC elements staged a coordinated attack on friendly installations in the Seven Mountains area. At 0200 hours the VC harassed the LA QUOC OP (VS926608) with 82mm mortar fire while directing 75mm RR fire at the BA XAOI base camp. But the main thrust of the attack was directed at the CSF FOB of BA CHUC where a VC force of battalion plus size launched a combined mortar and ground attack. At 0227 all contact was lost with the FOB and soon afterwards, it was overrun by the superior enemy unit. A reaction force arrived in the area early the following morning consisting of one CSF company from A-149 VINH GIA, Three companies of RF from TIENTH, and two companies of Mobile Strike Force. Results from the action of the 19th were 41 CSF KIA, eight CSF MIA, and one VNSF MIA; friendly forces also lost a B-2

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mortar, one 60 mm and one 81 mm mortar, 61 weapons and nine radios. The MSF retook the outpost the afternoon of the 20th. They remained in the area the following week and encountered only sporadic contact, mostly sniper fire from an unseen enemy. During the week MSF lost five KIA. Enemy losses were again unknown.

(m) OPN TRIPLE TREAT: A Company D multi-company operation in the area between CAI CAI and BINH THUAN THON along the Cambodian border during the last week of June. It commenced at 0840 hours on the 25th with the helicopter insertion of one company of MSF. Also participating were one company of CSF from CAI CAI and one company of CSF from BINH THUAN THON. There were three contacts during the first week, the most significant occurring at 252120 when an estimated reinforced VC Company at BT690008 took the MS element under fire. The VC were firing from three sides of the friendly element and were armed with automatic weapons, rockets and mortars. Spooky and gunships supported the MSF during the 35 minute fire fight after which the VC broke contact and withdrew. Results were one MSF KIA, two MIA; enemy losses included five VC KIA, one AK-47 captured.

(n) DELTA BLACKWALK Operation: At 271030 June 1968, one company MSF was inserted into area vicinity VS0036 in conjunction with a DELTA BLACKWALK operation. They immediately made contact with an estimated reinforced VC company. The enemy was armed with automatic weapons, machine guns, rockets and mortars. After 29 minutes of heavy fighting it appeared that the VC were reinforcing to battalion strength. At 1135 hours one additional MSF Company was inserted. Contact continued and at 1400 hours the 4/11th ARVN was also committed. In the early evening three companies CSF from KINH QUAN II (A-412) were also committed. Spooky and gunships supported the engagement along with six airstrikes. Contact was broken late on the 27th; elements remained in the area for security and to recover the bodies the following morning. Total results were two USASF KIA, four USASF MIA, eight MSF MIA. VC losses were six KIA and three weapons captured. Friendly elements were extracted at 281100.

(o) TUYEN NHON, A-415: At 281400 hours, two companies of CSF and one CRP were inserted into a suspected cache site vicinity XS2593. The CSF discovered three caches in the area containing an extensive amount of weapons and equipment. It included over 300 small arms, 60 and 82mm mortars, recoilless rifles, 300,000 rounds AK-47 ammo and tons of machinery, including a metal lathe. Friendly units remained in the area that night as security for the equipment which was not extracted that day. The following morning an additional cache was found in the same general area. There was negative contact throughout the period.

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(p) On 1 July 1968, two platoons of CSF, and three USASF were inserted in conjunction with a DELTA BLACKHAWK operation. Upon insertion the CSF element initiated contact with an estimated 200 VC armed with 57mm RR, machine guns, and small arms. After a 30 minute fire fight, the VC broke contact and withdrew in an unknown direction. Total results of this action were, negative friendly casualties; enemy: one VC KIA, two VC KBA; two 57mm RR, 160 9mm pistols, six RPG-7 rounds, 148 57RR rounds, four AP mines, two AK-47 drum magazines, 42 cases of AK-47 ammo, four 57mm RR tripods, six cases first aid packets, eight cases of medical supplies, 55 82mm mortar rounds, 84 B-40 rockets, 56 60 mortar rounds, two field telephones, 50lbs documents, and 17,000 assorted small arms rounds were captured. Destroyed were 29 sampans and 600 lbs of rice.

(q) On 6 July, 1 platoon of CSF from Detachment A-421 initiated contact with a company of VC armed with machine guns, automatic weapons, and small arms. After a 1 hour fire fight the enemy broke contact and withdrew leaving miscellaneous personnel equipment and clothing.

(r) On 17 July, 2 companies of MSF on a recon in force operation were ambushed by an unknown number of VC. Enemy was armed with small arms, automatic weapons, B-40 rockets and mortars. Contact ranged from sporadic to heavy throughout the day. Total results of this operation were; 4 USASF WIA, 5 MSF KIA, 19 MSF and 1 VNSF WIA, 2 MSF MIA. Enemy losses were 3 VC KIA.

(5) Special Operations.

(a) OPERATION SAMURAI V (Det B-52, PROJECT DELTA): Operation SAMURAI V was conducted in the I CTZ during the period 19 April through 20 May 1968, in an AO bordered by the THUA THIEN and QUANG NHAI provinces. The detachment was OPCON to CG, III MAF, Danang. During this period PROJECT DELTA employed the following elements:

RECONNAISSANCE TEAMS:	18
CIDG ROADRUNNER TEAMS:	14
RANGER COMPANIES:	2
MOBILE STRIKE FORCE COMPANIES:	1
CIDG NUNG BDA PLATOONS:	2

The total friendly losses for this operation consisted of one KIA, six WIA, six MIA. the total number of enemy losses during the operation are: 10 KIA, 15 KBA, two WIA, and two CIA.

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(b) OPERATION RAPIDFIRE IX (Det B-36): From 03 May to 23 May 68, RAPIDFIRE IX was conducted in HAU NGHIA Province. The mission was to conduct border surveillance and interdiction operations; the underlying mission was to locate VC units moving back towards Cambodia from Saigon. To accomplish this mission, the following elements were used:

Platoon size patrols of three USASF and 40 MSF.

Ambush patrols of three USASF and 11 MSF.

Recon/Ambush patrols consisting of three USASF and three MSF.

Thirty-four of the above listed missions were conducted with the following results: 15 VC KIA, three VC captured; two USASF WIA, one MSF KIA, six MSF WIA; 14 AK-47's, four M-1 carbines; one .45 cal pistol, two VC one-time crypto pads, one SKS rifle, one grenade launcher and five lbs of documents were captured; four sampans and 500 lbs of rice were destroyed.

(c) OPERATION TOAN THANG (Det B-36): On 31 May 68, eight companies of MSF were moved to TAY NINH Province to begin Operation TOAN THANG. The purpose of this operation was to relieve enemy pressure on the camp at KATUM, A-322. The operation was conducted by four MSF companies moving west out of camp TONG LE CHON and two MSF companies moving north from FSB St Barbara. On 021108 June, two MSF companies made contact with an unknown size VC force vic XT522895 set up in an ambush position. The VC force triggered the ambush with small arms and RPGs. The friendly force immediately counterattacked and the VC withdrew north. The results of this contact were: Five MSF KIA, 26 MSF WIA, one USASF WIA. Enemy losses were: Seven VC KIA and six weapons captured. On 021900 June, an ambush patrol from the Mobile Strike Command (MSFC) initiated contact with the point element of a VC company vic XT 506903 as the VC element walked into the ambush. Results were: 10 VC KIA, one SKS and one mortar captured. There were no friendly losses. On 050730 June, two MSF companies made contact with two platoons of VC in defensive positions vic XT 495863. The VC opened fire on the MSF as they were approaching the VC positions. The MSF element held fast and called in 155mm artillery fire from TONG LE CHON. As soon as the fires lifted, the friendly element assaulted. The VC broke contact and fled north. Results of the contact included 16 MSF WIA. Enemy losses were five VC KIA. On 051405 June, two MSF companies were moving to link up with two other MSF companies in the Fishhook area. An enemy base camp was located vic XT 489865 and Tac Air and 155 mm artillery were called in. As soon as the supporting fires lifted, the MSF companies assaulted the base camp area. The VC were well dug in and returned a heavy volume of fire before breaking contact and

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withdrawing north and east. Results of this contact included eight MSF KIA and 11 MSF WIA. Three VC were KIA and the base camp complex partially destroyed. On 120915 June, an ambush patrol from the MSFC vic XT 234772 while in an ambush position along a north/south trail initiated a contact on a VC squad moving south. Results were: Three VC KIA and two VC captured with no friendly losses. On 171235 June, vic XT 374934 two companies of MSF, on a sweeping operation to find VC mortar positions used against KATUM, came upon a VC platoon in fortified positions. 105mm and 155mm howitzers from Camp KATUM fired in support and a Light fire team arrived overhead. With heavy fire support, the MSF assaulted the VC positions, killing seven VC and capturing numerous documents. One MSF was KIA and four MSF were WIA. Operation TOAN THANG lasted from 30 May to 20 June 68. Throughout this operation, there were many small contacts and skirmishes. The operation was only partially successful in its avowed purpose, that of lessening the enemy pressure on KATUM. The operation did, however, put pressure on the VC elements in the area and caused them to realize they were not as secure as they were prior to the MSFC arrival. The total results of this operation are as follows: two USASF KIA, four USASF WIA, one VNSF WIA, 25 MSF KIA, 168 MSF WIA, two MSF MIA and one CAR-15 lost. Enemy casualties were: 66 VC KIA, 42 VC KBA, one VC WIA and two VC captured. Five AK-47s, three AK-50s, three SKSs, one RPG, one 60mm mortar, four bicycles and 4,000 lbs of rice were captured. Two bicycles were destroyed.

(d) On 6 June 1968, three companies of the 81st Airborne Ranger Battalion with PROJECT DELTA Ranger Advisors and Medical Personnel, along with the Vietnamese Delta Training Command, received orders to move to Saigon in support of the Capital Military District (CMD). On 7 June 1968, the 81st Abn Ranger Bn received orders to conduct a search and clear mission in the northern section of Saigon. The Vietnamese DELTA training command returned to Nha Trang, on 28 June 68. The 81st Abn Ranger Bn, PROJECT DELTA Ranger Advisors and Medical Personnel still remained in the Saigon Area. On 8 July 1968, the Vietnamese Delta Training Command returned to the Saigon area of operations. Since 6 June 1968 through the end of this reporting period, Project DELTA elements in Saigon participated in 109 Company Day Operations. In June, the 81st Abn Ranger Bn operated in the northern section of Saigon and in the GIA DINH area. The Bn was in contact almost continuously, attacking against well dug in enemy positions and receiving heavy enemy rocket fire, mortar fire, SA/AW, and sniper harassment. The 81st Abn Ranger Bn was credited with 145 enemy soldiers killed (USASF confirmed) and capturing eight POW's; five B-40 rocket launchers with 10 rounds of ammunition, one .45 cal pistol and eight AK-47 rifles were captured by the Ranger Bn. In addition, they forced the surrender of 132 NVA, the largest mass surrender in the history of the war. During the month of July, the 81st Abn Ranger Bn operations consisted mostly of search and clear missions within

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the area surrounding Saigon. A total of 11 friendly initiated contacts were reported, resulting in enemy losses of one KIA, one WIA, three CIA and five detainees. A cumulative of enemy losses inflicted by the 81st Abn Ranger Bn to date is 146 KIA, three WIA, 11 CIA, and five detainees, while friendly losses total 23 KIA, 116 WIA.

(e) OPERATION TOAN THANG II (Det B-36): In mid June, Company A was directed by CG, II FFORCEV to conduct an operation in the TAORs of camp LONG XOAI and camp CHI LINH to interdict enemy movement south into War Zone "D". The operation using CSF from both camps and one battalion of the 36th MSFC, began on 23 June with a heliborne assault. On 240645, vic YT 008788 the DONG XOAI element made contact with a VC squad. The VC withdrew northeast and linked up with an estimated two VC companies. Tac Air was called in and VC broke contact and moved out to the east. Results were two CSF WIA and four VC KIA. The DONG XOAI element continued to follow the VC element and at vic YT 008782, assaulted the enemy rear guard element, killing four additional VC. On 251045 June, the MSF element was ambushed by an unknown size VC element. The VC triggered the ambush too soon and the MSF counterattacked, forcing the VC to flee to the southeast. Results were four VC KIA and two AK-50 captured. There were negative friendly casualties. On 300830 June, the DONG XOAI element again made contact with a VC squad vic XT 969666. VC initiated the contact from a distance of 50 meters, but immediately broke contact due to CSF fire superiority and withdrew east. Results included one USASF WIA, two VNSF WIA, two CSF KIA and one CSF WIA. Enemy losses were two VC KIA and three VC WIA.

(f) OPERATION TOAN THANG III (Det B-36): On 040600 July Phase III of Opn TOAN THANG was initiated by three companies from the 36th MSFC combined with CSF companies from CHI LINH and DONG XOAI. The mission was to execute a combined foot-airmobile operation on 040600 July 1968 from camps CHI LINH and DON XOAI to conduct reconnaissance in force operations north and south of Highway 13 and east and west along Highway 13. They had learned through intelligence sources that enemy base camps were located in that area. The only significant encounter with the enemy was made on 061210 July when the CHI LINH Camp Strike Force element engaged an estimated two companies of VC, vicinity of XT 971712. The CSF initiated the contact from a distance of 15 meters, immediately destroying seven motorbikes loaded with ten 100 lb bags of rice. It was noted that several motorbikes had light machineguns mounted on the handlebars (none were captured). The VC broke contact immediately and withdrew in an unknown direction. A FAC directed airstrikes and artillery onto the enemy positions. The final results of the contact were negative friendly casualties and two VC KIA.

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(g) On 121030 July, 362d and 363d battalions of the 36th Mobile Strike Force began "CHINA BOY I". The CG, II FFORCEV directed the 36th MSFC to conduct reconnaissance in force operations in Camp BEN SOI, TAOR.. At the same time, the 36th MSFC Reconnaissance Company was to conduct long-range reconnaissance missions in the same area. The only significant contact was made on 151840 when an estimated NVA company assaulted the RON position of four MSF companies. The contact continued through the night with artillery, LFT's, Tac Air, and Super Spooky being used for support. The NVA reinforced their element with additional troops and placed fire (82mm mortar, automatic weapons and RPGs) on the friendly positions until 161030 when the contact was broken. The friendly losses were two MSF KIA and 47 MSF WIA (most were minor fragment wounds). Enemy losses were 52 VC KBA (USASF BC). Captured were one 7.62 MG, four 4 AK-50, one AK-47, four RPD, four RPG-2, 18 B-40 rocket rounds, six RPG-7 rounds, seven rds 61mm mortar, 10 RPD ammo drums, two rifle grenades, 18 hand grenades, three cans 7.62 ammo, medical supplies and documents. It is believed that the enemy had expected to encounter a routine CSF operation, using a minimum of force, therefore over committed his position and suffered heavy casualties.

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d. Plans and Organization.

(1) Long-range Plans/Concepts.

(a) A comprehensive study entitled "The Concept of Operations for the Role of Special Forces in RVN" was published by this headquarters on 13 April 1968 and submitted to MACV for approval in late April. The purpose of this study was to analyze the present conflict as it relates to the CIDG program and to present recommendations for changes in the concept of operations. The study evaluated past and present programs, problems, future concepts and possible post hostilities activities. The primary proposals made in the study concerned the Camp Strike Force (CSF) and Mobile Strike Force (MSF).

(b) At the same time this study was presented to MACV, a MOT&E was submitted to USARV to support the planned concept and realignment of CIDG/VNSF/USASF forces. This MTO&E is discussed in more detail in paragraph 1d(6) below.

(c) With the exception of recommendations pertaining to reorganization of the mobile strike force, the major proposals in the study were disapproved. The Mobile Strike Force Command (MSFC) was accepted enthusiastically; however, the reorganization had to be accomplished with the currently authorized personnel assets. Therefore, the MTO&E was disapproved by USARV. No indication was given as to when or if additional personnel would be available.

(2) Current Plans/Concepts.

(a) On 1 August 1968, this headquarters submitted to MACV a concept of operations concerning the use of assets within 5th SFGA to achieve overall objectives through CY 69. Once approved, this letter will be used as a basis for Annex K to Combined Campaign Plan AB-144. This plan is produced annually in bilingual form by MACV/JGS and assigns concepts and missions to the 5th SFGA for the calendar year. The concept submitted for CY 69 was generally an extension of plans outlined in AB-143. However, one obvious difference was the exclusion of specific plans related to new camps, camp conversions, camp transfers, and other proposals which can change according to the situation. Past experiences with AB-143 have indicated that detailed planning in country-wide combined campaign planning is not feasible. Too often conventional commanders have persisted in pursuing plans which were outdated and in need of revision in light of the current situation; therefore, the concept letter for CY 69 was directed at the broad, general concept of operations.

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(b) On 22 June, COMUSMACV directed that no further quarterly reviews would be required on Annex K to AB-1143, the Combined Campaign Plan for CY 68. All plans for new camps were disapproved and directives were given to increase emphasis on mobile strike force operations.

(3) General 5th SFGA Plans for CY 69.

- (a) Open seven (7) new camps.
- (b) Open two (2) mission support sites.
- (c) Close or convert nine (9) camps to RF/PF.
- (d) Transfer three (3) camps to VNSF control.

(e) These plans are based on the current situation and are naturally subject to change. As the 1st quarter CY 69 approaches, this headquarters will publish a plan to implement one or more of those actions listed above or will substitute more appropriate courses of action as the situation dictates.

(4) CIDG Force Structure.

(a) As mentioned in paragraph 1d(1)(c) above, the reorganization of the MSF was approved and 5th SFGA immediately adopted a phased program of reorganization to establish Mobile Strike Force Commands (MSFC) in each CTZ and a country-wide reserve based at the SFCB in Nha Trang. The organization of the MSF Rifle, Reconnaissance and HQ and Service Companies, and missions assigned these units is reflected in inclosure 12.

(b) In order to provide personnel to expand the MSF, it was necessary to realign the force structure and the unit authorizations in each CTZ. This realignment was accomplished by shifting Camp Strike Force (CSF) spaces over to MSF spaces. This trade off was at a ratio of 1.9 CSF to 1 MSF. The reduction in CSF spaces did not adversely affect the operations of the CIDG camps as strengths previously authorized were never used or required.

(c) Organization of the MSFC is progressing steadily and requests for additional MSF Battalions in I and II CTZ were submitted and approved. It is envisioned that further expansion will be in order for late CY 69. The current organization and indigenous strengths are depicted below.

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<u>CTZ</u>	<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
(I CTZ)	(16th MSFC)	-	----
	MSF Bn	2	1104
	Recon Co	1	135
	HQ and Svc Co	1	<u>224</u>
	Total		1463
(II CTZ)	(27th MSFC)		
	MSF Bn	5	2760
	Recon Co	1	135
	HQ and Svc Co	1	<u>224</u>
	Total		3119
(III CTZ)	(36th MSFC)	-	----
	MSF Bn	3	1656
	Recon Co	1	135
	HQ and Svc Co	1	<u>224</u>
	Total		2015
(IV CTZ)	(40th MSFC)	-	----
	MSF Bn	3	1656
	Recon Co	1	135
	HQ and Svc Co	1	224
	Airboat Co	1	<u>184</u>
	Total		2199

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<u>CTZ</u>	<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>
(SFOB Nha Trang)			
	55th MSFC	-	----
	MSF Bn	2	1104
	HQ and Svc Co	1	326

	Total		1430

(5) VNSF Force Structure.

(a) Little has been accomplished in changing the VNSF Force structure. A new MTO&E was submitted to JGS in June. This MTO&E included an addition of a Deputy Commander's section. Space increases of 479 are planned for CY 1969. This increase will include a HQ and Svc Co, and a sixth rifle company for the 81st Abn Ranger Battalion of Project Delta.

(b) The VNSF B Detachment at Chau Doc has been projected for close-out on 1 August 1968 and will move to CAN THO as the counterpart of B-40 Mobile Strike Force Command.

(c) The VNSF B Detachment (B-17) at DUC HOA is scheduled for closure and relocation to II CTZ as the counterpart to B-20 Mobile Strike Force Command.

(d) One camp, BEN SOI, was transferred to complete VNSF control during this reporting period. Progress of the camp has been satisfactory, however, lack of qualified VNSF continues to be the main obstacle to further advances in this program.

(6) USASF Force Structure.

(a) In May 1968, HQ 5th SFGA submitted an adjusted MTOE. This MTOE would have expanded the total strength of the 5th SFGA by 1202 spaces. It called for an increase at "C" and "B" Detachment level as well as at Group Headquarters. This MTOE was disapproved by HQ USARV because of troop ceilings imposed by DA. Present plans call for a stringent manpower survey to be made of the entire Group with the idea of reducing the strength by 100 spaces and achieving a

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better utilization of personnel assets. The Forward Supply Points, CIDG Hospitals, and the Command Liaison Detachment are especially in critical need of additional personnel. In that these activities are not authorized under the MTOE, there is no basis to requisition personnel for these slots.

(b) During the reporting period, three new "B" Detachments (B-16, B-20, and B-40) were organized to become command and control elements for the Mobile Strike Force Commands. The B-55 designation was removed from Saigon and re-established in Nha Trang in place of A-50² as the C&C elements of the 55th Mobile Strike Force Command. The Saigon Detachment was redesignated the Command Liaison Detachment. Detachment B-44 was converted to RF/PF and personnel assets were absorbed into the C detachment for utilization in the Mobile Strike Force Command B detachment. Detachments B-35 and B-42 are scheduled for closure on 19 Sep 68 and 1 Aug 68 respectively.

(7) I Corps Tactical Zone (Company C).

(a) Current Plans include emphasis on four areas: (1) Refresher training in marksmanship and small unit patrolling techniques; (2) increased ambush patrols, since the tactical situation calls for saturation patrolling, and more recon-ambush patrols; (3) briefings and debriefings, to include the use of sandtables and more complete debriefing reports (purpose: to better document intelligence gathered and to better acquaint CIDG with operation plans); (4) contingency plans.

(b) Contingency Plans. CG, III MAF has tasked three of its subordinate units to prepare and rehearse contingency plans for the reinforcement of CIDG camps under immediate threat of attack. Units and camps for which they are responsible are as follows:

AMERICAL DIVISION:	A-102 TIEN PHUOC
	A-103 GIA VUC
	A-104 HA THANH
	A-106 BA TO
	A-107 TRA BONG
	A-108 MINH LONG

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FIRST MARINE DIVISION: A-105 NONG SON

A-109 THUONG DUC

THIRD MARINE DIVISION: A-101 MAI LOC

Detailed Operation Orders have been prepared by each Division and rehearsals are presently being conducted. Americal rehearsals are preceded by two days of messages between units concerned which indicate the enemy build-up, deploy the Mobile Strike Force and finally request relief by the Division. This not only adds realism to the rehearsal, but also checks procedures and times. Two infantry companies and an artillery battery remain in the TAOR running joint operations with CIDG for periods of 48 to 72 hours. After action reports on each rehearsal are prepared and filed with operation orders. The degree of effort and enthusiasm so far displayed by these Divisions has been outstanding.

(c) Long-Range Plans include the conversion of one camp to VNSF control during CY 1969. This conversion had been planned for CY 1968 but the Tet and May offensive together with the loss of camp Kham Duc prevented it. It has been recommended by VNSF that two American advisors remain with this camp to coordinate joint activities with FMMF due to the frequency of joint operations with those forces.

(d) CIDG force structure will remain unchanged, except for increases resulting from opening new camps and bringing present CIDG companies up to strength. VNSF and USASF force structure will remain unchanged except for increases occasioned by added MSF Bn for CY 69.

(8) II Corps Tactical Zone (Company B).

(a) Current Plans. Current plans call for emphasis on small unit reconnaissance operations and increased surveillance of known base areas and infiltration routes.

(b) Long-Range Plans. Plans call for closing or converting six camps to RF/PF and relocation of one detachment to a border area.

(9) III Corps Tactical Zone (Company A).

(a) Current Plans/Concepts. During this reporting period, the plan for utilization of CIDG forces in III CTZ was to react to intelligence of large scale infiltration from Cambodia into the III CTZ. The CG, II FFV (OPCON

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Headquarters), using the 36th MSFC, directed operations in northern TAY NINH Province, northern and eastern PHUOC LONG Province, and western HAU NGHIA Province. In all of these large operations, the mission of locating VC infiltration routes and capturing prisoners/documents were the main concept. The A detachments intensified their border operations, H&I fires increased, "Arclight" and "Sky Spot" strikes were tripled all along the main border infiltration routes. A "Super Spooky" (C-130 with mini-guns, machineguns, rockets) was assigned to Co A to be utilized at night to detect and engage infiltration targets. This aircraft was extremely successful.

(b) Long-Range Plans/Concepts. The tactical plans and concepts remain the same. Additional emphasis is to be placed on training. Sniper training (14-day course) and "Quick-Kill" training will be stressed for all CIDG in II CTZ. It is envisioned that every CIDG in the II CTZ will attend these two courses as well as refresher training at TRANG SUP, the II CTZ Training Center. It is hoped that the M-16 rifle will be in the hands of all the MSF. This alone will influence many future plans/concepts.

(c) Organization/Force Development. The organization of Co A remains constant except that the 36th MSFC was recently organized into a Mobile Strike Force Command.

(10) IV Corps Tactical Zone (Company D). There were no significant planning activities or changes in organization which occurred in Company D except the reorganization of the MSF into the 40th MSFC.

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e. Training.

(1) General. The highlight of this reporting period was the command and staff emphasis the VNSF have placed on training. Through their willingness to go all out on training, we were able to draw up a standardized Program of Instruction for MSF/CSF refresher training and on-site training programs. In addition, plans are underway to form four Mobile Training Teams composed of one American and one Vietnamese officer and two non-commissioned officers. These teams will have the mission of going to each CTZ and giving on-site training to MSF company sized units. All personnel in the grade of Captain and below, excluding Sergeant Major E9, are required to attend the Combat Orientation Course (COC) at the SFOB. Approximately 10% of the personnel reporting to the SFOB have had previous tours in Vietnam. Another 10% are non-airborne qualified and over 20% are not prefix "3" or suffix "S" qualified. Because of this situation we have expanded our POI for the COC. The greatest deficiency in training continues to be the inability to read a map. Over 15% of the students fail the map test. A program which will provide for remedial training and re-testing is being developed. Another difficulty we have encountered is lack of knowledge and experience in patrolling. The patrolling training program being conducted on HON TRE ISLAND is expected to remedy this situation. At the S3 training conference held at the SFOB in July, the company S3's were asked to comment on the training given the replacements before they report to their units. All comments were favorable.

(2) I Corps Tactical Zone (Company C).

(a) The training program in I Corps is in a state of flux. The loss of our training center and components at Kham Duc on May 12 has required us to establish a new corps training center and new training program. Three general courses of action were available after the evacuation of Camp Kham Duc: (1) establish the new training center at a location separate from our present camps, (2) establish the center in Danang, and (3) establish the center in conjunction with one of our established camps. The latter course of action was chosen. Presently the new I Corps training center is being established at Camp Ha Thanh.

(b) The training center at Camp Ha Thanh is presently under construction on a hill adjacent to the camp. When completed, the camp and the training center will be mutually supporting. The center is being constructed by the Sea Bees, Camp HA THANH personnel and the recruits themselves. It is estimated the center is 40% completed. Temporary quarters, a small arms range, individual fighting positions and bunkers have been completed. Construction is continuing or will soon start on permanent sleeping, mess and medical facilities, an infiltration course, an obstacle course, and a recoilless rifle range.

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(c) The present training program is the pilot program. Although the training center has nine of the authorized training cadre from camp KHAM DUC, they are starting from scratch. All previous training aids were lost at Camp KHAM DUC. New training aids are being requisitioned from the training aids center located here in DANANG. Changes in the training program will be made as necessary.

(d) The present training cycle of 150 recruits began on 15 July and is scheduled to end on 9 September. The present eight week course consists of 397 hours of instruction; 103½ hours General Subjects, 116 hours Weapons Training and 177- hours of tactics including a 50 hour FTX. A second training cycle is scheduled to start in the near future dependent on the status of the training facilities.

(e) Each camp now has a system of retraining of CSF and CRP personnel but it is not a uniform program throughout I Corps. I Corps is attempting to establish a standardized retraining program for the Corps consistent with the tactical situation. The training program will consist of two one week training period based upon the training listed in the A Detachment Handbook.

(3) II Corps Tactical Zone (Company B).

(a) At the present time CIDG training is conducted in the camp areas except for CRP training. New recruits receive a basic six week training course; veterans who are recruited receive a two week refresher course. Mobile Strike Force recruits receive six weeks basic and one week of airborne training. As a result of the increased emphasis on training, indications are that CIDG personnel are more confident in their abilities when in contact with enemy forces and are more willing to maintain contact once established.

(b) The inclusion of "quick kill" into the MSFC training program during a test phase proved an invaluable aid in more effective marksmanship training. Full implementation of training according to the MSFC POI began in June. The company which received the training has not been evaluated in combat. It has participated in operations, but failed to make contact.

(4) III Corps Tactical Zone (Company A).

(a) The III Corps Tactical Zone Training Center maintains 350-500 CIDG in training at the Center at all times. The basic training lasts six weeks, with a four week refresher training course being conducted for the units displaying poor tactics during actual field combat. A major area of concern has been the procurement of bi-lateral training aids, i.e., text books.

(b) The overall level of training knowledge retained by the CIDG is very limited. This retainability is directly proportional to their desire and often leaves a lot to be desired. The VNSF training level is below par, particularly in the leadership field. This is very apparent when applied to leading multi-ethnic CIDG

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personnel. Only time and patience will overcome this problem. The USASF training level has decreased with the new influx of junior enlisted and officer material. This lack of sufficiently trained USASF personnel has hindered to some degree the overall quality of the detachments, but not to the point of diminishing returns.

(5) IV Corps Tactical Zone (Company D).

(a) CIDG Training Status. Due to an intensive recruiting program a majority of the CIDG personnel in IV Corps are untrained or partially trained. The training center at TO CHAU has prepared a program of instruction where the companies will be trained on a rotating basis.

(6) MACV Recondo School. The MACV Recondo School is tasked with the dual mission of training selected FVNAF personnel in the techniques of long-range reconnaissance and conducting an orientation course for incoming personnel assigned to the 5th Special Forces Group (Abn).

(a) Status of Personnel Training. The selection criteria for Recondo students is outlined in USARV Regulation 350-2 and requires all students to be volunteers, to have been assigned in country for at least one month, to have at least three months retainability, to be programmed for assignment to a long-range reconnaissance unit, and have a combat arms MOS. It has been found that many of the students are not volunteers and lack sufficient knowledge in general military subjects. Map reading accounts for the largest percentage of failures and is directly attributable to a lack of experience and prior training. Incoming personnel assigned to the 5th SFGA represent a broad spectrum of experience and ability. Company grade officers and enlisted personnel E-8 and below who have not recently completed a tour of duty in the Republic of Vietnam are required to attend a nine day course of instruction. Student backgrounds include in-country transfers to Special Forces, recent graduates of the Unconventional Warfare School at Fort Bragg, non-airborne Special Forces qualified personnel assigned to support activities, and combat tested veterans. Although some have attended pre-deployment orientation courses, their progress is generally on a par with the others in both physical and academic areas.

(b) Recondo Training Program. Recondo training consists of ~~286~~ 286 1/2 hours of instruction taught over a three week period. Classes normally consist of 65 students and are scheduled with an overlap so that a class commences and another graduates every two weeks. The instruction is designed to qualify personnel as long-range reconnaissance team leaders and team members. Students are responsible for learning the duties of all members of the team. Students are formed into six man teams and are continually observed by a cadre team advisor. The first week consists of academic subjects while the second week is spent on a field training exercise practicing the newly acquired skills. The final week consists of deployment on an actual combat operation under the scrutiny of the team advisor. Six man teams are inserted by utilizing rubber boats, stay behind and helicopters, with the latter being the most utilized and preferred method.

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(c) Replacement Training Program. The Combat Orientation Course (COC) consists of a nine day program designed to orient, familiarize and acclimate incoming Special Forces personnel. The first six days are spent in the classroom on subjects which are felt to be of immediate value or of operational necessity. Personnel are updated on the nature of the conflict and changes in strategy and techniques. The final three days consist of a combination field training exercise and combat operation.

(d) Methods and Techniques. Recondo students are formed and trained as six man teams. Map reading, alertness, attention to detail, discipline, physical training and lessons learned are stressed throughout the course. Employment techniques consist mainly of utilizing helicopters for team insertion and support. All activity and training is centered around the team concept as they engage in such exercises as jungle lane firing, immediate action drill, instinct firing and patrolling. The COC student is processed and assigned as an integral part of the course of instruction. Advisor and counterpart relationships are continually stressed. Lessons learned are included in all classes and are continually reviewed as well as being made available to students.

(e) Cadre Strengths. The Recondo School is allocated personnel as outlined in TDA P5-WA4X1Q-00 and consists of five officers and forty-one enlisted personnel. With the assignment of the additional mission of conducting a orientation course, two officers and ten enlisted personnel were authorized VOCO 5th SFGA for an aggregate of seven officers and fifty-one enlisted. Presently assigned are seven officers and fifty-four enlisted personnel.

(f) Major Problems. COC students were initially programmed to participate in a combat operation which would terminate the course of instruction. The increased input of student personnel and the inability of supporting units to profitably employ the students, resulted in a back log of personnel and adverse comments on critique sheets. Recondo students were losing valuable training time in movement to outlying areas during their second week. Commanding Officer, 5th SFGA requested that a survival training area be constructed but real estate was unavailable within the local area. The island of HON LON/HON TRE was established as a training site and has resulted in a series of highly successful training experiments. Facilities being constructed include jungle firing lanes, instinct firing, land navigation course, M-79 range, grenade range, zero range, mortar and TAC air adjustment training areas, and survival training displays. Travel time was reduced, training time was increased due to rescheduling and a more effective and realistic program has been initiated.

(g) Results of Training Programs. Recondo Totals: Graduated 197, Students entered 354, certificate of attendance nine. COC Totals: Entered 675, Graduated 507, unsatisfactory 168.

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(7) VNSF Training Center (Detachment B-51). During the reporting period, this detachment continued to successfully fulfill its principal mission of advising and assisting the VNSF training center in training both VNSF and CIDG personnel.

(a) Programs and Results. Nine of the thirteen courses of instruction available at the training center were in session during this quarter. Courses conducted and results were as follows:

COURSE NO	COURSE	COMMENCED	GRADUATED	NO STUDENTS
12	VNSF Off & NCO Basic	18Apr68	17Jul68	84
4	VNSF Radio Operator	20Nov67	25May68	21
3	VNSF Basic Airborne	2May68	22May68	122
4	VNSF Basic Airborne	17Jun68	10Jul68	100
30	CIDG Leadership	18Apr68	22May68	93
31	CIDG Leadership	3Jun68	9Jul68	91
32	CIDG Leadership	15Jul68	-	91
28	CRP	4Apr68	9May68	212
29	CRP	21May68	25Jun68	134
30	CRP	26Jun68	31Jul68	217
5	MSF Basic Airborne	28May68	8Jun68	131
6	MSF Basic Airborne	12Jul68	20Jul68	192
11	US Basic Airborne	17Jun68	30Jun68	27
3	Tae Kwon Do (Karate)	19Feb68	27Jul68	21
Special Course	MSF Refresher	29Jul68	-	115

(b) Advisory Efforts. Advisory and assistance efforts were concentrated in the areas of improving effectiveness of instruction and adequacy of training facilities, respectively. Concerning the improvement of instruction, joint meetings continued to be held between VNSF Instructional Committee Chiefs and their USASF advisor counterparts to discuss problem areas and to project and place a priority on all future requirements. Such meetings, coupled with daily contact of advisors with their respective committees, are extremely effective in insuring continued progress in instructional effectiveness. Furthermore, visits of instructor personnel along with their USASF advisors to other Vietnamese training centers, such as that at DUC MY, help broaden thought in such areas as training apparatus, facilities, procedures, and training aids.

(c) Results of many joint meetings and visits realized during the reporting period include the initiation of Quick Kill instruction to all CRP, CIDG Leadership, and VNSF Basic Course students, and also the initiation of a major training aids acquisition program. Under this program all committee chiefs and advisors have made a concerted effort to determine all present requirements for training aids in their respective areas of instruction. All

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required training aids that are not provided by the II Corps Training Aids construction and storage area, which recently agreed to support the training center, will be requested of the training aid construction and storage facility of the 1st Special Forces Group during a visit to Okinawa to be made soon.

(d) Translation of all CRP Course and CIDG Leadership Course lesson plans into English is now 65% complete, and are a considerable aid to USASF advisors in rendering suggestions to improve on material now being taught. In an effort to surmount a major language problem caused by a mixture of Vietnamese and various Montagnard troops that attend these two courses, the 30th CRP Course was divided into sections, Vietnamese and Montagnard, with separate but identical instructions given to each on a trial basis. This method proved to be a satisfactory, though not a completely effective interim course of action while the training center awaits the assignment of twelve Montagnard instructors scheduled to take over all instruction given to Montagnard troops.

(e) Improvement of Training Facilities. The following projects were completed during the reporting period.

A new cable tightening system was devised and installed for the eight cables of the 34 foot jump tower.

Firing lanes and a new training aids storage facility were installed on the demolitions range.

A 36' rappelling tower with a modification which allows helicopter rappelling training was constructed.

(f) Problems. Major problems that continue to hinder effective training include the lack of experienced VNSF instructor personnel and the lack of adequate MAP funding to support the VNSF effort. A strong and fresh command emphasis on this training center's activities has been realized during the reporting period. This added emphasis by both USAF and VNSF commanders has caused a very evident change for the better in support of the center, and is indicative of further future progress of a significant nature.

f. Combat Developments.

(1) During the reporting period, two significant projects in the realm of combat developments were undertaken. Project DUCKBLIND was terminated during the quarter and project SONJIA was initiated. Results of evaluation on Project DUCKBLIND were forwarded to ACTIV, HQ USARV. As of this writing Project SONJIA is still in the planning and preparation stage.

(2) Two new items were tested during the period.

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(a) 5th Special Forces Group received and tested five 35mm half frame cameras built into 7X50 binoculars. Reports from the field indicate that the binoculars are excellent when used on the ground. However when used from fixed wing aircraft, it was found that the shutter speed was not fast enough to eliminate the distortion caused by the motion of the aircraft.

(b) The elevated site marker balloon was tested by Detachment B-52 and the MACV Recondo School. Both units submitted that the balloon was unsatisfactory. The main deficiency was that the balloon was completely unstable and uncontrollable in any degree of wind.

g. Aviation.

(1) Army Aviation Support: The companies continue to receive Army aviation support from units within their own Corps Tactical Zone. Headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) receives from IFFORCEV resources two UH-1 helicopters and two U-1A fixed wing aircraft daily to support its command/control and administrative aviation requirements. In addition U-21 fixed wing support for the commander is provided by MACV and IFFORCEV. IFFORCEV also provides aviation support for the MACV Recondo School and the Nha Trang Installation Defense Command. Due to a shortage of replacement L-13 engines for the UH-1H helicopter, the following measures were taken by this headquarters to assist in the effort to conserve L-13 engine time:

(a) A daily administrative UH-1 helicopter flight from the SFOB to Cam Ranh Bay was eliminated. Personnel are now backloaded on USAF C-7A flights to Cam Ranh AFB.

(b) Fixed wing aviation support is requested for airfield to airfield flights.

(c) Use of USAF common user passenger flights available at USAF aerial ports throughout Vietnam is encouraged for incountry travel, thereby reducing the number of administrative flights required to support the Group.

(2) Tactical Airlift Support: The 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) has no organic Tactical Airlift Logistical Support in South Vietnam. All logistical airlift support is supplied by Commander, 7AF, through Commander 834th Air Division. This support consists of eight C-7A aircraft daily on a common user service, and four C-123's on a common service operating schedule basis. Additional C-130, C-123, and C-7A support can be obtained by submitting an airlift request to Military Assistance Command Vietnam J-4 Transportation Movement Authority. The airlift request is reviewed, approved or disapproved for air movement by MACV J-4 TMA. When an airlift request is approved, a priority is placed on the request in accordance with MACV Directives. The request then becomes a requirement and is submitted by TMA to the 834th AD Airlift Control Center (ALCC). ALCC in turn directs the

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execution of this required airlift. By using the three above stated systems the 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) averages a monthly logistical movement in excess of 12,000 tons.

(3) Tactical Fighter Support. A Special Forces FAC Study Group met for three days at the SFOB on 26-28 July 68. The purpose of this meeting was to resolve the shortages of FAC's presently supporting Special Forces operations in the four CTZ's. The group proposal was presented to the TACC Commander, General McLaughlin, and accepted for implementation by 1 Oct 68. FAC's and aircraft will be assigned to all Mobile Strike Force Commands and "B" Detachments. Each "B" Detachment FAC will be responsible for all the "A" Camp Tactical Air Support under his "B" Detachment. A USAF ALO (Air Liaison Officer) will be assigned to each "C" Detachment and have direct command and control of all Special Forces FAC's in that CTZ. Special operations and Mobile Strike Force Commands (MSFC) will have complete USAF Tactical Air Control Parties (TACP's) assigned to their unit. This will consist of three FAC's, two aircraft, two radio operators, and two crew chiefs. They, as well as all other Special Forces FAC's, will live with their assigned unit so as to attain maximum combat effectiveness, smooth coordination and planning, and immediate reaction time.

(4) I Corps Tactical Zone (Company C).

(a) Army Aviation Support. The latter portion of the reporting period saw an increase in the number of combat assaults by company C and more combat assaults are planned in the near future. Helicopter support for the three northern camps is provided by the 1st Marine Wing located at Da Nang. Support from this unit, to include medical evacuations, is poor. They have a relatively small number of helicopters and it is very rare when helicopters are made available for combat assaults. The reaction time for Marine medical evacuations is very slow; the majority of medical evacuations are from Army sources out of Chu Lai. Helicopter support for the six southern camps is provided by the Americal Division and the 18th AVN Bn located at Chu Lai. Excellent support has been received from the Americal Division in conducting combat assaults. Presently company C has a priority just below their own combat elements. The Army helicopters out of Chu Lai have also provided excellent support to camps NUNG SON and THUONG DUC; normally support for these camps is supposed to come from Marine Corps sources. Two UH-1D helicopters are assigned to Company C, on a weekly basis. These helicopters are used as command and control ships resupply, medevac, and for administrative missions. They are the principal means of shuttling mail and personnel between the various camps and the C team. These two ships are always immediately responsive to our needs.

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(b) Tactical Airlift Support. Tactical airlift support in I CTZ has always been responsive and provided excellent support.

(c) Tactical Fighter Support. Tactical fighter support is outstanding. At the present time, Company C is conducting a program in which liaison visits to CIDG camps are arranged for the pilots of the supporting air wings tasked to provide tactical air support. These visits have led to a better understanding between the camp personnel and pilots of each others' operations.

(5) II Corps Tactical Zone (Company B).

(a) Army Aviation Support. Increased availability of rotary wing aircraft for tactical needs has greatly enhanced operational capabilities. However, the lack of aircraft to perform command/support/liaison activities continues to limit efficiency within the Special Forces efforts in II CTZ.

(b) Tactical Airlift Support. Tactical airlift support has always been excellent.

(c) Tactical Fighter Support. Tactical fighter support has been excellent throughout the period. The proposal to place FAC's at all B detachments would greatly enhance TAC air coverage. Presently, Province FAC's provide coverage for CIDG operations. This is a division of effort and continuous FAC coverage is not available. Addition of FAC's at B detachments would insure continuous coverage of CIDG operations.

(6) III Corps Tactical Zone (Company A). Airlift support during the reporting period was particularly notable in III CTZ. During the month of May, there were two fairly large troop moves of the Mobile Strike Force. The first move took place on the 24th of May, moving these forces from DUC HOA to LONG HAI. The move lifted 1210 men and their equipment in 19 sorties by C-123 aircraft. The second move took place over a three day period, 29-31 May, and moved the Mobile Strike Force to new areas of operation. Also, May was highlighted by eight combat essential airlifts. Routine airlift dominated the picture during the month of June. The volume handled by the dedicated C-7A's and C-123 was at levels constant with their past performance. Special missions were at a lower sortie and volume rate. The only variation during the month was a movement of 17 C-130 sorties carrying 427,294 lbs of building material to CHI LINH. This move was accomplished with no difficulties. July airlift activities were highlighted by two large troop moves. On 11 July, one Bn of the 36th Mobile Strike Force Command was moved from LONG HAI to TAY NINH WEST. There were 875 troops and 96,000 lbs of cargo moved. Twenty-one sorties of C-123 aircraft were required. On 22 July, 781 MSF troops and 83,550 lbs of cargo were moved from TAY NINH WEST to LONG HAI. There were 19 sorties of C-123 aircraft flown. Also, the number of C-7A sorties increased slightly this month. This is due to the more efficient monitoring of loads at the ramp caused by a representative from

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Company A being present on the ramp at all times.

(7) IV Corps Tactical Zone (Company D).

(a) Army Aviation Support. Army aviation support overall is unsatisfactory. When helicopters are available in IV CTZ, they perform in an outstanding manner. But their availability is the deterrent factor. The entire IV Corps suffers from the lack of sufficient aviation assets and after priorities are established, Special Forces manages to get very little support. UH-1D's are allocated to Company D one per day four days per week and two per day three days per week. CH-47's are requested on a daily basis and the requests are seldom adequately filled. Evidence of this can be seen by the continuous backlog of materials on-line and the extreme difficulty in moving personnel. Tactically, each A Detachment could efficiently utilize aviation assets to conduct one heliborne operation per week as a minimum. Too often golden opportunities evade us when contact is established with the enemy or when intelligence fixes a target and reaction cannot be effected due to the lack of assets. VR aircraft attached to Company D, S-2 Section are always available and the pilots have effectively supported the "A" Detachments.

(b) Tactical Airlift Support. Tactical airlift support is satisfactory. Company D has committed for its use one C-123 five days per week and a C7A on a daily basis. The C7A aircraft operate with two crews to keep them in the air from dawn to dusk. Support from C-130 has been adequate when required.

(c) Tactical Fighter Support. Tactical fighter support is, at best, a hit and miss affair with the operational detachments. Strikes are never preplanned in support of a camp operation because they are unavailable. While a unit is in contact, tactical fighters occasionally arrive on station to provide support.

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h Logistics.

(1) General. From 1 May through 31 Jul 68, the Logistical Support Center continued to provide the widely dispersed companies and detachments with all classes of supply and limited depot maintenance. During the month of July the initial budget estimate was held for FY-70; also the program budget advisory committee for the 1st quarter of FY-69 was held. A program was initiated to reduce vehicles used by the SFOB; and 29 each 1/4 ton, nine 3/4 ton and three each 5 ton vehicles were withdrawn from the headquarters section.

(2) Supply.

(a) A new stockage list for expendable and janitorial supplies was completed and distributed to the field.

(b) Work continues on the R&U stockage list. The list is now approximately 25% completed and will be published in increments to speed dissemination.

(c) The new POL dispensing point is now in complete operation.

(d) The new Self Service Supply Center is now completed and in full operation.

(e) A new cycle inventory system has been developed and placed in effect. This provides for the daily inventory of six selected line items from each warehouse. This system insures continuous accountability with a minimum amount of time lost from normal daily activities.

(3) Movements and Storage.

(a) Cargo moved by mode:

	MAY	JUNE	JULY
C7A/C-123	536.2 S/T	700.9 S/T	367.6 S/T
Aerial Port	2,158.8 S/T	1,478.8 S/T	1,669.1 S/T
Air America	5.0 S/T	50.7 S/T	5.0 S/T
LST	1,780.8 S/T	102.2 S/T	532.9 S/T
Convoy	0	71.2 S/T	229.5 S/T
Total Tonnage Shipped	4,580.8 S/T	2,403.8 S/T	2,804.1 S/T

(b) The airfield matting section of LSC C7A ramp has been rehabilitated. The old matting was taken up, the area graded, drainage ditches and dry well dug, and new MX8 matting put down.

(c) Pre-rigged emergency air drop bundles of ammunition are no longer kept on the ramp. Experience has shown that pre-rigged loads did not give us the flexibility of support needed and that loads tailored to the situation at hand could be pulled and rigged in an acceptable period of time.

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(d) Interior floor area of warehouse 10 has been doubled by a new addition. Available space is now more than adequate to carry out the mission of warehouse 10.

(e) A two pump retail POL outlet was constructed opposite LSC gate 2.

(f) Airfield matting was laid on the ASP ready-line.

(g) Stocks of demo-blocks in the ASP have been reduced to comply with quantity distance factors set by USARV.

(4) Maintenance.

(a) During the quarter 673 job orders for engineer equipment were received with 284 pieces of engineer equipment being repaired and returned to the user or returned to stock; 2268 weapons were received with 1930 being repaired and 323 automotive job orders received with 318 vehicles being repaired.

(b) During the reporting period the following programs or improvements were accomplished by the SFOB maintenance facility:

Installation of covered drainage around the automotive shop.
Establishment of a quality control and inspection section.
Establishment of an office machine repair section.
Installation of a forklift motor pool and maintenance facility.
Roadside spot checks were initiated in the Nha Trang area.

(5) During the reporting period the following major accomplishments were achieved in the SFOB technical supply section.

(a) An ASL listing was published and distributed to all FSP's.

(b) The SFOB ASL was submitted to 2nd Logistical Command for technical editing.

(c) 1,370 excess fringe assets were turned into CRB depot, representing a total savings of \$207,556.08

(d) A walk-in customer service counter was established permitting one day service for all units in the Nha Trang area.

(6) I Corps Tactical Zone (Company C).

(a) Supply. During the period 1 May 1968 to 31 July 1968 Company C completely revised its supply system. A complete inventory of the Forward Supply Point at DANANG was completed with stock record cards established. This was necessary for the FSP to support 4500 CIDG, 900 MSF, and 231 USASF. The local purchase system was also revised resulting in a majority of the items now being acquired through normal supply channels. Fresh food is presently purchased in DANANG and shipped by Caribou to the A-teams. This is necessary because

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of the high cost of fresh vegetables in the outlying areas.

(b) Maintenance. The level of maintenance has gradually improved with the establishment of a permanent contact team. The team has the mission of continuously moving from A-team to A-team. In addition to performing field maintenance, the team also teaches organizational mechanics how to correctly maintain their vehicles. In May, a program was initiated to standardize all the generators used in I Corps. Three 10KW Libbey diesel generators were shipped to each camp and all other generators on site were backloaded. The generators backloaded to the FSP are inspected and if repairable or operational are further backloaded to the Logistical Support Center in Nha Trang.

(c) Movements. Because of the enemy situation and the availability of vehicles, Company C, depends almost entirely on the Air Force to resupply its camps. At present, the FSP is allotted one C7A Caribou and must "scrounge" its remaining C7A's from the III MAF. Of the nine Special Forces A-teams in I Corps, one does not have an airfield, five have C7A strips, and three have C-123 airfields. Company C has moved the following amounts of cargo during the reporting period:

May:	Air Land	682.5 tons
	Air Drop	107.5 tons
	Convoy	6.0 tons
	Sea	25.5 tons
		<u>821.5 tons</u>
June:	Air Land	808.0 tons
	Air drop	30.5 tons
	Convoy	42.0 tons
	Sea	122.0 tons
		<u>1002.5 tons</u>
July:	Air Land	1191.5 tons
	Air Drop	29.6 tons
	Convoy	7.5 tons
	Sea	141.6 tons
		<u>1370.2 tons</u>

Total tonnage moved 1 May - 31 Jul. 3194.2 tons

(d) Services. All detachments now have an account at the self-service store and can purchase small miscellaneous items totalling \$75.00 per month. This has eliminated the requirement for teams to requisition miscellaneous plumbing fixtures, household goods, electrical fixtures and general tools. A monthly newsletter is being published to keep the teams current with the supply situation. The letter also helps explain certain supply procedures and establishes new supply policies.

(e) Improvements. The FSP is presently building a concrete receiving area, a new warehouse, a staging shed, and a parachute drying tower. A planned

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technique (when the personnel shortage problem lessens) is to cross train personnel within the section. This will eliminate a warehouse being closed when the foreman is absent.

(7) II Corps Tactical Zone (Company B).

(a) Supply: Approximately 16,000 individuals are supported by the Co B, FSP. All special operations are supported from the assets received from LSC, Nha Trang. Local procurement is kept to the bare minimum in line with the cost-reduction program.

(b) Maintenance. There have been a total of thirty four (34) maintenance contact team visits to A detachments since 1 June. This has greatly reduced the deadline rate of vehicles at the subordinate detachments.

(c) Movements. Total poundage moved per month by air and ground modes is approximately 4,000,000 lbs. Total poundage shipped by Co B in support of Detachments and MSF operations were: Air-land, 5,978,032 lbs; air drop, 97,810 lbs; vehicle convoy, 418,744 lbs. The total cargo shipped from Co B for the period was 6,494,585 lbs. A total of 11,918 passengers were transported by supporting aircraft. On 15 July 1968, Company B fully implemented a single-line requisition system between A and B detachments and the FSP. This system makes it much easier for customers to keep track of due-outs and enables the FSP to give faster service to customers. A new rigger building and expanded drying tower are under construction. Two new warehouses and a maintenance facility have been completed.

(8) III Corps Tactical Zone (Company A).

(a) Supply: Company A's Forward Supply Point, located at Bien Hoa, is tasked to support 485 USASF, 20 attached LRP's, 8,500 Camp Strike Force and 2,500 Mobile Strike Force. Fifty percent of the Camp Strike Force are committed to the mission of surveillance, intelligence gathering, and interdiction. The remainder of the personnel are committed for camp defense. "Emergency" stockage is kept on hand at each camp for resupply to units in the field by UH-1D helicopters which operate in each "B" team area a minimum of two days a week. All classes of logistical support of MSF operations are rendered from the Forward Supply Point through the use of a forward mission support site. Each time a MSF unit is committed, it is necessary to issue new barrier materials to be used for area security and protection, re-stock used supplies, and direct exchange unserviceable equipment. Over the last three months an average of 6,924,449 \$VN per month has been spent to acquire supplies, materials and maintenance repair from the local economy. This support is broken down into five cost codes consisting of 902 (Subsistence), 905 (Supplies and Equipment), 906 (Camp Construction), 908 (Transportation and Vehicles Maintenance) and 910 (Repair and maintenance of Facilities). The expenditures for subsistence are consumed only in the purchase of rice. Approximately 6,000 bags of rice per month are purchased from Saigon at 1,000 \$VN per bag, for an average expenditure of 6,000,000 \$VN (51,282.90 \$US). The rice is enclosed within a plastic bag and then covered with a burlap bag to prevent moisture spoilage or spillage. A minimum amount of storage is required

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due to the fact that rice is readily available and thusly can be transported to the teams with a minimum amount of delay. In the area of the 905 & 906 Code, a unique situation exists. A large amount of local expenditures for supplies and equipment are on the stockage lists of supply units, but the availability of those materials is the prime factor. Certain items are available only when a depot initially receives the item. The item is immediately consumed by programmed due-outs, therefore, the Forward Supply Point only receives the needed materials when the items are readily available. All support, regardless of its origin is reimbursed from the 5th Special Forces Group budget. Some of the locally procured items are obtained at a substantial savings over what like items would cost from supporting units. The principal support obtained by these cost codes have been R&U items used in camp construction and operational necessities for supply movement, i.e., shipping pallets & banding materials, etc. Codes 908 and 910 pertain to the local economy acquired support within the area of vehicle and facility maintenance. These purchases are used to prevent a requirement for additional float items and to obtain support with the maximum amount of savings. A minimum amount of time is required to repair items from civilian businesses, therefore necessities are returned without delay. Many items are repaired on the local economy which would have to be replaced with new parts because the required echelon level is not available in-country. Many maintenance facilities have the same capabilities that are supplied at the Forward Supply Point and contract the higher echelon of maintenance to civilian firms which are located within country. Many products have been purchased in the past from local economy or through ~~abn~~ normal channels (i.e., mail order catalog, Sears & Roebuck water heaters and water pumps). Their parts can not be obtained through channels and repair components must be locally procured or locally fabricated.

(b) Maintenance. First echelon maintenance on vehicles was stressed during the reporting period as was continuous action in Maintenance Management Inspections. As a result only 4.8% of the vehicles were deadlined. Repair parts for vehicles were readily available from the LSC in Nha Trang. In contrast the percentages of deadlined generators (13%) and refrigeration equipment (10.8%) were rather high because of the equipment being old and/or lack of repair parts.

(c) Weapons Contact Team. In early May, Company A was loaned three Vietnamese small arms weapons repairmen from the 833d Ordnance Company ARVN. In three months these personnel traveled to nearly every Special Forces camp in III Corps. In the first month (May), they repaired over 600 weapons. The total amount repaired for the three month period was in excess of 3,000 weapons. Types of weapons repaired or inspected ranged from carbines, rifles, pistols, all the way up to and including 4.2 inch mortars, 81mm mortars, and .50 cal machineguns.

(d) Group Maintenance Contact Team. Two personnel were provided by LSC in early July to this WSP to help solve any problems in the maintenance field. They spent 10 days in III CTZ, during which time they made visits to B-32, B-33, and B-34. Generally they found that maintenance in Special Forces III Corps was very good.

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(e) Planned Improvements. The Company A FSP is in the process of setting up automatic resupply on all items that are fast moving and always on demand. An example of some of these items are butane, diesel, mogas, PIR rations, etc. The quality on hand of these items is reported on admin reports from each detachment. They are monitored at the FSP and filled according to need.

(f) Adequacy of Logistical Support. Because Company A operates on a fill or kill basis from the 1st Logistical Command, items may be obtained only when the supply units have filled all their programmed demands. Special Forces priority is below all US units. Therefore, they may have a stockage of an item but will not issue it because a request with a higher priority may arise. The maintenance support rendered by the 1st Log Command is not adequate. High echelon maintenance is either contracted out to civilian corporations or evacuated out-of-country causing added delay in the return of the item. Self service items are of limited quantity and the needed office supplies are not available. Shipment of supplies from the ISC is time consuming, otherwise logistical support of available items is adequate from the ISC.

(9) IV Corps Tactical Zone (Company D).

(a) Supply. During the reporting period the Company D FSP supported 496 USASF, 6583 CSF, and 1218 MSF. Two special operations were supported primarily with Class I and Class V and some miscellaneous Class II items. The concept of support was primarily that of establishing a Forward Supply Point in or near the AO. The supplies were moved in bulk via road or air (primarily fixed wing) to the FSP and from there via chopper to the troops in the field. Local procurement of supplies was minimal this month due to increasing emphasis on utilizing conventional supply channels.

(b) Maintenance. The company's two greatest problems are parts and transportation. Therefore a much greater emphasis is being placed on preventive maintenance. This is being realized through more frequent visits to the camps by maintenance personnel, and, of course, increased command emphasis. The ASL of the maintenance facility is constantly undergoing revision and expansion; currently it consists of 1609 line items, however 50 percent of these are at zero balance. The estimated goal for the ASL is 3000 line items. The deadline rate for equipment continues to hold around 2-3 percent. As mentioned previously, transportation is a great problem with respect to the maintenance program. Backloading difficulties revolve around this, both from the teams to the maintenance facility and to the SFOB through the 8th Aerial Port. Transportation of larger pieces of equipment between A, B and C Detachments is dependent upon CH-47's. This will be discussed later.

(c) Movements. During the reporting period, Company D Forward Supply Point handled over 14,886,674 pounds of supplies. A total of 8,951,541 pounds were received from the Logistical Support Center at Nha Trang and a total of 5,937,089 pounds were shipped to subordinate detachments. Of this, 2,933,934 pounds was via LOLEX and LAPES, and 1,212,544 pounds via Slingload. A total of 5,229,431 pounds were shipped via air and 707,135 pounds via road. The adequacy of support

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drops in only one area, that of CH-47 support. CH-47's are supplied to the units throughout the Delta, primarily by one Chinook Aviation Company. Due to the high maintenance requirement for these aircraft, it is very seldom that more than four aircraft (of eight available) are flown at any one time. These four aircraft must support daily all Special Forces requirements, MACV, two and sometimes even three ARVN divisions, and other smaller units which occasionally require their support. Under the present system, Chinook support is channeled through G-4, IV Corps. G-4 is allocated a specific number of aircraft for supporting nearly 50 MACV installations and 20 Special Forces Detachments throughout the IV Corps area. The aircraft which they are allocated, can be, and frequently are, for "Higher Priority" missions by IV Corps TOC (the primary control center for these aircraft). Also, in too many instances where a fixed wing aircraft could be used (i.e. an Air Force C-123), the CH-47's are utilized by IV Corps to pick up items in Long Binh and deliver to areas such as Chi Lang. Better priority planning on the part of using units would improve the utilization of the available aircraft in the Delta.

(d) The current trend reflects the need more than ever for maximum utilization of medium transport helicopter support. The coming monsoon season will make it necessary to support more detachments by both helicopter and fixed wing air drop and LAPES missions. The closing of many airstrips and roads plus the unpredictable aspect of weather will make it necessary to move a maximum amount of supplies on short notice and in a minimum amount of time. Since the quickest means of air transport will be the medium transport helicopter, an even greater workload is foreseen for the aircraft and its crews. The limited amount of aircraft now available has proven to be insufficient to properly support the units in the dry season; an even greater difficulty in the future is foreseen. This will, of course, greatly affect the Company D system of logistical supply. It will not, however, bring the logistical resupply system to a standstill, but rather limit the company's capability to support the subordinate units.

(e) With the increase emphasis on Maintenance, Company D is still awaiting the approval of the new TD's submitted for both Filipino Tech Reps and indigenous employees. Approval of these TD's is imperative for the efficient functioning of the logistical activities within Company D, particularly in the area of maintenance. The emphasis on preventive maintenance is based on the concept of mobile contact maintenance teams and they cannot be fielded until more Tech Reps are assigned.

(f) The support received from LSC continues to be outstanding. The problem, as always, is not the ability of the logistical system to support us, but the inability of the transportation system to support the logistical system. The concept of a Liaison NCO in Vung Tau to utilize 1st Log Supply activities and ship to use has already surpassed initial expectations.

(g) The first Log Command initiates project "Country Store" on the first of August. This will entail the permanent assignment of 1st Log personnel on location to give maintenance support to outlying US units (Cao Lanh, Chau Doc, etc). This is a step in the right direction although at this time it is beyond their capabilities to really field a complete maintenance contact team in a static location.

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1. Engineers.

(1) Construction and Rehabilitation.

(a) Following construction was completed or under construction during the reporting period.

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>CONSTRUCTION UNIT</u>	<u>% COMPLETE</u>	<u>EDC</u>
Camp BEN HET (new)	KB4 & 299 EBC	80%	6Aug68
PLATEAU GI (rehab)	KB4	100%	-----
DAK PEK Airfield	299 EBC	100%	-----
B-50 (new)	KB3 and Contract	90%	15Aug68
KATUM (airfield and rehab)	168 EBC	UNK	UNK
TON LE CHON (rehab)	KB2	50%	15Sep68
TRA CU (rehab and airfield)	KB1 and 168 EBC	UNK	UNK
THANH TRI (new camp)	KB1	100%	-----
MY DIEN II (new camp)	KB2	100%	-----
MAI LOC (new camp)	14 EBC	25%	10Sep68
NONG SON (new camp)	MCB 3	25%	31Aug68
TRA BONG (new TOC)	Staff Engineer	22%	1Aug68
HA THANH (new bunkers)	35 EBC	22%	1Aug68
C-1 Motor Pool	Contract	100%	-----
C-1 Admin Building	Contract	100%	-----
Rewire all C-1 camps	SeaBees	100%	-----
TO CHAU (rehab)	KB1	60%	10Sep68
TRANH - SUP (rehab)	Self Help	80%	10Sep68
THIEN NGON (bunkers)	30 EB (ARVN)	80%	10Sep68
HON QUAN (TOC)	Self Help	85%	31Aug68
CHI LINH (rehab)	KB3	75%	15Sep68
BU DOP (15 billets)	Self Help	90%	31Aug68
LONG HAI (rehab)	36 EBC	90%	10Aug68
PHU TUC (airfield)	20 EBC	10%	30Aug68
CUNG SON (rehab & additions)	Self Help	25%	15Sep68
AN LOC (airfield)	70 EBC	38%	15Sep68
TIEU ATAR (camp completion)	KB4	40%	30Sep68
DAK SEANG (airfield)	299 EBC	30%	15Sep68
C-1 Water Distribution System	SeaBees	100%	-----
C-1 S-2 building	Contract	50%	26Aug68
C-1 S-4 Warehouse	Contract	15%	29Aug68
C-2 (MSF billets)	Contract	50%	30Sep68
C-2 (B-23 FSP Reconstruction)	Self Help-Contract-70 EBC	30%	31Sep68

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LOCATION	CONSTRUCTION UNIT	% COMPLETE	EDC
C-2 (B-23 MSF facilities)	Contract	40%	31Sep68
C-2 BOQ	Contract	100%	-----
C-2 Warehouse	Contract	100%	-----
C-2 Gen Bldg	Contract	100%	-----
C-2 MSF Supply Room	Contract	100%	-----
C-2 MSF billets (3)	Contract	100%	-----
C-2 Dependent billet for Hosp	Self Help	100%	-----
C-2 Maint Facility	Contract	95%	10Aug68
C-2 Warehouse	Contract	35%	31Aug68
C-3 TOC (timber)	Staff Engineer	80%	15Aug68
C-3 Security Force billets	Staff Engineer	70%	31Aug68
C-3 Headquarters Area (rehab)	Staff Engineer	70%	31Aug68
C-3 FSP Complex	Contract	100%	-----
C-3 BEQ (2)	Contract	50%	31Aug68
C-3 Convalescent Center	Contract	80%	30Aug68
C-3 Ration Breakdown Area	Contract	100%	-----
C-3 R&U building	Self Help	90%	6Aug68
C-4 Dispensary	Contract	100%	-----
C-4 Warehouse	Contract	100%	-----
C-4 Personnel bunkers	Contract	10%	31Aug68
C-4 CIDG billets	Contract	50%	31Jul68
C-4 Warehouse storage bins	Self Help	50%	31Jul68
SFOB LSC warehouse 2A	Contract	100%	-----
SFOB LSC Maint bldg	Contract	100%	-----
SFOB Ammo Dump bunkers	Contract	100%	-----
SFOB Aviation hanger	Contract	100%	-----
SFOB Recondo billets	Contract	100%	-----
SFOB COC latrine & Hq	Contract	100%	-----
SFOB Artillery billets	Contract	100%	-----
SFOB Water towers	Contract	100%	-----
SFOB BOQ X-503	Contract	10%	26Jul68
SFOB Water wells	Contract	20%	26Jul68
SFOB Museum	Contract	100%	-----
SFOB Ordnance office	Contract	0%	31Jul68
SFOB Warehouse #6 Ext	Contract	0%	9Aug68
SFOB BEQ (2)	Contract	0%	15Aug68
SFOB Ammo berms	Contract	100%	-----

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<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>CONSTRUCTION UNIT</u>	<u>START DATE</u>	<u>EDC</u>
TIEU ATAR (completion)	KB4	1Jul68	31Aug68
DAK SEANG Airfield	299 EBC	1Jul68	31Jul68
MINH THANH (enlarge camp)	KB2	UNK	UNK
DUC HUE (airfield)	KB2	UNK	UNK
AN LAC (airfield)	70 EBC	1Jul68	31Jul68
PHU TUC (airfield)	20 EBC	1Jul68	31Jul68
C-1 BOQ-BEQ	Contract	UNK	UNK
C-1 Road construction	Contract	UNK	UNK
C-2 Ready line	Contract	UNK	UNK
C-2 Rigger warehouse	Contract	UNK	UNK
C-2 Parachute drying tower	Contract	UNK	UNK
C-2 Handball court	Contract	UNK	UNK
C-2 FSP rebuilt at B-23	Contract	UNK	UNK
C-2 BEQ at B-23	Contract	UNK	UNK
C-2 Latrines at B-23	Contract	UNK	UNK
C-2 Messhall at B-20	Contract	UNK	UNK
C-2 BEQ at B-20	Contract	UNK	UNK
C-2 Maint facility at B-23	Contract	UNK	UNK
C-3 CIDG hospital	Contract	UNK	UNK
C-3 Water wells	Well Drilling Tm	UNK	UNK
C-3 Water towers	Contract	UNK	UNK
C-4 Road surfacing	Contract	UNK	UNK
SFOB Road construction	864 EBC-PAB	1Jul68	31Aug68
SFOB renovation	Contract	1Jul68	31Dec68

(2) Well Drilling Operations.

(a) One borrowed rig at KONTUM was used to dig one well. Special Forces will continue to use the rig while training operators.

(b) Well drilling team continued to drill in III CTZ. Four wells have been completed with eight more planned for III CTZ, during the next quarter.

(c) One shallow well is to be constructed in IV CTZ at Det A-442.

(3) Budgeting and Funding. As of the end of the quarter \$1,808,750, or 62% of FY 68 funds have been obligated; \$1,169,577 or 65% of obligated funds have been expended.

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(4) Post Engineer. Approximately 1800 work orders were processed, and 16,200,000 gallons of potable water was used at the SFOB. Critical operational facilities were wired to the emergency power supply, 9000 cargo pallets were constructed (with two for moving two elephants), and 22,000 concrete blocks were manufactured.

(a) With the advent of the monsoon in some parts of the country, numerous airfields failed and were subsequently closed. The basic problem was that there was no carry over of information on performance of the airfield from the past monsoon season. Those airfields that did fail did so after a small defect was not corrected, but was allowed to deteriorate. Directions on how to perform minor maintenance was sent to all detachments.

(b) Problems experienced in III CTZ fall into three areas: equipment, material, and funds. The engineering equipment is old and needs to be replaced in most cases. Although much repair is actually uneconomical, funds are expended for this purpose simply because it is the only equipment available. Material problems are due to either unavailability of certain items or inability to provide transportation to ship the items to the construction site. In many cases it is cheaper to locally purchase some items than to have them transported from distant locations. Fifty percent of the construction projects in III CTZ are held up due to unavailability of supplies. The inability to expend funds for these hard-to-get items has caused contract delays and in some cases substandard construction.

(c) Company D also has experienced problems due to lack of aircraft to ship construction materials by air. They partially alleviated the problem by prefabricating some facilities such as billets, team houses, classrooms, cement forms, etc.. This practice has not only reduced cargo weights, but has also improved basic construction design, uniformity, and speed and ease of construction on the site. Another problem in IV CTZ has been solved by using lime soil stabilization techniques. The technique of lime soil stabilization is being undertaken in certain construction projects in the delta. Clay, the primary soil found in the Delta must be removed or stabilized before loadbearing equipment can be adequately supported during damp weather. In the past, rock, gravel, etc., were all employed to accomplish the task adequately, however the cost of both material and transportation has been exorbitant. Under the guidance of the Delta Soils Laboratory (a USARV sponsored research organization), lime stabilized soil techniques have been developed and great success has been accomplished in construction utilizing the same. This unit is presently involved in two projects which will employ this technique, and it is anticipated that a considerable amount of both money and time will be saved by using lime stabilization.

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j. Political Warfare (POLWAR).

(1) General.

(a) The S5 functional area has undergone significant changes. These changes were necessitated by the following problems. First, the S5 functional area was too limited when compared with the VNSF counterpart program of political warfare. Secondly, the CA/PSYOPS and intelligence programs were not coordinated. Finally, civic action was too much a give-away program which was unappreciated by the people and produced few tangible returns.

(b) The S5 section has been reorganized to parallel more closely the VNSF political warfare section. A VNSF political warfare officer is responsible not only for CA/PSYOPS, but also for troop motivation and indoctrination, morale, and welfare. A motivation and indoctrination officer has been added to the Group S5. All USASF detachments were reorganized to provide at least one CA/PSYOPS officer and one NCO at all levels of command. These changes provided the personnel required to coordinate CA/PSYOPS and intelligence efforts along the same lines utilized by the VNSF. Vietnamese participation was thus increased, producing a much more effective program. Finally, the integration of civic action within the POLWAR program will eliminate the give-away aspects of past projects. Recipients are to be psychologically prepared so that they are better able to appreciate and use CA assistance.

(c) To better prepare the newly assigned CA/PO officers and NCO's, a 40 hour POLWAR course was conducted at the SFOB. All CA/PO personnel attended. The following is a list of the subjects covered during the course: motivations and attitudes, target analysis, key communicators, PSYOP campaign, exploitation of Hoi Chanhs, gaining and holding an audience, communication techniques, functions of a loudspeaker team, face-to-face persuasions, attitude differences (VN & SF), introduction to POLWAR, the 16 man POLWAR teams, PX-COMM Social Welfare, and motivation and indoctrination. Practical exercises were conducted on all aspects of the instruction as well as a tour of local POLWAR facilities. Armed with the knowledge gained, CA/PO personnel returned to their detachments and began to implement new and improved programs.

(2) I Corps Tactical Zone (Company C). Presently POLWAR activities in I Corps Tactical Zone are limited due to the fact that only three POLWAR Teams are engaged in operations. Three are in training and three more are waiting to be trained. The three POLWAR teams that are engaged in operations are successfully proving their value.

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(a) Psychological Operations (PSYOPS). The PSYOPS effort in I Corps Tactical Zone is directed at friendly target audiences to win support of Vietnam (GVN) and its Allies. Some of the PSYOPS themes being used presently are:

- Do Not Support the VC
- Weapons rewards
- Inform GVN of VC activities
- Counter VC propaganda
- The VC lie and destroy
- Peace talks
- Informative news

Most dissemination is done by USASF personnel, POLWAR teams, aerial broadcasting, and leaflet drops from aircraft. The most effective means are hand dissemination by POLWAR teams, the showing of movies, and performances by culture drama teams. All of these methods involve face-to-face communication.

(b) Psychological Warfare (PSYWAR). PSYWAR is propaganda directed against the enemy to demoralize him and reduce his will to fight. Themes now being used are of a "Chieu-Hoi" nature, and urge the enemy to defect. Company C is also initiating the "Phoenix operation" to attack the enemy infrastructure. Some of the more standard themes used are:

- Hardships
- Peace talks
- Lack of equipment
- Lack of doctors and medical supplies
- Friction between North Vietnamese (NVA) and the VC
- VC defeats
- Pro GVN

PSYWAR materials are disseminated by the same means as PSYOPS material. In addition, POLWAR teams take leaflets and posters into areas of enemy activities and place them along trails, on trees, and in other spots where they may be seen. No leaflets have been airdropped since 24 July. In the past the 7th PSYOP Battalion in DA NANG, with the 9th Air Commando Squadron doing the flying, furnished excellent direct support. But now all requests must go through III Marine Amphibious Force (III MAF). This procedure has caused much delay in leaflet printing, delivery, and aerial broadcasting. The 7th PSYOP Battalion has a detachment at DONG HA with the 3rd Marine Division and another detachment at CHU LAI with the Americal Division. An agreement has been made for these detachments to provide additional support for our camps in their areas. The

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camps could get support from either CORDS or JUSPAO, however, the distances involved and consequent time delays militate against such support. CORDS and JUSPAO are used mostly in the DANANG area. The oncoming monsoon season will greatly limit operations and aerial support from the 9th ACS in the mountain ranges. Their O2B aircraft do not have an instrument capability nor can they maneuver through cloud openings when the ceiling is too low. The Commanding Officer of the 75th PSYOP Battalion has agreed to give a 1000 watt loudspeaker and crew to man it if a helicopter can be obtained. Attempts to obtain a helicopter on a full-time basis have failed. Such a capability would greatly improve our program by shortening reaction time to intelligence.

(c) Social Welfare. Two projects have been undertaken to improve the living conditions of the CIDG and their dependents. First, CIDG PX's are being operated in three camps. A civilian agent buys goods in DANANG. After shipment to the camp, the goods are resold to the CIDG at the DANANG cost price. A civilian agent also purchases rice in DANANG at a price below that prevailing near the camps and it is shipped to the CIDG camps and resold in the same manner as PX goods. CIDG are thus able to buy rice and goods that normally would cost more or not even be available on the local economy.

(d) Motivation and Indoctrination. Indoctrination and education of CIDG personnel is one of the primary functions of the POLWAR Teams. Each week classes are given by the members of the team. Both pro GVN and anti NVA/VC themes are stressed. Magazines and newspapers are distributed to CIDG personnel regularly to keep them up-to-date on current events, victories, government activities, and enemy defeats. Award programs, promotions, and a newly implemented rank structure for CIDG enlisted men (to include rank insignia) have all served to increase the motivation and morale of the CIDG. Games, sports, and competitive activities, both individual and team, have been used to promote morale. Pingpong, volley ball, running, and marksmanship tournaments have been held. Trophies and extra privileges were awarded to the winners. A competition program among counterparts is being held quarterly. The first, consisting of both games and a picnic, was held July 4th. The next is planned for Vietnamese Independence Day in November. TIEN-PHUOC, A-102, conducts a Soldier of the Month program. Camp winners will compete for I CTZ Soldier of the Month including prizes, awards, and publicity. On 27 July a poster campaign was initiated based on the theme: "Be proud to be a CIDG because you are the best in Vietnam." Posters, currently being printed by the 7th PSYOP Battalion, will be distributed to all camps. In the past month culture drama teams have given five performances to CIDG personnel in addition to those for the civilian populace. Four were staged at A-106 and one at A-107. The CIDG were greatly pleased with the entertainment. Twice

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each month the USASF Commanding Officer, his counterpart, the S-5 section, and its counterparts make trips to local hospitals, visiting the sick and wounded and giving them packets of food and necessities. Vietnamese films are obtained monthly from the culture center in DANANG. These films are rotated from camp to camp every week to obtain maximum variety.

(e) Civic Action. Each camp conducts a medcap program designed to improve civilian health and thus enhance the image of the GVN and FWMAF. In the area of education several schools are being aided through the USASF Civic Action Program. Schools are being repaired at TRA BONG (A-107) and TIEN PHUOC (A-107) as well as two schools at HA THANH (A-104). A new school has been opened at GIA VUC (A-103) and two others are near completion at THUONG DUC (A-109). In addition most schools are periodically provided with school kits and other school supplies by CARE and CORDS. A bridge is being repaired at TIEN PHUOC. Plans are being considered for a bridge at BA TO (A-106). At TRA BONG, a bridge was completed on 1 August. At MINH LONG (A-108) a fish pond that will supplement the local diet is near completion. One of the largest projects is the support of approximately 28,000 refugees divided among the nine camps. Aid to these refugees takes the form of food-stuffs and clothing obtained through the Catholic Relief Service and supplies from our own channels. Another project recently began at GIA VUC is an agriculture demonstration sponsored by USASF and CORDS from QUANG NGAI Province. This is to convince the local population that crops other than those native to their area can prosper and provide them with more food and income. A similar project has been planned for BA TO.

(3) II Corps Tactical Zone (Company B).

(a) In the II Corps area many difficulties are encountered when attempts are made to increase the allegiance of the population towards the GVN. Historically, the Montagnards have been apathetic, if not hostile, toward the Saigon regime. Until recently the latter has ignored the Montagnards. The Vietnamese administrators assigned to the II Corps are of poor quality. This situation has resulted in almost insurmountable obstacles to the goal of national unity in II Corps.

(b) Company B has been attempting through the construction of dependent housing, reward incentive programs, and the POLWAR team concept to increase support for the GVN. In II Corps, there is an active construction program to improve CSF dependent housing. Medical care, improved sanitation, improved housing, contact with western technology, and money have contributed to better living standards. The standard of living has also been raised substantially

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in areas where CIDG security has been provided. In general, this means those villages clustered around CIDG sites where the populace have a sense of security. More emphasis is being placed on disseminating information concerning rewards which are given for turning in enemy weapons and intelligence on enemy movements. The POLWAR team concept, recently introduced to Vietnam, shows great promise. Care, however, must be exercised in choosing the members of the team. The ethnic balance of the team should be approximately the same as that of the people to be indoctrinated. Sending a predominately Vietnamese team into a Montagnard village or using a Vietnamese team with Montagnard CIDG will create tensions that are self-defeating. Company B has been informed by II Corps headquarters that they cannot train more Montagnard POLWAR teams because of a lack of interpreters. Interpreters will be provided to the POLWAR school to overcome this problem, but due to the language barrier, the implementation of the POLWAR program will be delayed while we organize our own POLWAR teaching cadre.

(4) III Corps Tactical Zone (Company A). During this reporting period Company A has successfully trained 15 CIDG POLWAR teams at the III CTZ training center in TRANG SUP. Each A detachment now has a school-trained POLWAR Team and most of these teams are enthusiastic about developing various programs and projects in their particular camps. There are also three CIDG drama teams at various detachments. These teams vary in size but each has a band, male and female singers, comedians and actors. Several camps have initiated CIDG dependent housing, PX's, clubs, barber shops, theaters, reading rooms, and other construction projects. Other projects which have been either revamped or newly initiated are organized sports, dependent schools, and camp sanitation. Numerous programs have been begun which are designed to boost the morale of the CIDG. These include frequent film showings combined motivational rallies, interdetachment sports competition, and unit award and decorations. The month-long training course was the first of three phases of training planned to produce an effective POLWAR Program in each camp. The second phase of training has recently been initiated. During this two or three month Second phase a POLWAR Mobile Training Team (MTT) will visit each detachment to assist the camp CIDG POLWAR teams in their programs. Emphasis will be placed on developing an effective motivation and political indoctrination program. A minimum of ten days will be spent at each detachment. Each MTT consists of four POLWAR instructors (formerly the instructors for the Basic POLWAR Course), one interpreter, one member of the Company A USASF S5 staff (either the S5 or the CA officer), and his counterpart. The third phase of training will be OJT supervised by the A&B detachment POLWAR personnel. In order to insure that these programs are understood, properly implemented, and given the proper support by the USASF and VUSF POLWAR personnel at each detachment, Company A held a POLWAR Orientation Course at Det A-301, TRANG SUP, for these personnel

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while their teams were in training at TRANG SUP. This orientation course lasting two days, included classroom instruction by members of Company A's S5 and S2 sections as well as active participation in the graduation ceremonies for the CIDG POLWAR Course. Television sets have been purchased for all detachments which requested them for viewing by the CIDG and their dependents. ~~These~~ TV sets have been marked "FOR CIDG USE ONLY" in both Vietnamese and English. Several camps have constructed or are planning to construct theaters for TV viewing, movies, and rallies.

(a) Psychological Operations (PSYOPS). The majority of PSYOPS have been conducted through face-to-face communication during MEDCAPS and various Civic Action projects. Det B-32, TAY NINH, has a particularly effective program in progress. Det B-32 and its subordinate detachments conduct weekly MEDCAPS and employ leaflets, loudspeakers and face-to-face communication. Increasing success has been experienced in obtaining intelligence by conducting continuous MEDCAPS in some of the more isolated hamlets. During the FTX portion of the POLWAR course held at TRANG SUP, the POLWAR trainees distributed leaflets and posters and talked with the villagers during their stay in each hamlet. The PSYOPS conducted during this period ~~were~~ a definite success and a strong change in attitude could easily be detected in the villagers.

(b) Psychological Warfare (PSYWAR). Reaction and support have been the main themes for Company A's PSYWAR Program. Company A, while originating PSYOPS material, depends on the 6th PSYOPS Battalion for mass reproduction. In exploiting an individual situation, the most critical factor is reaction time. Under normal conditions Company A can produce and disseminate leaflets and tapes within 24 hours after the exploitable situation has occurred. The following is a recap of situations exploited by Company A during this reporting period:

May. The attack on NUI BA DEN presented a challenging PSYOP problem. It was clear-cut victory for the Communists but the American press was spreading the false Communist propaganda claim of having overrun a Special Forces camp. The fact that the camp was operational a few hours after the attack and that the Communists left behind some of their dead, enabled the development of the following leaflet: "To VC cadre who participated in the fighting at NUI BA DEN: Why follow your leaders to death? Your attack on NUI BA DEN was for nothing, the camp is working now as before the attack. You can see that for yourself. Your leaders left five bodies behind; these are your comrades left to rot in the sun. Do not let your fate be the same as your fallen comrades. Rally now and return to your homes and loved ones. Stop the useless killing; rally now." Using a GVN Army marching song for background a tape of the following leaflet was broadcasted by aerial loudspeaker: "VC keep away from Special Forces"

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units if you want to live. Your leaders tell you that NUI BA DEN was a Special Forces camp, but this is not true as you can see for yourself. If NUI BA DEN was a Special Forces camp, you would have received many more casualties." Fifty thousand leaflets were dropped. For two hours the tape was broadcasted over the suspected enemy positions of the attackers of NUI BA DEN. A second exploitable situation happened when the village of BO DUC in PHUOC LONG Province suffered from a typical Communist tactic of terrorizing a village and then putting it to the torch for no apparent reason. First, food and protection were provided to the people left homeless and hungry. Then a leaflet was developed which read: "Citizens of BO DUC: You can stop the useless burning and suffering caused by the VC by reporting them to the local Government. You have seen for yourself how the VC make war on the helpless people of your village. Support the GVN, let them help and protect you." A loudspeaker tape was also made to reinforce the leaflet. Fifty thousand leaflets were dropped and over two hours of aerial loudspeaker broadcast were employed to exploit this situation.

June. A MEDCAP returning to Det B-32 observed a woman detonating a VC booby trap, severely injuring her right leg. The MEDCAP team administered first aid and then took her to a nearby hospital. This act of VC terror was fully exploited by the quick production of leaflets showing the injured woman receiving medical care in the hospital. Main themes used were "support the GVN" and "the GVN come to the aid of the people."

July. On the evening of 19 July, a NVA soldier, Nguyen Khac Tan, turned himself in to Det A-301 as a Hoi Chanh. Preliminary questioning showed that he was a member of H/16 VN BINH GIA's Regiment and that his unit had suffered at least 60 KIA's and 90 WIA's as a result of action against the MSF on 15 and 16 July. He also stated that his unit's morale was low because of casualties from airstrikes, combat operations, and a fear of being sent to Saigon. PSYOPS exploitation of Nguyen Khac Tan was started immediately by having him prepare a taped message to his unit and a text for a leaflet. To increase credibility his picture was also placed on the leaflets. The text for the leaflet along with the photograph was picked up from Det B-32's location on the morning of 20 July and taken to the 6th PSYOP Battalion. The leaflet was processed and 100,000 copies were ready for dissemination on the morning of 21 July. Altogether 458,000 were dropped and four hours and thirty minutes of aerial broadcasting was conducted. On 25 July, Ho Van Du, an assistant squad leader of squad 3, platoon 1, C-1 company, 258th Battalion, turned himself in the Det A-322, KATUM, as a Hoi Chanh. Exploitation was started immediately with the development of a message written by Ho Van Du to his fellow comrades and a taped recording. A quick reaction leaflet was printed with Ho Van Du's photo and the text of his message shown in his own handwriting. The following is a translation:

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"To all comrades of C-258th Battalion: I am Ho Van Du, assistant squad leader of squad 3, platoon 1, C-1 company, 258th Battalion. I rallied to the GVN on 25 July 1968 at KATUM. Our leaders have lied to us, for I have been well treated and well received by the GVN. They consider me as their brother. I am living a very good life. Thinking about the past days with all of you, I worry very much about you. Try to get back to the GVN side as soon as possible or it will be too late." The standard long-range PSYWAR campaign based on standard leaflets and tapes, plays an important role in Company A's overall PSYWAR program. PSYOP aircraft and POLWAR ground operations are utilized. The 6th PSYOP Battalion supplies the leaflets, tapes, and aircraft needed to carry our program. The main themes during this reporting period have been "Chieu Hoi" and the Paris peace talks. Company A has available for its use three weekly scheduled U-10 flights as well as C-47's and U-10's upon request.

(c) Social Welfare. Each camp in IV CTZ conducts daily medical programs, camp sanitation programs, and MEDCAPs. All camps have a daily sick-call for the CIDG and their dependents. Camps normally allow neighboring villagers to take advantage of this medical aid. This practice eliminates the need for frequent and time-consuming MEDCAP's to the villages. Each camp has a CIDG POLWAR team member assigned to check on the camp's sanitation. When the troops or their dependents begin to neglect their sanitation responsibilities, the POLWAR team, by example, persuasion, and other means initiate a camp cleanup campaign. The A detachment medic and counterpart have the overall responsibility for insuring proper camp sanitation at all times. Det A-342, DONG XOAI, has been holding a monthly pickup (litter) day in their camp and in the neighboring hamlets. The local district chief has been fully cooperative and has used his influence with the populace to enforce this campaign. Many camps have a daily trash recovery program which is supported by the troops and enforced by the VNSF. In Company A, the MEDCAP is more than just a medical operation. MEDCAP's are conducted not only by the USASF and VNSF detachments medics, but also by intelligence personnel, POLWAR officers, and CIDG POLWAR teams. Det A-321, BEN SOI, has continually acquired intelligence under the umbrella of a weekly MEDCAP program to an isolated hamlet in their area, PHUOC TAN (XT 037417). Where there is a local civilian populace, most of the other detachments also take advantage of the intelligence opportunities in MEDCAPs. Their success varies from detachment to detachment.

(d) Motivation and Indoctrination. Since the initial training of the POLWAR teams at Det A-301, our motivation and indoctrination program has continued to improve rapidly. The POLWAR team members were taught how to conduct rallies, give speeches, plan skits, etc., during the basic 4-week course; they are now practicing what they learned at their individual detachments. At many camps,

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the nightly movies are immediately followed by short motivation and indoctrination classes. Company A is developing leaflets, tapes, and posters directed towards the CIDG soldiers and their dependents, making them aware of their responsibilities to the GVN. We are preparing to implement a soldier-of-the-month program and various competitive sports programs to support our motivation and indoctrination program.

(e) Civic Action. The Civic Action projects at most detachments are restricted to those projects needed within the camps. These include such items as dependent housing, latrines, schools, theaters, barber shops, reading rooms, and PX facilities. These projects contribute toward the primary POLWAR objective in III CTZ for 1968 of initiating an effective motivation and political indoctrination program for the CIDG and their dependents. At Det A-344, BUNARD, an outstanding theater/meeting hall has been built by the CIDG to be used for TV viewing, movies, rallies and lectures. The POLWAR team at Det A-333, CHI LINH, has completed about 30% of their civic action projects of building hardened dependent housing, a school for their 100 school-age children, and a theater for TV viewing and movies. The response of the CIDG at this detachment is outstanding since they are actually doing all the labor under the guidance of the CIDG POLWAR Team and the engineering direction of a USASF P3 Team. Det A-342, DONG XOAI, has completed a PX, club, meeting hall, barber shop (10\$ VN for a good haircut), dependent housing and a school. Det A-301 has finished one building of its planned CIDG dependent housing and recently replaced the entrance sign over the local CIDG cemetery. Det A-343, DUC PHONG, has built a club and has partially completed a theater/meeting hall. Det A-341, BU DOP, has constructed a small chapel using salvaged ammo crates. Det A-331, LOC NINH, recently finished a tiled well in their dependent housing area and are repairing this housing as material becomes available. Det B-36, LONG HAI, recently provided engineer and skilled labor assistance in response to a request from a local village chief who, though provided materials by CORDS, had no idea how to construct a needed village dispensary. During the FTX portion of the two CIDG POLWAR team training courses the POLWAR trainees spent one week working on civic action projects in the neighboring hamlets. These projects included repair of community buildings, re-digging the hamlet drainage ditches and generally responding to reasonable requests for assistance from the villagers. This project was very successful. The villagers, once they saw that the CIDG actually were serious about these projects, came out of their homes, helped in the physical labor, and even fed the CIDG POLWAR trainees their noon meals. In return, when the CIDG trainees found that their labors were appreciated and rewarded, they doubled their efforts.

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(5) IV Corps Tactical Zone (Company D). POLWAR teams continue with political classes and dramatic performances for CSF troops. On 13 July, the Company POLWAR team departed for Detachment A-416 located at MY DIEN II, where they spent three days with the CSF and their dependents. Entertainment was provided for the troops and their families, as well as indoctrination classes. The POLWAR team also spent considerable time with the camp POLWAR squad, giving them assistance on future planning. Visits to camps will continue at two each month.

(a) Psychological Operations (PSYOPS). Leaflets concerning the accomplishments of the CSF and MSF were requested from the 10th PSYOP Bn for the purpose of showing the friendly population exactly what the forces are capable of doing. Wall newspaperboards were made by each POLWAR squad to show accomplishments.

(b) Psychological Warfare (PSYWAR). The 10th PSYOP Bn has been furnishing printed media for distribution in enemy held areas. Armed propaganda teams have conducted numerous missions into OLAM, South of NUI COTO in CHAU DOC Province, also in PHU NAUT Village, CHAU DOC. Themes used for hostile population groups range from information on the GVN to support provided for those loyal to GVN.

(c) Social Welfare. Dependent Housing projects are springing up in IV Corps around camps, so dependents can be accommodated. Health and sanitation programs have been organized to assist the CSF dependents in improving their living conditions.. CRS and CARE have contributed heavily to our program of caring for refugees as well as to CSF and their dependents.

(d) Motivation and Indoctrination. Victory celebrations are held following each mission when CSF personnel perform exceptionally well. Group information programs are conducted once or twice a week, using lesson plans provided by higher headquarters. Subjects range from "your government and you" to "peace conference info". Sports contests are a big part of teaching CSF personnel how to work as a team. Various events, such as ping pong, volleyball and badminton, are a part of the sports program.

(e) Civic Action. Numerous self help projects are being conducted throughout Company D's TAOR. Projects include: bridge repair, hospital and school repair, building of schools, market places, and others.

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k. Personnel.

(1) Strength. Authorized and assigned strengths at the beginning and at the close of the reporting period were as follows:

(a) Beginning of Period

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>AGG</u>
Authorized:	691	24	2765	3480
Assigned:	639	23	2729	3391

(b) Close of Period:

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>AGG</u>
Authorized:	691	24	2765	3480
Assigned:	723	25	2790	3538

(2) Replacements. During this quarter a total of 199 officers and 830 enlisted replacements were received. During the same period, the losses were 115 officers and 769 enlisted.

(3) Discipline.

(a) A total of 96 incidents were reported to the Provost Marshal's Office during the reporting period, 45 less than last reporting period.

(b) Judicial punishment has increased over the last period.

General Court Martial	0
Special " "	4
Summary " "	4

(c) Nonjudicial punishment has decreased by five from the last period.

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(d) Legal assistance was rendered to 110 clients.

(a) Problem: Lack of disciplinary code for CIDG. At present no disciplinary code or system exists for CIDG personnel which can be used to control them and enforce orders. Without such a code, CIDG personnel will continue to go AWOL whenever they desire. In addition, military duties, such as guard, will continue to be performed in a haphazard manner. In actual practice some camps do impose fines; however, there is no authority for this and the fines are not uniform. It has been suggested that a code of non-judicial punishment be set up to solve this problem. After much study including several consultations with VNSF counterparts, this command has decided that such a suggestion is impractical. There are many different ethnic groups within the CIDG and each group responds to different kinds of punishment. For instance, striking a Vietnamese soldier may be effective in some situations but under no circumstances should this form of discipline be administered to a Montagnard. Against Chinese soldiers, fines are particularly effective. Such differences would make it difficult to devise a workable uniform code. Also, certain punishments are acceptable if meted out by certain cadre. For example, a Montagnard soldier would accept confinement by an American or another Montagnard but not by a member of the VNSF. Some punishments are difficult to put in writing, such as, the use of "hot boxes" or filling knapsacks with stones and making an individual crawl some distance. Any such code proposed by the USASF would have to be acceptable to the VNSF. The latter have different concepts of punishments from the USASF. There would be problems in reaching agreement on a mutually acceptable code. Finally, such a code would not be an effective deterrent to desertion and common crimes. Legally, the CIDG are civilians and can quit at will. As for common crimes, the CIDG can only be punished by civilian RVN authorities. A suggestion, however, has been made which could solve this problem of discipline. A proposal is now before the Minister of Defense of the Republic of South Vietnam which would recognize the CIDG as a part of the RVN military establishment. The CIDG, therefore, would be subject to the RVN code of military justice and the jurisdiction of the military courts.

(h) Morale and Personnel Services. The overall morale of the 5th Special Forces Group could only be termed outstanding.

(a) Tabulation of Personnel Visiting R&R Leave Centers.

	May	June	July
Hawaii	50	50	70
Australia	25	25	31
Tokyo	15	15	16
Taipei	20	20	20

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Bangkok	35	33	40
Manila	5	5	5
Kuala Lumpur	4	5	6
Penang	8	7	5
Singapore	6	6	21
Hong Kong	25	22	34
	193	188	238

R&R allocations are increasing for 5th Special Forces Group, especially for the more popular locations: Hawaii, Sydney, and Bangkok. These increases will keep pace with the higher assigned strength figures.

(b) Promotions. The number of promotions rose proportionately with assigned personnel as a total of 251 enlisted personnel were promoted during the reporting period.

(c) Reenlistments and Extensions. The following figures reflected an untiring effort by the Career Counselor and a healthy state of morale among 5th Group personnel:

<u>Category</u>	<u>Eligible</u>	<u>Reenlisted</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
RA First Term	30	16	53.33%
RA Career	92	87	94.57%
AUS	10	2	20.00%

Also, 48 RA personnel extended their ETS, and 7 AUS personnel accepted recall to active duty in USARV.

(d) Decorations Awarded.

<u>Award</u>	<u>May</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>July</u>	<u>Total</u>
DSC	1	4	1	6
LFC	0	0	1	1
SS	26	30	20	76

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LM	3	7	10	20
SM	5	3	9	17
BS V	96	88	64	248
BSS	135	226	126	487
AM V	6	8	3	17
AM	158	87	140	385
ACM V	16	32	38	86
ACM S	53	95	89	237
Total	499	580	501	1580

(e) Combat Badges.

	<u>May</u>	<u>June</u>	<u>July</u>	<u>Total</u>
CIB	132	102	209	443
CMB	14	15	16	45
PH*	115	48	29	192

*(Purple Heart figures do not reflect those issued by hospitals to SF personnel)

(f) Chaplain Activities. The Group's chaplains made 231 visits to SF detachments and spent a total of 215 days in the field and 204 hours traveling by air. A total of 3566 personal contacts, such as counselings and interviews, were conducted. Religious services held were as follows:

	<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>ATTENDANCE</u>
Catholic	130	4120
Protestant	64	1357
Memorial	26	1088

(g) Special Services. The number of movies shown at the Green Beret Theater and attendance figures are shown below. A better selection of films partially accounts for the greater attendance in July.

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<u>Month</u>	<u>Films Shown</u>	<u>Attendance</u>
May	21	4938
June	20	5234
July	21	8111

Other Special Services facilities available for use at the SFOB include two handball courts, basketball court, karate room, weight lifting room, horseshoe pits, and reading room. There is also an excellent Army beach located close by and an out-board motor runabout available for use by Special Forces personnel.

(5) Personnel Management.

(a) Requisitions. The current group requisition system is functioning well with only minor problems being encountered. One problem existing in enlisted requisitions is the monthly submission of a total group five digit enlisted MOS inventory report. This requires time that could be better devoted to other tasks. USARV has informed 5th Group that a machine print-out of the group enlisted authorized and assigned strengths is to be effected in the near future and the submission of an enlisted MOS inventory report will no longer be required.

(b) Critical MOS. At the present time this headquarters has no critical MOS shortages for MTOE and TDA positions. However, personnel are needed and required in certain positions in which there is no approved MTOE or TDA.

(c) Personnel Information Roster (PIR). The PIR is sent out monthly (by the tenth of each month) and is due back to Group Personnel by the twenty-fifth of each month. It contains information on authorized slots by grade, MOS, and Job title and personnel filling the slot by name, SN, grade, PMOS, SMOS, DOR, DEROS and remarks section. Problems encountered in the preparation, distribution, and use of the PIR information are due to the distance between subordinate units and Group Headquarters and lack of transportation. It often takes seven to ten days for all the PIR's to reach their destination. Because it takes the same length of time for the material to get back to UPO, the companies have only a few days to work on their PIR. Each company-size unit PIR has approximately 350 to 400 names to be checked for all the data. With the companies' other work load, the time is insufficient. The suspense date cannot be extended because the last PIR is received normally by the last of each month. Our outgoing suspense date is the tenth of the month. To meet that suspense date, the PIR's must be given to the typist no later than the third day of each month. This involves five companies, a Headquarters Unit, and thirteen separate detachments. Approximately a week is needed by UPO in order to verify the new PIR's. Each month the PIR section performs an

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MOS Inventory from the PIR which provides information on critical shortages and upcoming losses within 90 days. This is broken down by company with a three digit MOS breakdown for group. Invariably 20 to 60 EM and officers are not accounted for. The PIR breakdown is balanced but when applied against Morning Report entries it is found to be incorrect. It is not feasible to check every PIR against each 201 File to determine where the remainder of personnel are assigned because of time limitations. While this procedure is accomplished for one company each month, the other companies' PIR's that have been previously corrected are again in error. A method to verify each PIR quickly is being sought. Then of course there are typographical errors. While minor, they are still a problem to a truly accurate PIR. Typographical errors are seldom caught and if the existing ones are not caught they continue from month to month with new ones being added. In addition there is a problem of posting new personnel to the PIR and the changes that occur due to promotion, Med Evac's, KIA's and PCS's. They are handled to some degree of accuracy during the middle of the month but not at the end of the month and the beginning of the new month. Because of changing PIR's, the section is behind in posting for approximately 10 days. Companies are not utilizing manpower properly according to their PIR. For example, 91B's fill 05B slots and 12B's fill 11F slots. A "start from scratch" PIR has been tried and still the companies shuffle their MOS's to have E7's in E5 slots etc.. Some method is necessary to insure proper duty assignment of personnel and their being reported as excess if they can not fill a vacancy. The Command Readiness Team which is being initiated should alleviate this problem. In summary, personnel management problems break down into two main groups, lack of time to properly prepare an accurate PIR each month and too few methods of verifying the information on the existing PIR. The ideal solution would be the introduction of automatic data processing.

(6) Civilian Employees.

(a) Strength. The last quarter of fiscal year 1968 saw a reduction in civilian personnel of 55 employees. The last quarter started with a total of 3670 civilians and ended with a total of 3615. The low for the quarter occurred in May with a total of 3599 personnel.

(b) Recruitment. Recruitment is encouraged in the vicinity of detachments throughout the Republic of Vietnam when position vacancies are anticipated and funds/position authorizations are available. Preference in selection is given to: current employees who are qualified and are subject to reduction in force, disabled CIDG veterans and widows of deceased CIDG veterans if qualified, and former employees who have applied for reemployment after release from military service with honorable discharges. Local recruitment requires the detachment to locate applicants who appear to possess necessary qualifications for the particular vacancy, to submit to their "C" Detachment the required forms necessary to obtain the appropriate security clearance from the local military security service detachment, and to provide the applicant with a physical examination which will be made a part of his records.

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(c) Pay. Civilians are paid from CIDG Funds in accordance with the pay grades authorized in the US Forces Classification manual, Vietnam. Individuals who qualify may also receive a family allowance, combat pay, and language differential pay. Newly hired employees are hired at one grade below that authorized for the position for a period of thirty days. Satisfactory completion of this temporary appointment will warrant promotion to the authorized pay grade. Employees cannot be rated higher than the authorized pay scale for the position they occupy.

(7) I Corps Tactical Zone (Company C).

(a) Morale and Personnel Services. Morale within this organization remains at a high level. It has been customary to rotate personnel after serving on A Detachment sites for six months to the C Detachment. This policy is adhered to as much as the tactical and replacement situation permits. Requests for R & R and leave are processed and honored to the maximum practical extent. During the reporting period 57 persons were afforded R & R to approved leave centers. This unit has two helicopters with crews attached for duty at all times. This affords a regular pick-up and dissemination service for mail on almost a daily basis. A representative of each staff section is encouraged to visit each A Detachment at least once each two weeks. Special Services equipment is requisitioned directly from the supporting Special Services activity in this area. Support to date has been excellent. This unit also maintains a close relationship with the local USC and regularly receives paperbound books, playing cards, cigarettes, and food packages for distribution to members of the unit.

(b) Personnel Management. There have been no serious management problems although there has been a large turnover of key personnel within the reporting period. The activation of Det B-16 with two new subordinate A Detachments has created some personnel shortages, however, they are being filled as replacements become available. Retraining of current assets has assisted in this area. Emphasis is also placed upon the identification and elimination of personnel determined to be unqualified or inefficient in their assigned duties, or who are habitual offenders of proper morale and discipline principles. It is felt that their continued assignment to a unit working so closely with host-country personnel is not in the best interests of current U.S. objectives in Vietnam.

(c) Civilian Employees. This unit employs a total of 333 civilian employees. These civilians are utilized in various administrative, mechanical, medical and logistical positions. Civilians are also employed as combat interpreters and interpreters/translators. Applicants are interviewed by the civilian personnel officers and the USASF supervisor of the section for which they are seeking employment.

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(8) II Corps Tactical Zone (Company B).

(a) Morale and Personnel Services. Postal service is excellent with mail being delivered at least three times a week to the A sites and daily to the B and C detachments. Special Services are adequate, although the Officer Club facility is small and no library exists in the unit at present. Finally, religious services are held once a week at the C detachment and B detachments and at least once a month at each A camp.

(b) Personnel Management. In the next 60 days 46 EM will be lost. Over half of these will be in operations MOS's. Eight will be in medical MOS's. There is a need for cooks in one detachment and the C detachment. In the next 30 days 71L's (Admin Supv E6, E5, and below) will be a major problem. A minimum of eight supply personnel are required to maintain just the present capacity for the FSP at C-2 and at B-23.

(c) Civilian Employees. Company B utilizes 289 appropriated fund employees. The MSF (B-20) employs 92 people. Two of the B detachments have approximately 45 people each while B-23 employs 116 civilians. Each of the 24 A detachments has about 25 employees. Employees are utilized by all staff sections as interpreters, skilled laborers, technicians, and administrative personnel. Approximately 100 non-appropriated and appropriated fund employees are hired through local civilian personnel offices. A special attempt is made to hire dependents of deceased CIDG or disabled CIDG. All employees are organized and managed under the unit funds officer. He supervises their pay, whether from the CIDG appropriated fund or the non-appropriated mess funds.

(9) III Corps Tactical Zone (Company A).

(a) General. The health records for assigned and attached personnel to Company A were transferred from Group Headquarters to Bien Hoa. Many advantages will result from this change. Records will be posted on a much more accurate and timely basis. They will be available for local reference during treatment. Physicals can be conducted at unit level. Health record will now accompany the remains of all personnel killed in action whereas in the past, they were mailed at a later date. The personnel and finance records for the LRRP (Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol) personnel attached to the 36th MSFC were transferred from Group Headquarters to their parent units. (1st Infantry Division, 25th Infantry Division, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, II Field Force Vietnam, 199th Light Infantry Brigade, and 9th Infantry Division). The basic reason behind the transfer was to improve personnel actions, reassignment actions, finance support, and casualty reporting. The current procedures for the shipment of personal property for personnel who are medically evacuated to hospitals outside the Republic of Vietnam were altered. A survey of 17 cases showed that it took an average of 15 days from the date of reassignment order until the paperwork was processed.

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the property shipped. In most cases the individual was in the hospital about 12 days from the date of the WIA to the date of the order. Thus the property often arrived after the individual left the hospital either for CONUS or return to RVN. To correct this situation, reassignment orders are now picked up early rather than waiting for them through channels. Also if the individual has very little property, his belongings are delivered to the hospital before he is medically evacuated so he can hand carry them. On 12 June, an S1 conference was held to orient all subordinate level S1's on personnel and administrative policies. Generally, adjutants of B detachments are not experienced in administration. Instruction on over 100 personnel subjects and procedures was given.

(b) Morale and Personnel Services. Actions were taken with 1st Logistical Command Special Services to obtain six unit libraries for issue to each B detachment and the C detachment. Each library will have between 300 and 400 books. Each detachment has constructed a library area at its location. Special Services athletic equipment is being obtained for the A and B detachments. Although the equipment has not been received, all administrative action has been completed. Company A headquarters has built basketball, volleyball, and tennis courts. As a result of MSF battalions operating separately, a mail delivery problem was created. To dissolve the problem, the casualty line numbers were used to break down mail by MSF unit location for direct delivery by helicopter. Mail is delivered almost once a day to B detachments. Mail delivery time from CONUS to the remote A detachments averages eight or nine days.

(c) Civilian Personnel. Civilian personnel employed by Company A and subordinate detachments number almost 460 to include 245 workers performing administrative and logistical services at the company headquarters and almost 215 supporting combat operations at A and B detachments. Employees are recruited by Company A, CPO, from the Bien Hoa and Saigon areas. Applicants for employment must undergo a series of tests administered by the CPO. Once the applicant is found to be technically qualified, he then fills out two application forms: a personnel questionnaire and a sponsor statement. Using these forms a VNSF Security Officer investigates the applicant. The employees only start working upon completion of the security investigation. Employees are assigned to sections or detachments depending on job vacancies within the authorized civilian table of distribution. The CPO pays and manages civilian employees in accordance with the 5th SFGA Reg 690-1.

(10) IV Corps Tactical Zone (Company D).

(a) Morale and Personnel Services. Mail goes to each detachment a minimum of three times a week with continued effort to utilize all available aircraft for this purpose. The unit fund sponsored one party, sending beer and food stuffs to each A detachment. Twelve to fifteen movies are sent to each detachment monthly.

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Personnel on detachments can utilize the recreational facilities at Can Tho on visits to this area. These facilities include tennis courts and a swimming pool at the MACV compound, the USO establishment, local chapels, and the Det C-4 club.

(b) Personnel Management. The only problem encountered is nonpublication and late receipt of orders for permanent change of station and separation from the service. Several cases occurred where individuals had to report to Group for scheduled DEROS without orders.

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(1) Medical.

(1) USASF Medical Care. The number and dispersed location of 5th SFG (Abn) personnel make it virtually impossible for one dentist to provide adequate care for all of Special Forces in Vietnam. As a result of conversations between the Group Dental Surgeon and Major General Robert Shira, Chief of the Army Dental Service, steps have been taken to obtain another dentist for Special Forces in Vietnam as authorized in our MTOE.

(2) CIDG Medical Care. Due to a chronic shortage of SF qualified ancillary medical personnel, both the Special Forces and the Airborne requirements have been dropped for 91S, 91P, 71J, 92B, and 91E personnel.

(3) Veterinary Medicine. Due to the large area covered by Special Forces and the great need for veterinary support, the veterinarian assigned to Group cannot do the required job. This situation has been discussed with the Chief Veterinarian in Vietnam at USARV Headquarters. As a result, an additional veterinarian will be assigned to the 5th SFG in September 1968.

(4) Medical Supplies. In May 1968, Special Forces was cut off from drawing medical supplies through the 32nd Medical Depot. While investigating the problem we found that Special Forces can receive better medical support by ordering all supplies from Okinawa and shipping directly from Nha Trang. As a result Special Forces A, B, and C detachments draw medical supplies from the SFOB and close control is exercised over all requisitions.

(5) Training. During the second quarter of 1968 Special Forces personnel at A, B, and C detachment levels trained a total of 442 CIDG airmen, 172 indigenous nurses, and one advanced dental technician.

(6) I Corps Tactical Zone (Company C).

(a) Medical Care. USASF personnel receive emergency care, first aid treatment and primary diagnosis at the Company C dispensary. When hospitalization is required USASF personnel are admitted to Army or Navy hospitals in I Corps. The company C CIDG hospital serves the medical needs of the CIDG and MSF in I CTZ. The capabilities of this hospital are adequate except for major surgical procedures. Army, Navy, and German hospital ship facilities fill requirements for major surgery and their cooperation has been outstanding in this area.

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(b) Problems. Some personnel are unnecessarily evacuated from the field for minor wounds and illness, however, this problem is being resolved by closer cooperation between USASF and VNSF medics in the field. Another problem is that VNSF counterpart doctor obstinately refuses to cooperate in the care of CIDG patients. The CIDG hospital has adequate space and personnel for all CIDG patients in I Corps. The VNSF doctor has offered no assistance at this hospital for the past three months. Discussions with our counterpart lead to agreement that all CIDG patients should be treated at this site and that he would join the staff as physician and assist in patient care. So far, cooperation from the VNSF has been withheld in efforts to get CIDG patients transferred from Dui Tan hospital and the VNSF dispensary. In many instances these two facilities provide unsatisfactory care and are havens for malingerers. A solution to this problem is not obvious at present; however efforts toward an understanding will continue.

(c) Training. In June, thirty five indigenous nurses and medics received the basic six week course. Thirty one of the thirty five students passed the examinations. The four that failed were Montagnards who had difficulty with the language; however, because they showed obvious enthusiasm and interest, they were provisionally passed to obtain full qualification after OJT. Thirty three are employed at A sites and two at this location. A new class is programmed for September.

(d) MEDCAPS. Previously no supplies have been received specifically for MEDCAPS. A new channel evidently has just opened via the Logistical Command and this will be explored for obtaining supplies. MEDCAPS have utilized our regular supplies in the past. When supplies become available A team can expand their programs. The hospital, at present, has personnel to initiate a MEDCAP team to supplement A team efforts.

(7) II Corps Tactical Zone. (Company B)

(a) Medical Care. The medical and dental records of USASF personnel in B Company have been transferred from the SFOB to the CIDG Hospital. Cooperation with the 71st Evacuation Hospital has continued in dental and medical specialties for USASF personnel.

(b) Veterinary Medicine. A plan has been developed to immunize dogs in the C detachment areas with rabies vaccine.

(c) Medical supply has been the most severe problem area at the CIDG Hospital in recent months. For example, on 27 July 68, the CIDG Hospital was completely out of such essential items as Ringers Lactate and 5%

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Dextrose/Water (intravenous fluids), adhesive tape 4 inch ace bandages, 4 inch cast plaster, and intravenous catheters. Supply levels of disposable needles, disposable syringes, blood recipient sets, penicillin, and chloroamphenicol were critically low. Fortunately, the 71st Evacuation did assist the CIDG Hospital to some extent, but it is quite embarrassing when a hospital has to ask another hospital for such basic medical items as those mentioned above. In fact, medical supplies reached such a low ebb that several patients had to be transferred to other hospitals in the area. It is hoped that the procurement of medical supplies from Okinawa through the SFOB will prevent this problem from recurring.

(d) Training. The CIDG Hospital completed a ten week basic medic course for 31 Montagnards and Vietnamese from II Corps. The course consisted of didactic instruction and on the job training by Special Forces medics, physicians, nurses, and laboratory technicians from CIDG Hospital with cooperation from personnel at the 81st Evacuation Hospital. Experience has shown that an intermediate course following the basic course is necessary if the student is to acquire any adeptness as a medic. This program is being worked on at the present time and consists of more on the job training than the primary course. Nurses from the 71st Evacuation Hospital were invited to tour the CIDG Hospital. As a result a number volunteered to spend their free time working at the hospital not only in patient care but in teaching the indigenous personnel nursing and sterile techniques. The two Montagnard medics working at the CIDG Hospital were selected by the surgeon because of their basic intelligence and their aptitude for medicine. They accompany on daily rounds, assist in operations and complete assignments in basic science and medical textbooks. The projected plan is to tutor them and others of their caliber over a period of years until they have attained a comparable level with that of a Vietnamese doctor.

(e) MEDCAPS. Several MEDCAPS were conducted by the C Detachment in the past three months. Experience has shown that, except for the civic action and propaganda value, MEDCAPS are a waste of manpower and are impractical from a medical point of view. Statistics are being compiled but most of the patients cannot be treated because of inadequate medical facilities and the need for frequent follow up over prolonged periods. Sufficient amounts of drugs to cure the illnesses cannot be given because of fear of overdoses or because the drugs need to be manufactured for possible toxicity and side effects. MEDCAPS could be equipped with mobile laboratory facilities or even portable X-ray units. Unfortunately, this seems unfeasible. Arrangements could be made to medevac patients requiring hospital care. This is also impractical because most of the people are unwilling to leave their villages to come to the hospital.

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Therefore at the present time, MEDCAPS are of little value in serving the medical needs of the indigenous population. Time would be better utilized if one of the more intelligent natives (male or female) were trained as a medic and returned to his village.

(8) III Corps Tactical Zone. (Company A).

(a) USASF Medical Care. Basic medical care is given to USASF personnel at the CIDG hospital, including routine sick call and immunization. Where more advanced care is required, USASF personnel are sent to either the 93rd Evacuation or the 24th Evacuation Hospitals in Long Binh. Emergency dental work is done at the 93rd Evacuation Hospital. Most non emergency work is sent to the Group Dental Officer at Nha Trang.

(b) CIDG Care. The CIDG Hospital is composed of two 40 bed wards, two operating rooms, a combination laboratory and X-ray facility, mess hall and supporting activities. It handles emergencies, definitive, and surgical patients. Ninety percent of all treatment is surgical in nature. The staff handles between 30 and 50 cases a month, and an average of 150 minor procedures which include DPO's (delayed primary closure). The hospital has an average of 80 patients per day under treatment. The convalescent center at Long Binh will be able to handle patients in another week or so. With the addition of a capable medical staff whose only function will be convalescent work, it is expected that the many long term care patients will recover much quicker than at present. The hospital has a preventive medicine specialist and the Preventive Medicine Program is formalized as a separate section. More of the specialized techniques and equipment are being brought into use. Inspections and visits to the camps in III Corps further expanding the Preventive Medicine Program to the lowest levels of command where it will be most effective. At present, we have no serious preventive medicine problems in III Corps.

(c) Veterinary Medicine. At present we have no veterinary medicine problems at Company A. There have been no significant diseases, epidemics, or veterinary immunization problems.

(d) Medical Supplies. The medical operations for the CIDG Hospital, B, and A detachments are a responsibility of the S4 section. This includes all phases of command, supervision, and support. In the past, the only problem was the long time (30 days or more) required to train the medical supply replacement. Training was needed since medical supply specialists were hard to get and the position was usually filled with a 91B4S. Company A

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is now fortunate to have a genuine medical supply specialist. In general the supply situation has been more than adequate and operations will continue to improve when moved into the new building.

(e) Training. The training of the VNSF at the CIDG Hospital is the principal training program in effect. At present there is one VNSF surgeon and 14 NGO medics. They are being trained in both the medical and administrative aspects of hospital operations. Much emphasis has been placed upon improving the working relationship with the VNSF medic counterparts. Joint USASF/VNSF were instituted and they have been very helpful. The VNSF are now doing a greater volume of work, and much of it is more advanced than before. Also there are more joint medical activities.

(f) Miscellaneous. The hospital is expected to start a general "face lifting" to include remodeling the surgeon's office, wards, latrine, X-ray and laboratory facilities.

(8) IV Corps Tactical Zone (Company D).

(a) USASF Medical care. A and B detachment personnel requiring medical or dental treatment are sent to Company D on the first available aircraft. Personnel wounded on operations are immediately evacuated to the 3rd Surgical Hospital (Dong Tam). The Company D surgeon holds sick call daily. He is on call 24 hours a day to treat USASF personnel on an emergency basis. Patients that require special treatment are placed in medical evacuation channels. Personnel requiring dental treatment are treated by either the Dental Surgeon from 5th SF Gp when he makes his rounds of the Camps or at the 13th Aviation Battalion Dispensary.

(b) CIDG Medical Care. During the reporting period the Company D medical section treated 1700 CIDG patients and 3150 dependents/civilians. USASF medical personnel at the A detachments treated a total of 23,307 CIDG patients and 22,998 dependents/civilians. A total of 1303 persons received inoculations. The preventive medicine program is concentrating on preparing for the forthcoming flood season. All personnel are receiving cholera and plague inoculations; areas are being rat-proofed and water supplies are being checked to insure against contamination. A Letter of Instruction is being prepared by Company D to outline the responsibilities of camp personnel.

(c) Hospital Program. On 13 June 1968 Company D opened a 16 bed dispensary for the treatment of CIDG/USASF personnel. CIDG personnel formerly could only be treated at ARVN/Civilian hospitals. The clinic

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includes a doctor's office, treatment room, laboratory, shower/toilet and a 16 bed ward.

(d) Veterinary Medicine. There are no problem areas in IV Corps. USASF medical personnel treat an occasional pig, cow, or other animal for worms or pneumonia. All dogs that are pets of members of the various camps have been treated for worm infestation and have received rabies inoculations.

(e) Medical Supply. Medical supply to IV Corps is generally good. The following items, however are in short supply: Procaine Penicillin, 1,500,000 units. Insecticide, spray, aerosol. Tetracycline, 250 mgm tablets. Bicillin, 1,200,000 units. Surgical tape, 3 inch. Sponge, gauze, surgical, 2X2's. Mycolog cream.

(f) Training. The Company D medical section has outlined a program of instruction where indigenous personnel employed at the various A teams receive a course in laboratory procedures. Only 2 students receive instruction at one time. This insures that the student receives personalized instruction. The instructor is Vietnamese so there is no language problem.

(g) MEDCAPS. All USASF medical personnel at A detachment level are continually conducting medical patrols within their Area of Operations. Many of these patrols are in conjunction with combat operations. Company D/VNSF C-4 conducted 3 MEDCAPS in the surrounding CAN THO Area. These patrols are conducted in conjunction with the CA section. A total of 1138 patients were treated. Short supply of items in paragraph e. (4) above have restricted the number of MEDCAPS.

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m. Signal.

(1) Operations. During the reporting period all means of communication utilized within 5th SF Gp continued to operate at a high level of efficiency.

(2) Training. A number of personnel assigned to the 5th SFGA in the O5B MOS do not yet have the necessary proficiency to be a Special Forces Radio Operator. A communications orientation course has been established for them. This course, consisting of 44 hours of instruction, has proven adequate to insure that Radio Operators are proficient in Continuous Wave (CW) operations and familiar with the communications equipment utilized in the 5th SFGA.

(3) New Concepts/Equipment.

(a) The Robins Model 671/G 71 foot crank-up tower is being utilized to extend the FM capabilities between A and B detachments. Prior to this, there existed a definite problem with FM communications between the B detachment and its subordinate A detachments. The use of conventional relays or retransmission facilities on the highest possible terrain features was unsuccessful in most cases because of the difficulty of securing and protecting these suitable sites for an extended period of time.

(b) The TSC-26 radio now installed in Co E (Signal) has not caused any major technical problems which would require the presence of the two civilian technical representatives originally assigned. Furthermore, Co E now has an NCO who is technically qualified to repair this radio and the two civilian representatives have been returned to ECOM control. In the event that "in-house" resources and personnel capabilities can not meet maintenance requirements in the future, civilian technical representatives will be requested on a TDY basis.

(4) I Corps Tactical Zone (C Company).

(a) Operations. Teletype operations (both RATT and TROPO) and the SSB nets (both CW and voice) are definitely the work-horses of the company. Twenty-four hour communications are maintained with higher headquarters on secure teletype and with all subordinate camps on SSB. This capability provides an operation which is one of the most reliable and effective in Vietnam. FM communications are somewhat of a problem due to the fact that C Company does not have direct communications with all camps. Messages can be relayed to the more distant camps but this system, though adequate is not desirable.

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(b) Training. Company C training provides specific instruction in all phases of radio operations. All instruction and training is OJT and has resulted in each man being proficient in any phase of company communications to include base-station radio and A detachment radio operations.

(c) New Concepts/Equipment. The new FM secure equipment will arrive shortly and will be evaluated during the next quarter.

(5) II Corps Tactical Zone (B Company).

(a) Operations. The establishment of a tropospheric scatter circuit to QUI NHON has greatly enhanced telecommunication to B-22. A circuit to IFFORCEV has been established between S3, Co B and G3, IFFORCEV. It enables the operations sections to coordinate via secure communications. Equipment for the establishment of the S3 circuit was not available at the time of circuit activation. This problem was resolved by acquiring equipment on loan from the 51st Signal Battalion. The efficiency of all means of communications within Co B is reliable with the exception of two radio teletype circuits. These two circuits are due for conversion to tropospheric scatter.

(b) New Concepts/Equipment. An attempt was made to raise a balloon (Little Joe Project) with radio relay equipment attached. The balloon burst before an adequate test could be conducted.

(6) III Corps Tactical Zone (A Company).

(a) Operations. Company A headquarters terminates two VHF teletype circuits, one from Det B-33, HON QUAN, and one from Det B-34, SONG BE. This is an excellent means of providing teletype communications, however, the circuit to HON QUAN is of low quality and causes periodic problems in communications. Conversely, the SONG BE circuit is of excellent quality and provides a highly reliable communications link. Requests have been submitted to USARV for additional VHF circuits to Det B-32 and Det B-36. All operational B-detachments and the 36th MSFC subordinate to Company A have radio teletype communications capability. In the case of detachments B-33 and B-34, this capability is primarily a backup if their VHF circuits become in-operative. Radio teletype is normally a reliable means of communications; however, this reliability varies with changes in weather, time of day and yearly seasons. It is also highly dependent upon the operator's knowledge of radio theory and radio wave propagation. For these reasons VHF teletype is a much more desirable means of communications. SSB voice radio, AN/FRC-93, provides the Commander's Radio Net to all detachments subordinate to Company A. All B-detachments and the 36th MSFC monitor this net 24 hours a day

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while all A detachments enter the net upon request. A large volume of traffic is passed on this net in the form of phone patches between Company A and subordinate detachments. An average of sixty patches are effected daily with the majority originating within the Company A Staff. As a result, the volume of traffic transmitted over teletype means is greatly reduced. In addition to phone patches, SSB voice is used for coordination of teletype as well as a backup. Special Forces in III CTZ are extremely fortunate since the terrain permits FM communications far in excess of the planning range for FM radios. It is not unusual to communicate over 100 kilometers with FM equipment. In addition, NUI BA DEN Mountain, the highest terrain in III CTZ, provides an excellent radio relay site that has proven vital to operations. Through this relay, any Special Forces team in III CTZ can communicate with any other. With the addition of speech security equipment, the role of FM will be even greater.

(b) Training. Company A has been experiencing a critical shortage of trained radio and radio teletype operators. To offset this, both on-the-job and cross-training programs have been initiated at the Company and B team level.

(c) New Concepts/Equipment. The MSS of the 36th MSFC must have a radio teletype capability when deployed. In the past this capability was provided by an AN/GRC-26D teletype van. As this van was quite large, movement was a problem every time a new MSS was established. To alleviate this problem, a modified version of the AN/GRC-26D was obtained. The latter was mounted in a much smaller van with wheels. This new van can easily be air lifted by helicopter or C-123 aircraft while the wheels allow it to be towed for short distances. It can be positioned at an exact selected site within the MSS. This van has been used on several operations and has proven itself superior to the previous system. Airboat communications posed another problem. Company A is required to provide FM communications for the airboat platoon, located at Det A-352, TRA CU. After extensive experimentation a satisfactory communications system was developed for the airboats. This system consists of a RT-505/PRC-25 radio, a specially fabricated mount, a waterproofed Air Force noise suppressor headset with microphone (modified to fit an AN/PRC-25), a long wire antenna system, and extra long connecting cables with a push button type switch to activate the microphone. This system was installed in an airboat and tests were conducted under full throttle conditions. From the gunner's position radio contact was established from the boat to Det B-35 approximately 20 kilometers away. From the driver's position, contact could be established at 3/4 engine speed. Mounts and antennas have been installed in all airboats thereby permitting radios to be interchanged between boats with little loss of time. Another significant improvement in Company A communications was achieved since speech security equipment for FM radios has been obtained in sufficient quantity to

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provide secure voice circuits between all detachments. This equipment is of two types, the KY-8/TSEC and the KY-38/TSEC. A secure voice circuit has been installed between the company A TOC and II FFORCEV using the AN/VRC-46 radio and a KY-8/TSEC cipher device. By early August, all B detachments and the NUI BA DEN relay will have secure FM voice circuits, using the KY-8/TSEC and terminating at Company A. These secure circuits will provide a more expeditious backup means for teletype. All operational A-detachments will receive the KY-38/TSEC but this requires use of Radio Set AN/PRC-77. This radio set is similar to the AN/PRC-25 but is adapted for use with the KY-38/TSEC. Headquarters, 5th SFGA, presently has 500 of these radios on order and until their arrival, the KY-38/TSEC cannot be placed in operation. The reliability of this equipment is yet to be determined.

(d) Miscellaneous. The importance of land line (telephone) communications (both internal and outgoing) cannot be overstressed. At the beginning of the rainy season, approximately 50% of the dial system was rendered inoperative. To prevent this from reoccurring, several steps were taken. All old internal telephone cables, mostly WD-1 wire lines, were replaced with 26 pair cables. The dial system phones were repaired and alternate cables were installed between Company Headquarters personnel (to include two hot lines) and, at the same time, provide spare lines to prevent lengthy telephone outage.

(7) IV Corps Tactical Zone (D Company).

(a) Operations. During the period 1 May through 31 July 1968, Company D communications center processed 3,401 incoming and 4,155 outgoing messages. Communications center operations continued to be hampered by a shortage of personnel. The signal maintenance facility began the reporting period with a backlog of 235 deadlined items. During the reporting period the signal maintenance facility received 431 items for repair. 411 were repaired and returned to the detachments. 11 were deadlined for parts, 21 were evacuated for higher echelon maintenance and none were awaiting evacuation at the end of the reporting period. 211 were carried forward as deadlined. Completion of a signal warehouse allowed the signal maintenance shop to expand its office space. This expansion coupled with the addition of a signal parts clerk has allowed closer supervision of the maintenance flow. As a result the signal maintenance facility is able to pinpoint its problem areas and resolve them, giving a more efficient maintenance flow. During the month of May, all single sideband radio nets within Company D were monitored by the 101st Radio Research Company. A total of 31,557 transmissions were monitored and four security violations were discovered. Three types of practice dangerous to transmission security were also uncovered. In the month of July, Company D and all its subordinate detachments FM radio nets were monitored by the 101st Radio Research Company, using a mobile station located at MOC HOA and an airborne monitoring

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station. No security violations or practices dangerous to transmission security were detected. Also, in the month of July, Company D, B-41, and B-43 underwent an inspection of their respective Crypto facilities by a team headed by the Group Crypto custodian. No security violations were found. Discrepancies in paperwork were corrected on the spot.

(b) Training. All detachments have been directed to make all contacts on the Group Emergency Net using the AN/GRC-109 radio set. While not the primary Special Forces radio in Vietnam, this radio is still the primary means of communication for Special Forces units in general. It is felt that the use of this radio for emergency contacts will allow Special Forces radio operators to maintain proficiency in use of this set.

(c) New Concepts/Equipment. Due to atmospheric conditions during the rainy season, RTT reception became poor in late morning and afternoon hours. This resulted in SITREPS and ISUMS being late in reaching their respective staff sections. The deadline for the SITREP and ISUM was changed from 1500 to 1200. This resulted in these reports being transmitted in the early morning. It can be seen that this present deadline will have to be adjusted as the seasons of the year and the corresponding atmospheric conditions change. The 52nd Signal Bn completed construction of a VHF RTT system to MOC HOA and CHAU DOC. This system is for the use of MACV teams at these locations, removing MACV traffic from Special Forces RTT nets.

(d) Miscellaneous. In many cases, submission of requisitions for signal spare parts through normal supply channels resulted in delays in getting these parts due to misrouted or lost requisitions. Coordination was made with Group Headquarters to deliver spare parts directly from the Company D Signal Maintenance facility to the Group Signal Warehouse. Results of this change have shown up in the significant reduction of items deadlined for parts. Detachments were turning in deadlined signal items to the Signal Maintenance facility in batches of 10 - 15 radios at one time. This was causing an unnecessary workload on the signal maintenance facility, resulting in excessive downtime of deadlined signal items. A program was instituted to get all deadlined signal items turned in for repair as soon as possible after they were deadlined. Immediate result of this program was an unusually large backlog of deadlined signal items. However, as this backlog was reduced, the downtime of deadlined signal items was correspondingly reduced.

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n. Comptroller.

(1) Appropriated fund management.

(a) There has been considerable activity during July towards establishing program managers within the primary staff for the in-country portion of the Operations and Maintenance funding programs. Each applicable staff section is to be assigned responsibility for the cost cell falling within its responsibility of operations. Cost ceilings will be provided on a quarterly basis. Comptroller will furnish expenditure data so that progress can be measured against program levels. In addition, the expenditures made for each program within a Company will be reduced to expenditures per 100 CIDG soldiers. This will permit comparison of Companies in terms of relative performance as well as total expenditures, and will allow the Commander to objectively determine the effectiveness of each C Detachment Commander to utilize resources.

(b) There has also been considerable effort to establish controls over the FEPA obligation authority. The primary difficulty lies in the fact that an effective, responsive, and timely cost system is not in effect. Obligation Authority consists of Ammunition--65%, and long lead time mission essential equipment--35%. There is no problem in administrative control of the long lead time mission essential equipment because all requisitions are tightly controlled by the 5th SFGA and obligations are recorded at the time the requisitions pass through the United States Counter Insurgency Office in Okinawa. There is a problem in administrative and operational control of the ammunition portion of the obligation authority because nearly all issues of ammunition are made by 1st Log Cnd in Vietnam to elements of the 5th SFGA scattered throughout the RVN. 1st Log Cnd does not currently have an effective method for documenting and costing these ammunition issues to 5th SFGA. This may be due in large part to the fact that the 5th Gp is but one of many customers within a principally free issue ammunition system. It might be advisable to consider placing 5th SFGA on a non-reimbursable basis for issue of ammunition made by 1st Log Cnd. The primary disadvantage to this proposal is that it would eliminate financial management control for ammunition from the Parasol Switchback funding system. Another disadvantage to consider is the effect free issue of ammunition to the 5th Gp would have on priority. The Group does not operate under a TOE or TA as do the conventional units in RVN. Whether or not ammunition issues are made without regard to financial management controls, one thing is obvious, and that is, that there still must be some means of timely and accurately reporting ammunition issues to the C.O. 5th SFGA, in order to manage resources. Program Directors for portions of the FEPA resources could also be established with a more responsive cost accounting or resource utilization rate accounting system.

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(c) There has also been considerable activity in establishing controls over the Materials Category of the Operations and Maintenance Obligation Authority. As with the control of the ammunition portion of the FEMA Obligation Authority, the primary difficulty lies in the fact that an effective, responsive, and timely segmented cost system is not in effect. About 25 million dollars of a 40 million dollar a year OMA Material Category funding program of supplies is issued by the 1st Log Cmd in RVN to the 5th SFGA. The remaining 15 million dollars is used to obtain supplies or to let contracts through the U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Office in Okinawa. Once again, as with the FEMA Obligation Authority, there is no problem in administrative control of the portion of the Material Category OMA allotment for supplies and contracts obtained or let through the CISO supply office. There are some problems experienced by the Group in receiving cost data by diminutive cost cells for management and control purposes. There is a problem in administrative and operational control of the in-country issue portion of the obligation authority because issues are made in country without having a timely accurate, and efficient cost accountability or resource accountability system. Whether or not Material Category issues from 1st Log Cmd to 5th SFGA are made without regard to financial management controls, one thing is obvious, and that is, that there still has to be some way of documenting Material Category issues. With an effective reporting system of in-country issues, the CO 5th SFGA would be able to manage these resources by appointing members of his staff as program directors.

(2) Programming and Budgeting.

(a) Comptroller exercised staff responsibility for developing the FY 1969 Command Budget Estimate during the quarter. A phased plan for development of the FY 1969 CBE was drawn up at the end of the previous quarter, which outlined the requirements for input from the other staff sections and set forth the dates for when the input would be due so that suspense date set for submission by DA and USARPAC could be met. It became necessary to prepare the budget without a MACV approved concept of operations in order to meet the 24 April 1968 suspense date imposed by USARPAC. The Comptroller and the S4 hand carried the proposed CBE to USARPAC to be available to explain changes in requirements over those stated in the FY 1969 Initial Program Budget Estimate which had been submitted Aug 1967. Changes in budgetary requirements were caused by enemy changes in weaponry, disposition, and capability, but primarily by a proposal to expand and reorganize the CIDG. Comptroller and S4 remained at USARPAC from 25 April 1968 until 2 May 1968 with a proposed Operating Program and Budget which had not been approved by HQ MACV. Comptroller, 5th SFGA called CO 5th SFGA to inform him that a MACV approved concept should be forwarded as soon as possible to USARPAC. Comptroller received assurance prior to departure from USARPAC that the FY 69

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proposed CBE would be forwarded to DA with a qualified recommend approval indorsement for planning purposes subject to concept approval by COMUSMACV. USARPAC decided, subsequent to departure of Comptroller, not to forward proposed CBE to DA without a MACV approved concept of operations. Comptroller was notified that the proposed FY 1969 CBE had not been forwarded to DA with the qualified indorsement referred to above on 18 May 1968. The budget officer and Comptroller. 5th Gp then proceeded to Okinawa to obtain CISO assistance in revising the CBE to conform to a revised, but still not yet approved, 5th SFGA concept of operations. Budget revision was completed 25 May 1968. Comptroller and budget Officer then proceeded to HQ MACV and presented the revised FY 69 CBE. The revised concept of operations had still not been approved by MACV. After two days of deliberation and explanation of the entire revised FY 69 proposed CBE, Comptroller 5th SFGA obtained approval of the document to include revised concept of operations. The document was then forwarded to USARPAC by MACV on 23 May 1968. USARPAC forwarded the revised document to DA on 12 June 1968. Since then, CO 5th SFGA has been notified that the document arrived too late in DA to be considered in issuing the FY 1969 AFP (Annual Funding Program) and 1st Quarter Advice of Allotment. The FY 1969 AFP and 1st Qtr Advice of Allotment had been made by DA in accordance with the Initial Program Budget Estimate submitted by Hq 5th SFGA in Aug 1967. The proposed FY 1969 CBE is currently under consideration at DA and CO 5th SFGA will be notified at a later time about any additional funding.

(b) Comptroller exercised staff responsibility for developing FY 1970 Initial Program Budget Estimate. This document was drawn up using a phased development plan similar to the plan used to draw up the FY 69 Proposed Command Budget Estimate. Difficulties encountered were minimal even though considerable time and effort was devoted to obtaining necessary MACV approval for the concept of operations before dispatch to USARPAC.

(3) Non appropriated fund audits. The Comptroller conducted audits of non appropriated mess funds. They showed need for a more formal standardized accounting system. Numerous errors were uncovered and are subject to audit by USARV. Brigadier General Frank H. Linnell, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, Hq USARV, has offered the services of the USARV Staff to CO 5th SFGA for formal inspections, audits, guidance, and service. Plans are to obtain services of an audit instructor to give classes to auditors of 5th SFGA Comptroller in all applicable non-appropriated fund regulations. 5th SFGA will then standardize the Mess Association to conform to requirements of applicable regulations.

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31 July 1968. RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)**2. (C) Section 2. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.****a. Personnel. None.****b. Operations.****(1) Locating the Enemy.****(Co A)****(a) OBSERVATION.** During the rainy season the enemy is usually found on high ground along trails.**(b) EVALUATION.** Enemy defensive positions and trenches are flooded in low areas and he is forced to move to higher ground.**(c) RECOMMENDATION.** Operations should not only cover areas along routes of movement but should especially search all the higher ground in the area of operation.**(2) Extraction Techniques and Recognition Signals.** (MACV Recondo School)**(a) OBSERVATION.** The recon team members utilize a half panel which is snapped open and closed to attract the attention of the lift ship. The panel appears to blink and is much more discernable than if displayed in the normal manner. When employing more than one lift ship, it was found that only one positioned itself on the panel while the others landed at their discretion and required the troops to expose themselves unnecessarily. Utilizing a panel for each touch down point alleviated this problem.**(b) EVALUATION.** Extractions have been executed with minimum delay and confusion utilizing panels as described above.**(c) RECOMMENDATION.** That the procedure of snapping or winking the panel be utilized during extractions and that units also employ multiple panels for multiple ship landing zones.**(3) Casualties due to friendly fire.****(Co A)****(a) OBSERVATION.** Gunship support has caused friendly casualties and friendly artillery has wounded friendly troops on several occasions.94
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(b) EVALUATION. While a medevac ship was on the ground it received one small arms round and called directly to his gunship support. Without consulting the ground commander the gunships fired into the friendly troop positions causing casualties. Also, while FAC personnel were adjusting artillery, the rounds were shifted too close to friendly troops and caused casualties.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Insure that all aircraft are briefed to fire in support of the ground troops at the command of the ground commander only. The ground commander should have the final decision as to whether artillery is too close or not and the FAC should follow the precise instructions of the ground commander.

(4) Personnel on Combined Operations.

(Co C)

(a) OBSERVATION. On all combined operations there should be at least one USASF advisor and one interpreter with each CIDG unit that is combined with an American unit.

(b) EVALUATION. Even though each American company working with CIDG forces has an interpreter, maximum control and benefit can be obtained only when USASF personnel and their own interpreter accompany the unit. On combined LRP operations and combined sweeps American forces depend on quick response and interpretation of incidences developed by CIDG forces. Delay due to a misunderstanding reduces the effectiveness of the operation. Usually the American unit's interpreter has little or no knowledge of the CIDG with which he is working and cannot effectively communicate with them.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. None.

(5) Camp Security.

(Co A)

(a) OBSERVATION. Camps often develop a fixed pattern when sending out their camp local security. The security element will merely move out to a position often used before and remain there during the night. This allows the enemy to plot local security positions and to move large elements around security positions safely and still pass close to SF camps.

(b) EVALUATION. Ambushes from the camp must be set up along different routes each night. Listening posts with sufficient communications to call in H & I fire must be established in constantly changing locations. Patrolling must be conducted along continuously varying routes. If these practices are

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not followed, the entire concept of the SF camp being established along known enemy lines of communications will prove to be only partially valid.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION.** That the same amount of operational planning be given to the planning of local security at night as is given to regular company size day operations. The local security if employed properly and placed out a sufficient distance from the camp, will serve as an excellent detector of VC activity and enemy movement around SF camps will be disrupted.

(6) CSF and Armored Cavalry in Night Perimeters.

(Co D)

(a) **OBSERVATION.** At various times CSF units are called upon to conduct operations in which armored vehicles are used. When forming a perimeter for night defense, these vehicles form up in a circle similar to the wagon trains of earlier years. The CSF troops automatically make themselves comfortable on top of, under, and between the vehicles. Armored vehicles at night make good targets for VC mortar and B-40 rocket attacks. If the VC struck with the CSF in such a position, it would cause much confusion and many friendly casualties.

(b) **EVALUATION.** After explaining to the VNSF counterpart the possibility of a VC mortar and B-40 attack, he generally will be willing to move the CSF out away from the vehicles. By forming a perimeter away from the vehicles, one mortar round will not be able to cut up the entire unit. It also reduces the possibility of VC rocket gunners getting in close range of the vehicles. In this manner safety is provided for the troops and security is provided for the vehicles.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION.** None.

(7) Operational Results.

(Co A)

(a) **OBSERVATION.** VNSF and CSF have a tendency to avoid contact when there are no USASF personnel on operations or assigned to the camp.

(b) **EVALUATION.** The VNSF and CSF have doubts about their ability to request, receive and adjust U.S. controlled fire support. They also fear that the U.S. units may fire on them by mistake and that the VNSF will not be able to contact the U.S. units.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION. USASF should thoroughly train their VNSF counterparts on requesting and adjusting fire support. There should be one VNSF or interpreter on all operations that can act as liaison with U.S. units. All CSF and VNSF operations should also have one English speaking VNSF available to go up with FAC or AO if additional guidance and coordination is needed.

(8) Developing Patterns in Preparing for and Conducting Operations. (Co C)

(a) OBSERVATION. Camps have developed patterns which unintentionally can give the enemy information as to starting time and location of operations.

(b) EVALUATION. It has been noted that camps usually hold their briefings and rehearsals or put on tiger fatigues at approximately the same time prior to each operation. When going into certain areas, a larger number of CSF soldiers are usually used. Camps often use the same routes when departing from the secure area that previous patrols used when they left to conduct an operation in the same area. The CSF have a habit of using the same night locations every time they operate in a certain area. All of the above form patterns which provide the VC with intelligence on camp operations. Deviations from these patterns usually result in catching the VC unaware and within friendly ambushes.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. A few USASF personnel wearing tiger fatigues for no reason is one method of changing a pattern and confusing VC agents.

(9) NVA Convoy Ambush Tactics. (Co C)

(a) OBSERVATION. During two major ambushes on convoys, the enemy troops were positioned with their backs to a large body of water and were forced to assault through the ambushed convoy in order to break contact.

(b) EVALUATION. This tactic has been very successful in the past. Surprise was achieved because the ambushes occurred in areas previously considered to be unlikely areas for ambushes. The assault was initiated within a very short time after the start of the ambush and before any supporting force could be employed against them.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That this tactic be brought to the attention of all units.

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(10) Extra Radio Handsets on Operations.

(Co A)

(a) OBSERVATION. It has been observed that most radio failures on operations can be attributed to faulty handsets.

(b) EVALUATION. On operations the radio handset usually receives the majority of abuse and wear. It is caught on brush and vines in thick terrain or the operator may drop it during a contact. It is also constantly exposed to weather and dirt.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. One additional handset should be carried on all operations. Radio operators should be cautioned and instructed in the proper handling of the handset. All handsets should be checked for serviceability and waterproofing before and after each operation.

(11) VC Water Traffic.

(Co D)

(a) OBSERVATION. An analysis of VC water traffic along the Mekong River from the Cambodian border to Hong Ngu has confirmed suspicions that the VC watch and take advantage of the movement of river patrol craft.

(b) EVALUATION. As the patrol boats, river (PBR) cruise by, VC river traffic is halted. Once the PBR's have passed, the VC immediately cross the river or move in the opposite direction from the PBR's. Apparently the VC recognize the extent of the patrol areas and the time frame for PBR operations.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Arrangements should be made for continued surveillance of the river patrol area of operations. A decoy could be sent through with other units on standby for immediate reaction. The use of a sampan which is anchored in an advantageous spot for surveillance and reporting has proved useful. Do not compromise the surveillance element by allowing them to fire upon or intercept the illegal traffic. Let the VC continue to believe that any interception is a matter of misfortune rather than technique on the part of the patrol element.

(12) Expedient Fougasse.

(Co B)

(a) OBSERVATION. It has been observed that expedient fougasse separates and does not maintain its flammability when exposed to the extremely hot and humid climate prevalent throughout Vietnam. It has also been found that the fougasse may appear in perfect order, but still will not fire.

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(b) EVALUATION. None.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. The expedient fougasse must be checked and double checked to insure that it does not dry up and become nonflammable. It should be checked at least twice a month. Once the fougasse is six months old, a test fire of certain cans should be conducted.

(13) Displacement of the 4.2" mortar.

(Co D)

(a) OBSERVATION. The range of the 4.2 mortar may be overcome by displacing the mortar to alternate locations which allow coverage of the remote areas of the TAOR.

(b) EVALUATION. At unscheduled times the 4.2" mortar should be moved into a firing position to place interdiction fire on reported enemy locations. The movement may be conducted by either boat, or wheel, or track vehicles. Certain targets allow for displacement to established FOB's. At other times, a security unit is required to accompany the weapon. Prepositioning of ammo at FOB's must be followed with periodic inspections for continued serviceability.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS. None.

(14) Detection of Enemy Booby Traps.

(Co D)

(a) OBSERVATION. The enemy frequently uses vines and green foliage, which are easily identifiable to him, as booby trap trip wires and to cover mine detonators.

(b) EVALUATION. Vines and foliage normally are not found on the footpath of a trail even though they may completely surround the trail. If this is a warning device for the enemy, it can well serve as a warning device for friendly troops.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. None.

(15) Booby Trapped Signs.

(Co D)

(a) OBSERVATION. It has been found that the enemy has intentionally posted booby trapped signs which were offensive to the CIDG.

(b) EVALUATION. One such sign was angrily torn down by a CIDG soldier and the resulting explosion killed two and wounded two CIDG troops.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. None.

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(16) Areas mined and booby-trapped by the enemy.

(Co B)

(a) OBSERVATION. Heavily mined and booby trapped areas normally have sections which are assigned to one man. He serves as a guide when enemy units travel through his area.

(b) EVALUATION. None.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. When patrolling, watch for particularly heavily mined and booby trapped areas. When one is found, leave a stay-behind element to attempt to capture the individual in charge of the area. If captured, he can be forced to show the location of all mines and booby traps. Upon his removal from the area, the enemy suffers a great deal since they are also unfamiliar with the mines and booby traps in the area.

(17) Operations to Assist Rice Harvesting.

(Co C)

(a) OBSERVATION. There are large quantities of VC rice being grown outside secure areas but the villagers are afraid to harvest this rice because of VC taxation or lack of security. Operations should be planned to assist friendly villagers with the rice harvesting and to deny the rice to the enemy.

(b) EVALUATION. During the last rice harvest a concentrated effort was made by all camps to harvest the rice outside their secure areas. A number of methods were used, all of which met with success. One method was to have the CSF dress as civilians and accompany the civilians out to the fields to harvest the rice. The CSF, normally 8-12 strong, carried their weapons in bundles of sticks and hid radios within their clothing or cooking pots. One individual would set up a PRC-25 or 10 radio in the edge of the woodline while the others actually assisted in the harvest. All persons maintained a continuous surveillance over the surrounding area to observe for movement, taxation, or harassment. Use of the radio facilitated in calling in artillery fire on the VC or calling for a reaction patrol from the camp. A second method was the use of saturation patrolling around the roads to prevent VC taxation. A third method instituted was the helilifting of approximately 140 villagers into a VC area while CSF secured the area. After the villagers harvested the rice all personnel were helilifted back to the camp and village. Each villager who participated in the operation was rewarded with the rice.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. None.

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
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(18) Development and Utilization of a "Rappelling Bag."

(a) OBSERVATION. During operations in which rappelling has been conducted from helicopters, there existed a problem of the nylon ropes becoming entangled and knotted while falling to the ground. It was found that the improvised "rappelling bag" pictured below successfully eliminated the problem.



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(b) EVALUATION. The materials necessary for construction are easily obtainable and it can be constructed with a minimum expenditure of effort and time. When rolled up, it measures 18 inches in width and has a diameter of approximately eight inches. Its weight is 15 lbs. Therefore, it can be stored and maintained in the infiltration aircraft for immediate use. Approximately eighty feet of rope is "double stowed" within the bag and held by retaining bands. The remaining single strand of rope is used to secure the rope to the aircraft. The running end of the rope is fastened, utilizing a bowline knot, to a length of chain weighing from three to four pounds. This length of chain is sewn in a pocket at the bottom of the bag. To employ this device, the entire bag is pushed out of the aircraft. The weight of the bag with the chain attached pulls the rappelling rope out of the retainer bands as it drops to the ground.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. When the rappelling bag is utilized, it is recommended that two personnel exit the left door of the aircraft and one exit the right door. This allows the aircraft commander to observe the infiltration. It is further recommended that the "double snaplink" technique be employed when using the rappelling bag. When the first three individuals reach the ground, they must back off a distance of ten to twenty feet away from the area below the aircraft before unsnapping. This is to allow for the lift of the aircraft and enough slack or free rope for the following three personnel to quickly snap into. When the second group reach the ground, they will not be hampered by coming in contact with the bag or the snaplinks left on the line by the previous three personnel.

c. Training.

(1) Status of Incoming Personnel.

(MACV Recondo School)

(a) OBSERVATION. Personnel reporting for assignment to 5th SFCA are generally in poor physical condition and lack experience in the mandatory skills such as map reading, survival, etc.. Although some of these personnel have received pre-deployment training, many have never been subjected to surviving in a jungle environment or experienced being deployed by helicopter.

(b) EVALUATION. Classroom type instruction alone does not properly orient the soldier for duty in South Vietnam. The type of pre-deployment training being presented is evidently inadequate in the subjects of mortar and artillery adjustment, control of TAC air, heliborne operations, land navigation, physical training, and survival.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION. That these subjects be stressed in all predeployment training being conducted at Fort Bragg and other training centers. A copy of the Group Combat Orientation Course POI was forwarded to Fort Bragg and a survey team from CONARC was apprised of these shortcomings. Special Forces training at Fort Bragg should be slanted away from the UW role and should emphasize those subjects and techniques most appropriate to the present conflict.

(2) Personnel Qualified in the Vietnamese Language. (Co B)

(a) OBSERVATION. Virtually no operational detachment has a USASF linguist qualified in Vietnamese with a proficiency level 3 or higher.

(b) EVALUATION. This situation puts the USASF advisor at a great disadvantage when dealing with his counterparts because he must rely almost entirely on an interpreter. Even if one assumes that the interpreter is completely loyal and reliable, much is lost in translation. Though indigenous interpreter/translators would still be required, the USASF linguist could check translation of documents and could be used to discuss those matters which the detachment commander does not want the interpreter to have access to.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That a sufficient number of USASF personnel be programed for the long Vietnamese course at the Defense Language Institute to enable assignment of qualified linguists to each operational detachment. The best person to be so qualified would be the Intelligence Sergeant.

(3) Camp Strike Force Artillery Platoon. (Co A)

(a) OBSERVATION. The Camp Strike Force personnel that have been selected to receive artillery training do not appear to have a thorough knowledge of their job when they take over the guns.

(b) EVALUATION. Camp Strike Force personnel do not usually have sufficient education to quickly grasp the fundamentals of artillery training. They are not always the best qualified for the job, and some are not highly motivated.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Personnel selected for artillery training should be the most educated, motivated, and dependable Camp Strike Force soldiers available. If no qualified personnel are available, recruiting may be the answer. If possible, they should be sent to ARVN artillery school. Artillery advisors should be assigned to the platoon on a permanent basis after the CSF assumes control of the guns.

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(4) Hand and Arm Signals.

(Co D)

(a) OBSERVATION. CSF platoon and squad leaders are very weak in the use of hand and arm signals and in the various formations that are used to deploy their forces.

(b) EVALUATION. None.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That Patrol Leaders Cards be printed in VN and that they be issued to all leaders down to and including fire team leaders.

(5) Use of VNSF and CIDG instructors.

(Co A)

(a) OBSERVATION. When instructing CIDG, it has been noted that they are more responsive to instruction by their own people.

(b) EVALUATION. CIDG training improves when they are taught by their own people. The CIDG show a greater interest and participate more when instructed by their own personnel.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That VNSF and selected CIDG be used as instructors when training CIDG. These instructors should initially be trained by USASF personnel. The instructors should in turn train new instructors who may be selected from among the ranks of the students themselves.

(6) Tactical Refresher Training for VNSF and CIDG.

(Co D)

(a) OBSERVATION. It has been observed that the VNSF and CSF for some reason believe that the only required tactics in counter-guerrilla operations are the ambush and raid. They are unfamiliar with even basic fire and maneuver tactics in many cases.

(b) EVALUATION. A recent operation pointed out this deficiency quite clearly. A 70 man friendly unit was moving across an open area in daylight and was taken under fire by an enemy squad in the woods approximately 300 meters to the front. The situation called for a fire and maneuver front, but the operation commander did not seem to understand this concept when he was so advised. Everyone merely dropped in place and began firing in several directions. Eventually the operation commander formed an assault line and initiated a long attack to the target. The enemy squad had received no well placed fire and escaped through the jungle.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION. Refresher training should be conducted at least annually and should include basic infantry tactics such as fire and maneuver. Leaders and troops alike would then be prepared for all contact situations and not just those in which the friendly force has the initial advantage as in a raid or ambush.

d. Intelligence.

(1) Requirement to Treat "MAT" and "KIN" Information in the same Manner as US "SECRET" and "CONFIDENTIAL".

(a) OBSERVATION. The requirement to provide identical treatment for ARVN security classifications on KIN-CONFIDENTIAL, MAT-SECRET basis has been successful in that the documents are given the same treatment by US personnel; however, MAT and KIN documents are not given this degree of protection in ARVN channels. MAT documents are seldom, if ever, receipted for or accountable.

(b) EVALUATION. Classified documents received from VNSF counterparts are being locked in safes or stored in vaults by US personnel while the record copies of the same documents are lying in the open in the counterpart's office. It is common practice for USASF Team, which is unable to maintain a current, posted operations and order of battle map due to inability to provide adequate protection, to utilize their VNSF counterpart's map which contains the identical information and is stored in the open. The protection requirements are waived by the ARVN whenever operational necessity dictates or proper storage facilities are not available. However, the US requirements remain the same and operational capabilities of US personnel are restricted. The G-2 Section, VNSF, has been quite cooperative in downgrading MAT documents to KIN. It seems unrealistic to treat these documents in the same manner as US classifications, particularly if the originator can arbitrarily downgrade them with a grease pencil.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That the present system be revised, and particularly, that unaccountable, unnumbered ARVN MAT documents which are not signed for not be brought under US accountability as SECRET.

(2) Operational Priority for Intelligence Requirements. (S2)

(a) OBSERVATION. Unit requirements for personnel, supplies, etc., are processed on a priority basis when needed for tactical operations or in support of a tactical operation. However, all intelligence requirements are handled in the same manner.

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(b) EVALUATION. Intelligence requirements and requisitions for logistical and/or funding support could differentiate between normal housekeeping or administrative functions and actual operations. If a priority could be assigned which would differentiate between the numerous requests for routine support, activities could expedite those needs which are for actual operations in support of tactical elements.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That such a priority system be adopted for combat support requirements.

(3) Joint Intelligence Operations.

(Co A)

(a) OBSERVATION. In the past, intelligence operations were not exploiting the full potential of the Special Forces posture in Vietnam.

(b) EVALUATION. With a new Joint Policy Directive issued by American and Vietnamese Special Forces, new emphasis is placed on all aspects of intelligence and counterintelligence operations. The directive calls for close coordination and cooperation between American and Vietnamese intelligence efforts. This increased emphasis can only improve our intelligence and counterintelligence efforts.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That directives requiring a joint VNSF/USASF effort be bilingual joint directives.

(4) Inadequate Intelligence Nets.

(Co A)

(a) OBSERVATION. It appears that many agents within the various agencies know each other and fabricate stories to justify their monthly pay.

(b) EVALUATION. When new intelligence reported that tanks were in the Ben Soi TAOR, there followed a large number of tank reports that were obviously fabricated. The agents are not targeted, but are free to gather intelligence on their own.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. All agents should be closely observed and those that are not reliable should be relieved. A few well targeted, reliable agents are better and more economical than a large number of poor ones.

(5) Delayed Intelligence.

(Co A)

(a) OBSERVATION. Tay Ninh City has a very decentralized intelligence gathering capability. At best, our intelligence gathering, dissemination, and tactical reaction is poor.

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(b) EVALUATION. All agencies (Sector, JTAD, MSS, US Conventional Units, USASF, VNSF) appear to do a tremendous amount of duplication in the areas of CB, ARLA, Units, Personalities, AKA, and filing. Because of this, much information is not disseminated.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. A central agency should be staffed and equipped to handle the necessary essentials of intelligence. All other agencies would then be free to feed all information to this agency and concentrate on areas of immediate interest. When questions or need for EEI arises, this one agency would be the focal point for collection.

(6) Bomb Craters as Cache sites.

(Co A)

(a) OBSERVATION. During the past two months several caches have been located in bomb craters.

(b) EVALUATION. The enemy is making excellent use of a commonly found man made feature. The terrain is dotted with bomb craters and very little work is required to convert them to cache sites. The fact that bomb craters are so numerous also gives the enemy an advantage in that troops are discouraged by the time consuming task of searching every crater.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That all units in SVN be advised of the VC/NVA use of bomb craters as cache sites.

(7) Immediate Debriefing of VR Aircraft Pilots.

(Co B)

(a) OBSERVATION. It has been found that maximum utilization of and reaction to intelligence gained on VR missions can be obtained by having the aircraft land at the camp location on the same day that the VR mission was flown in its TAOR and the pilot debriefed immediately.

(b) EVALUATION. None

(c) RECOMMENDATION. None.

(8) Use of Indigenous Personnel to Collect Intelligence.

(Co B)

(a) OBSERVATION. Many CIDG camps are located in areas that do not have villages in the immediate vicinity of the camp. If these camps are to have any collection effort, it is necessary to have agents travel long distances through enemy held territory where good intelligence can be acquired.

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(b) EVALUATION. Those camps that have been able to infiltrate agents into areas located far from the camp have gained valuable intelligence. A system that is being used effectively at the present time is to use CSF personnel dressed in black pajamas, armed with bolt-action rifles, and wearing sandals. This allows them to travel long distances without suspicion. This method of gathering intelligence is highly recommended and works well in very remote areas. Project Delta has successfully employed a similar concept for some time.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That reliable natives be enlisted to dress like VC couriers and move to target areas to secure intelligence.

(9) Duties of the Intelligence Sergeant.

(Co B)

(a) OBSERVATION. In many camps the duties of the intelligence sergeant have been curtailed by other areas of responsibility. Many camps only have one intelligence-trained person on the site. When he goes on R and R or on an operation, an intelligence gap is created. The B detachments often send requirements to the camps to which only the intelligence sergeant can respond.

(b) EVALUATION. The duties of the intelligence sergeant are very important. Operations are based on intelligence and the intelligence sergeant should be able to substantiate operational areas. There are many requirements involving CI/Collection efforts that require much of the intelligence sergeant's time.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Where shortages in intelligence-trained personnel exist, the intelligence sergeant should be non-operational. This will enable him to devote full time to intelligence and correct shortcomings within the camp program. A detachments should be required to submit a weekly INTSUM and overlays detailing information obtained from returning operations. A two-way continuous flow of intelligence information should thus be possible.

(10) Radio Security.

(Co C)

(a) OBSERVATION. Support units violate radio security continuously when working with CIDG camps.

(b) EVALUATION. Helicopter pilots, especially when new to operating with CIDG camps, continuously use camp names instead of call signs. Camps have been correcting these violations and support units informed of call signs and frequencies.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That all support units be furnished SOI's or SOI extracts.

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(11) Intelligence Liaison Contact Files.

(Co D)

(a) OBSERVATION. Maintenance of a file containing brief dissertations on all liaison visits to other intelligence agencies, including personalities contacted, matters discussed, likes, dislikes, and personality quirks, can be a big asset in establishing better liaison relationships.

(b) EVALUATION. Liaison with other intelligence agencies is a necessity in the intelligence field. It is extremely important that good relations be developed and maintained with other intelligence agencies and an important fact in these is knowing personalities. It follows, therefore, that by maintaining a record of liaison visits to include notes on personalities, the liaison effort should be enhanced.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS. That detachments insure that intelligence liaison contact files are maintained.

(12) Reporting Agents' SOR numbers with Intelligence Reports.

(Co D)

(a) OBSERVATION. When subordinate detachments fail to report agent SOR number in INTSUM's or other intelligence reports, it is difficult for higher headquarters to properly evaluate the information in the reports.

(b) EVALUATION. Evaluation of sources is one of the key tools used to properly evaluate intelligence information reports. If the recipient of the report has no idea of who the source is, he has effectively lost one of his primary analytical tools for assessing the information in the report. By reporting SOR numbers in conjunction with reports, timely and more accurate assessments of information can be made as well. This also assists higher headquarters in the evaluation of each source for the purpose of upgrading or downgrading his reliability rating, or even terminating him.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. All intelligence reports from USASF/VNSF agents should contain the agents SOR number.

(13) Use of Full Frame 35mm Cameras on Operations.

(Co D)

(a) OBSERVATION. Full frame 35mm cameras should be utilized on operations rather than the half frame cameras.

(b) EVALUATION. On most operations 72 pictures are more than what is needed and, more often than not, a large quantity of pictures are wasted. The half frame print also loses its clarity when enlarged to 8" x 10" size.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION. None.

(14) Lack of Civilians within TAOR.

(Co D)

(a) OBSERVATION. It has been found that the lack of civilian population within a TAOR results in an inability to establish intelligence nets. This is a serious but not insurmountable hindrance to the establishment of effective area intelligence.

(b) EVALUATION. In TAOR's where no appreciable civilian population exists, maximum consideration must be given to all intelligence gathering means available, e.g., visual reconnaissance aircraft, PW's, reports from adjacent units, captured documents, small unit reconnaissance operations, Sky Spot, contacts made, caches found, and DISUMS from all levels.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. None

(15) Collection of Intelligence.

(Co D)

(a) OBSERVATION. Information coming from Vietnamese agencies is frequently given an inflated evaluation as to source and content. Incomplete reports are either withheld or, in some instances, filled out with standard vague information. (Example: a report contains no information about uniforms. The enemy usually wear grey uniforms. Therefore, the agency adds this safe, vague information.)

(b) EVALUATION. A difference between the US and Vietnamese rating system and the tendency for American Advisors to aggressively criticize gaps in the collection and reporting system form an atmosphere in which the Vietnamese will seek to avoid criticism by outwardly complying with required changes. In addition, ratings are inflated because the VN fear that a realistic rating will compromise their effort and not please the counterpart.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. S-2 advisors should immediately establish a common ground of understanding as to what is meant by each rating. He should also stress an atmosphere of constructive criticism and avoid creating a situation where he is on one side and the S-2 is on the other. The emphasis should be on improving means of collection rather than criticising the lack of results.

(16) Exploitation and Evacuation of Captured Documents, Material, and Personnel.

(a) OBSERVATION. Over and over, large quantities of material, documents,

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or even PW's have been dumped out at B detachments by capturing units without any supporting information. Detainees, PW's and even refugees have been left with no means of distinguishing which was which. Time and again this has led to inefficient processing of detainees, unnecessary overloads on interrogation resources, and inefficient exploitation of intelligence sources. Often the processing unit is given no idea as to location or circumstances of capture and has no point at which to begin exploitation.

(b) EVALUATION. The necessity for quick action under the pressure of contact and the haste and confusion of airmobile type operations in particular, contribute to this problem. Too often the lack of specific instructions for capturing personnel leads to complete lack of action on their part and they just dump their captured items at the nearest occupied friendly location.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. American units in the field and US advisors with indigenous forces should be thoroughly briefed as to the proper procedures for classifying and handling of captured material and personnel. They should be thoroughly familiar with the necessary minimum information which is to be furnished by the capturing unit to the processing unit. Unit SOP's, especially in airmobile units, should emphasize basic action to be taken to insure that this information accompanies the captured material or personnel to higher headquarters.

(Co D)

(17) Harassment Tactics Against VC.

(a) OBSERVATION. The enemy's tactic of small terrorist type harassment can be effectively utilized against the VC. Willing soldiers or Hoi Chanh can go into known VC bivouac areas in small groups of three or less, throw grenades or harass the VC with small arms fire just as the VC do to our outposts.

(b) EVALUATION. This practice has been effectively utilized. The enemy does not expect this tactic. Its occasional use forces the enemy to spend time watching for and thinking about it rather than resting.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. None.

(Co D)

(18) Intelligence from Market Trends.

(a) OBSERVATION. Special Forces Camps that purchase their produce from the local civilian market should note the daily routine of both the civilian buyer and seller of goods. Changes in the normal routine can be indications of enemy activity.

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(b) EVALUATION. As an example, the sudden stockpiling of food by local civilians could indicate that the enemy will commence offensive action and thus prevent the import of goods into the market place. Lack of certain items may indicate that the VC are imposing high taxation on the producer or is procuring a large quantity of the items for his own use. This could also mean an increase of the number of troops in the area or a prolonged action by the enemy is about to take place. Market gossip is also a valuable source of information.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. The CIDG camp's purchasing agent should be trained to look for these trends and to report them to the intelligence personnel of the camp.

e. Logistics.

(1) Sandbag, Polypropyl, FSN: 8105-926-2034.

(Co B)

(a) OBSERVATION. The life expectancy of the sandbag, polypropyl, FSN: 8105-926-2034, is four to seven weeks.

(b) EVALUATION. This item is not satisfactory for use in semi-permanent fortifications. Field use of the sandbag, polypropyl, has shown that it will disintegrate when it is exposed in a hot, dry environment. The burlap sandbag lasts from five to six months. The LSC has stopped requesting the polypropyl sandbag, but substitute issue continues. Therefore, we must supply it to troops in the field.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. The polypropyl sandbag should be used for hasty field fortifications only. If the polypropyl sandbag is designed for use in semi-permanent fortifications, it should be reevaluated.

(2) Treated Malaysian Hardwood.

(S4)

(a) OBSERVATION. Treated Malaysian Hardwood, an extremely hard and durable lumber, is excellent for such construction as bridges, wharves, bunkers, and structures subject to prolonged periods of wet weather. However, since it is extremely hard and rough cut, it is difficult to work with and not entirely suitable for finished carpentry work.

(b) EVALUATION. The 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne) Logistical Support Center has on hand considerable stocks of treated Malaysian hardwood in assorted sizes from 4" x 6" down. This lumber is available for issue to all activities supported by the Civilian Irregular Defense Group program. This lumber is available in addition to allocations of finished lumber.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION. Units contemplating construction of buildings that will be subjected to prolonged exposure to water or damp weather should seriously consider using treated Malaysian hardwood lumber because it will appreciably increase the service life of the structure, reduce maintenance, and thus result in an overall reduction of labor at the cost of a slight increase of initial labor.

(3) Prerigged Supplies.

(S4)

(a) OBSERVATION. Emergency prerigged supplies consisting of ammunitions, medical items and water were formerly maintained at the LSC in a ready to drop posture for possible emergency resupply requirements. These prerigged supplies required constant maintenance, inspection, and care.

(b) EVALUATION. The content of prerigged supplies are based on probable requirements, which may or may not be specifically the supplies required when the resupply is affected. The LSC has the capability to pull, package, and rig supplies within the time frame in which aircraft can be made available for dropping the supplies.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. In order to provide the kind and quantity of supplies requested when an emergency resupply is required, the supplies should be pulled, packaged and rigged at the time the requirement is made known. (This procedure is now in effect at the LSC.)

(4) Expedient M106 Recoilless Rifle Mobile Mount.

(S4)

(a) OBSERVATION. A 3/4 ton trailer chassis can be utilized, after modification, as a mobile mount for the M106 recoilless rifle in the absence of a 1/4 ton vehicle.

(b) EVALUATION. The M106 recoilless rifle must be highly mobile to operate effectively against tanks or in a camp defense role. Sufficient vehicles are not available at A detachments to allow use of the 1/4 ton vehicle as a mount for the 106 recoilless rifle. A 3/4 ton trailer can be modified for this purpose by removing the body from the chassis, cutting the chassis frame down and adding a flat sheet metal bed. The 106 recoilless rifle can then be attached to the chassis. The results are a highly mobile weapon which can easily be maneuvered by three American soldiers. It is also easily towed and fired from behind a 1/4 ton or 3/4 ton truck. The bed of the trailer can also be adapted to safely carry 8 rounds of ammunition in their fiber containers.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION. None

(5) Airboat Battery "Quick Disconnect" Capability. (SL)

(a) OBSERVATION. Airboats must have a battery "quick disconnect" capability because the battery must be disconnected in order to prevent accidental starting when the airboat is not in operation.

(b) EVALUATION. Airboat batteries have not been available in supply channels. The 12 volt battery commonly used in 1/4 ton and 3/4 ton trucks provides the proper voltage and is of the correct dimensions to fit into the airboat battery box, but the airboat battery quick terminal disconnect is not present. Battery terminal lug clamps can be locally purchased or obtained from local salvage points. A 1/8 inch bolt can be welded to the battery clamp and a wing nut placed on the bolt. By attaching the clamp to each of the 12 volt battery terminals you have a suitable substitute for the airboat battery quick terminal disconnect.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. None.

(6) Patrol, Indigenous Rations (PIR). (SL)

(a) OBSERVATION. Operational rations, Patrol Indigenous Rations (PIR), should be distributed automatically on an equal basis to all using units without regard to desires for any particular menus.

(b) EVALUATION. PIR are allotted to the 5th Special Forces according to a contract for a specified amount of rations by five specific types of menus. These rations are shipped from Japan and Okinawa to FSP's at Da Nang, Qui Nhon, Nha Trang, and the Command Liaison Detachment in Saigon RVN. Requests for PIR's by type have previously been submitted by A and B detachments to the FSP's and the menus which were more desirable were requested in larger quantities than the less desired menus. Some requisitions were filled, some partially filled, and due outs maintained for the unfilled portion of the requests. This procedure caused needless administration burdens which were reduced by automatically distributing all rations received on an equal basis to all using units. By having the LSC or FSP's prepare the DA Form 2765-1 (issue slip) for actual quantities shipped to each unit, requisitions and due outs are eliminated.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. None

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f. Organization. None.

g. Other.

COMMUNICATIONS

(1) Emergency DC Power.

(Co C)

(a) OBSERVATION. An obvious source of 28 VDC to power AN/VRC-47 radios is sometimes overlooked by inexperienced operators. One such source is the generator.

(b) EVALUATION. All operators should know where and how to obtain emergency power when the primary source fails. A 28 VDC source is available on most generators, either through an outlet on the front panel or by a connection directly to the battery. Generators are operated 24 hours a day and provide a constant and reliable 28 VDC source which is capable of handling one or more VRC-47 radios. It is also a good source of primary power for radio sets.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. None.

(2) Command Net Operations During an Attack.

(Co C)

(a) OBSERVATION. During heavy contact or when a camp comes under attack, the company command net becomes overloaded and cannot handle all the traffic.

(b) EVALUATION. When a camp is under attack or a patrol is in heavy contact, they require almost exclusive use of the command net. Traffic from the other camps still has to be passed during this time.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. All other stations in the net should be switched to an alternate frequency. This permits the camp in trouble to have exclusive use of the primary frequency, while the NCS still maintains normal traffic with the other camps on the alternate frequency.

(3) Installation of Alternate Antennas.

(Co C)

(a) OBSERVATION. Alternate antennas must be available to maintain communication when the primary antenna is knocked out.

(b) EVALUATION. Mortar or rocket attacks cause extensive damage to exposed antennas and coaxial lead-ins. When alternate antennas are installed

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and the lead-ins come into the same bunker at the same place, both antennas can be rendered useless by one round severing both lead-ins at once.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Bury the alternate antenna and lead-ins approximately six or eight inches under the ground. The antenna and lead-in must be sealed to prevent grounding. Care must be taken not only to separate the antennas, but also to separate the coax lead-ins. If they come into the same bunker, they should not have the same point of entry.

(4) Use of the HT-1 Radio in Bunkers.

(Co D)

(a) OBSERVATION. It has been found that the use of an external antenna is necessary to provide adequate communications when the HT-1 radio is used from within a concrete bunker equipped with PSP stand off.

(b) EVALUATION. None.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Bunkers should be equipped with external antennas; a whip or RC-292 should be used with coax connections from the antenna to the radio set. If possible, wire lines should be laid and buried as an alternate means of communications.

(5) Air Ground Frequencies.

(Co D)

(a) OBSERVATION. Special Forces FM A/G frequencies are contained in numerous SOI extracts throughout the QTZ and there have been many SOI compromises by other units. This has resulted in confusion and delay in getting out changes to the compromised item to all subscribers.

(b) EVALUATION. None.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. A complete FM A/G reserve SOI item should be held by each subscriber. In event of compromise by any unit, all subscribers should be notified that the reserve item is in effect.

(6) Interchangeable Antenna Systems For Multiple Radio Complexes.

(Co D)

(a) OBSERVATION. Three radios, the FRC-93, the PRC-74, and the AN/GRC-109, all use the same type of antenna. The only difference is the manner in which the antenna is coupled to the set. An interchangeable system can be effected so that any antenna may be used with any radio.

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(b) EVALUATION. Connect a short section of coaxial cable to the FRC-93 and terminate it with a female coupling. Then cut a second short section of coaxial cable with a female coupling on one end. Bare the opposite end approximately one inch, thereby allowing the same antenna to be used for the AN/GRC-109 and the AN/GRC-74. (This common cable will have to be alternated between radios for use of one or the other radio.) The female ends of the coaxial cables are set in wood blocks. All that remains to be done is to terminate all antennas with a male coupling and label each as to frequency.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. None.

(7) Utilization of Antenna 271A/PRC (long) on Operations. (Co D)

(a) OBSERVATION. It has been found that on operations the short antenna is insufficient for maintaining good communications with the CP, therefore requiring the use of the long antenna. The long antenna opened to full length necessitates slow movement through heavily vegetated terrain.

(b) EVALUATION. Adequate communications and ease of movement can both be realized by extending the long antenna two or three sections and then taping the remaining sections to the top section.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. None.

(8) Batteries for the HT-1 Radio. (Co D)

(a) OBSERVATION. It has been found that the use of civilian (commercial) 1.5 volt batteries will cause corrosion of the battery compartment and damage to the radio due to battery leakage. This is especially true of Japanese manufactured batteries.

(b) EVALUATION. None.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That only BA-30's be used in HT-1 radios. However, if civilian batteries must be used for any reason, the battery compartment should be checked every two or three days.

FINANCE

(9) Programming and Budgeting. (Compt)

(a) OBSERVATION. It is absolutely essential that an approved concept of operations for the next fiscal year be obtained prior to submission of the Command Budget Estimate for the corresponding fiscal year to higher headquarters for approval.

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(b) EVALUATION. See discussion of this subject found in paragraph 1n (2), this report.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. None

POLWAR

(10) CIDG POLWAR Team.

(Co A)

(a) OBSERVATION. The POLWAR Team concept has proven extremely effective when training and employment receive command emphasis.

(b) EVALUATION. Prior to the POLWAR Training Course, the CIDG POLWAR teams in most detachments were under strength, unmotivated, and had no knowledge of their duties. The training program has rapidly changed this situation and now each team is actively engaged in promoting the support of the CIDG in their camps and are producing outstanding results when compared with any previous programs.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. CIDG personnel that are placed on POLWAR teams should be interested in this type work. They must be highly motivated and willing to put much individual effort into their work. These ends can be achieved through proper support and guidance on the part of the USASF CA/PO officer or NCO. The detachment commander must also show great interest in the program and continuously encourage his counterpart to do the same.

(11) POLWAR Team Projects.

(Co A)

(a) OBSERVATION. The effectiveness and motivation of the POLWAR teams can be enhanced if the teams are allowed to determine their own projects to the greatest extent possible

(b) EVALUATION. None.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That lists of projects not be presented to POLWAR teams simply to be accomplished. Sufficient latitude must be allowed for team initiative in order to develop a truly effective team.

(12) Posting of Health Posters.

(Co A)

(a) OBSERVATION. Most MEDCAPS do not have sufficient personnel to accomplish all assigned tasks and also post health posters throughout the village. It has been found that children, when properly motivated, are most effective at posting the health posters and telling the people that the MEDCAP team is in the village.

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(b) EVALUATION. Health posters are a very important part of all MFD CAPS. They are a constant reminder to the people as to who their friends are, and to the protective measures to be taken to safeguard their health.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. None

(13) Medical Treatment of Civilians while conducting Operations. (Co D)

(a) OBSERVATION. It has been found that when civilians are given medical aid by personnel conducting a combat operation, they will often respond by freely offering information of intelligence value.

(b) EVALUATION. In many cases civilians have knowledge of areas where the enemy has previously been or is presently located. They often are aware of booby trapped areas. When friendly forces show their interest and concern for the people by offering medical treatment for minor ailments, they are assuring the local population of their good intentions and are opening a door through which current intelligence can be received and immediately acted upon.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That an extra medical kit or two be carried on operations just for this purpose.

(14) Effective Civic Action Projects. (Co A)

(a) OBSERVATION. Frequently large well planned Civic Action projects have had negative results, have failed to overcome apathy or at least have failed to create enthusiasm.

(b) EVALUATION. Civic Action projects are not as effective as should be. More effective Civic Action projects have been produced by following these guidelines: For your initial project in an area, select a project that the people want, even if more practical projects are needed. Short-term projects where the people can readily and quickly see the end result are necessary before enthusiasm and confidence can be created for a long-range project. As much, if not more of the planning, equipment, and personnel must be devoted to concurrent psychological operations as to the Civic Action project itself. Use self-help projects whenever possible. It may take longer, but the people will appreciate the end result more and they will recognize many other projects they can perform themselves where only a minimum amount of material for support is required. Finally, never distribute commodities without having the appropriate government official present. Your presence will speak for itself and his support may prove invaluable at a later date.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION. That the guidance outlined above be followed when planning and conducting Civic Action projects.

(15) Bulgar Wheat as a Food for Refugees.

(Co C)

(a) OBSERVATION. In the past, the Montagnards have refused to eat Bulgar wheat. It was thought that this food was unfit for refugees and they would only eat it as a last resort.

(b) EVALUATION. Bulgar wheat was found to be of nutritional value. It was also found the Montagnards only refused to eat Bulgar wheat which was old and which they felt was contaminated.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That Bulgar wheat stock be stored and shipped under the "FIFO" principle. In other words, the first stock put into the warehouse is the first stock shipped. Also, with each amount of Bulgar shipped a series of leaflets on how to prepare Bulgar should be attached.

(16) Distribution of CA Commodities.

(Co D)

(a) OBSERVATION. When giving support to a school or hospital, it has been found that distributions at regularly scheduled intervals are more effective than sporadic bulk contributions.

(b) EVALUATION. None

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That commodities be distributed on a regular basis. The facility being supported interprets this as a demonstration of our concern for them rather than as a payoff.

(17) Leaflet Dissemination.

(Co D)

(a) OBSERVATION. It has been demonstrated that face to face PSYOPS has always been the most effective.

(b) EVALUATION. At the present time too much emphasis is being placed on leaflet drops. More emphasis needs to be placed on hand-delivered leaflets. One of the major problems is to convince RF/PF troops to take leaflets with them to the field.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That leaflets be given out to villagers and placed along trails, in bunkers, and other locations whenever possible. Leaflets would not be

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at the mercy of the winds if distributed in this manner.

(18) PSYOPS Reporting.

(Co D)

(a) OBSERVATION. Since the last reporting period, incidents of PSYOPS value have slipped by unexploited. One case was the release of civilian prisoners which had been held captive and used as a labor force by the VC.

(b) EVALUATION. Had a camera been present and pictures taken, a local PSYOPS theme would have been very effective. General information on the incident was disseminated throughout the area.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Emphasis should continue to be placed on the necessity of having a camera accompany all operations and pictures taken of all incidents which might be of value.

(19) Resettlement of Refugees.

(Co C)

(a) OBSERVATION. On a recent operation, a patrol returned to the camp with a large number of refugees who had been living in an enemy controlled area. It was the plan of the patrol to bring them back into the no fire zone and resettle them there in a new life hamlet. The CA/PO personnel in the camp were quite unprepared to handle the situation.

(b) EVALUATION. No plans had been made prior to the patrol's departure to bring back and resettle refugees. There were limited supplies on hand and the others were slow in arriving. There was little time for coordination with either district or higher headquarters with various organizations with the capability of aiding refugees. In short, such a program needs planning and coordination before it can be successfully executed.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. Before any detachment takes it upon itself to implement a refugee resettlement of any size, it should first carefully plan and coordinate with all organizations concerned to make sure that the program is feasible and in the best interest of the GVN.

MEDICAL

(20) CIDG Medical Care.

(SURG)

(a) OBSERVATION. While attempting to improve medical care for CIDG, it

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was noted that USARV Reg. # 40-50 was ambiguous in describing care available to CIDG in US hospital facilities.

(b) EVALUATION. The regulation now states that care will be provided on an emergency basis for CIDG patients. It would be of great benefit to have this rewritten to state that surgical care will be provided on a routine basis. This would make it unnecessary to do general surgery at the CIDG hospitals thus freeing some medics for A team duty, allowing the Surgeon more time to get out in the field, and greatly reducing the supply requirements of the hospitals.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. That USARV Reg. # 40-50 be rewritten as above. This change is now under study at USARV Headquarters.

(21) Emergency Thoracentesis.

(Co D)

(a) OBSERVATION. A thoracentesis is the aspiration of fluid and air from a chest wound through the thoracic cavity and is often a life saving procedure, particularly if evacuation is going to be delayed. Needles of the required length are not always available, but it has been found that the air-inlet needle from a serum albumin set is a very effective substitute.

(b) EVALUATION. Since the air-inlet needle has a knurled knob instead of a normal hub, it is necessary for the user to fashion an adapter. This adaptation can be accomplished by means of the sterile rubber tubing which is also found in the albumin set and which fits snugly over the needle end and stopcock or syringe. Sterility, which must be maintained throughout the procedure, can be accomplished by wearing surgical gloves during assembly.

(c) RECOMMENDATION. None.

(22) Contact Dermatitis.

(Co D)

(a) OBSERVATION. A type of moth exists in the Delta region of South Vietnam which can produce a dermatitis characterized by a rash and itching. Although HCTA or Dibucaine will relieve the itching temporarily, it is much more desirable to prevent the symptoms.

(b) EVALUATION. This type of moth is about one inch long, is white or yellow in color, and has a pointed head. Although they are not found alive during the dry season, the dead moths collect in storerooms and other closed places. Personnel engaged in cleaning or working in such places may come in contact with dust containing the offending agent at any time of the year.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION. When the moths are in evidence and contact has been made with them, showers should be taken quite often. It is also advisable to cover the tops of insect bars to prevent the offending agent from rubbing off the moths and filtering down on the individual. Personnel engaged in cleaning enclosed areas are also advised to shower as soon afterwards as possible.

(23) Control of Medications.

(Co A)

(a) OBSERVATION. It was found that control of medications being dispensed to indigenous patients was inadequate.

(b) EVALUATION. It was learned that some medications which had been dispensed in quantity to indigenous patients were either given to other people or sold on the market.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS. That those medications intended for indigenous patients be held in separate containers marked with the patients name and that the patient be required to return to the dispensary at required intervals to receive the medication.

(24) Premeditated, Self-inflicted Gunshot Wounds Among CIDG.

(Co B)

(a) OBSERVATION. In the past, a minor wound (self-inflicted or not) allowed the CIDG soldier to be sent to the nearest ARVN hospital closest to the A detachment and resulted in extended absences and a reduction in manpower.

(b) EVALUATION. CIDG personnel admitted to hospitals for minor injuries or wounds frequently extend these absences due to lack of adequate control of released patients. In most cases the record systems are casual, contain no factual release date and result in the CIDG personnel actually being AWOL (but unchargeable due to the poor records system). Detachment medics have treated in the camp dispensary injuries and self-inflicted wounds which did not involve major vessel, nerve, or bone damage. These occasions were also used to conduct medical cross training of other members of the detachment and CIDG medics. This practice has discouraged self-inflicted wounds and has therefore reduced the time lost by CIDG malingering in cities or villages adjacent to ARVN and provincial hospitals.


(c) RECOMMENDATION. That A detachment medics treat in the camp dispensary all CIDG injuries and self-inflicted wounds not involving major vessel, nerve, or bone damage.

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AVTB C

25 August 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for Period Ending
31 July 1968. RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)



HAROLD R. AARON
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

13 Incl
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- 1 - SWC Combat Dev, Ft Bragg, N.C., 28307
- 1 - CG, RYUKYU Island, APO 96331
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- 1 - CO, 8th SFGA, 1st SF, APO 09837
- 1 - CO, 10th SFGA, 1st SF, APO 09108
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- 1 - Co C, 5th SFGA, 1st SF, APO 96337
- 1 - Co D, 5th SFGA, 1st SF, APO 96915
- 1 - CMD In Det, 5th SFGA, 1st SF, APO 96243
- 1 - 46th SF Co, 1st SF, APO 96261
- 1 - US Army CISO, APO 96248

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AVHCC-DST (15 Aug 68) 1st Ind (U) MAJ Elingman/ds/LBN 4433
SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for Period
31 July 1968. RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 11 OCT 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1968 from Headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces.

2. Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning the status of incoming personnel, pages 102 and 103, paragraph c(1): Concur. Personnel arriving in RVN for assignment to the 5th Special Forces Group should be in good physical condition and well grounded in the basic principles necessary to conduct small unit tactical operations and survive in a jungle environment.

b. Reference item concerning requirements to treat MAT and KIN information in the same manner as US SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL, page 105, paragraph 2d(1): Nonconcur with the recommendation. Paragraph 11h, AR 380-5 establishes the policies and procedures for the handling of foreign government originated classified material.

c. Reference item concerning exploitation and evacuation of captured documents, material, and personnel, page 110, paragraph 2d(16): Concur. MACV and USARV directives and regulations prescribe the correct procedures for identification and processing of captured material and personnel. Action will be taken by this headquarters through command publications to remind commanders and intelligence officers at all levels of the directives in effect.

d. Reference item concerning sandbag, polypropyl, FSN: 8105-926-2034, page 112, paragraph 2e(1): Concur. Procurement of burlap (cotton) sandbags has been terminated. Only polypropylene (FSN 8105-926-2034/2035/2036) and acrylic (FSN 8105-935-7101) will be available in the future. Polypropylene are presently stocked in USARV depots whereas the first acrylic bags are scheduled to arrive in RVN in October 1968. Defense Construction Supply Center (DCSC) indicates that acrylic bags have proven superior to all other types in every test.

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11 OCT 1968

AVHCC-DST (15 Aug 68) 1st Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) for Period
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e. Reference item concerning CIDG medical care, page 121, paragraph 2e(20): Nonconcur. USARV Regulation 40-50 authorizes emergency medical care for occupational injuries. This care is equated to that provided civilian war casualties, under the provisions of USARV Regulation 40-46. USARV medical facilities are not staffed nor equipped to provide routine medical care to Vietnamese civilians as a matter of general policy. The only routine medical care for Vietnamese civilians is provided by the military Medical Civic Action Program (MEDCAP II). MEDCAP is directed toward improving local health requirements, but is limited by operational requirements.

FOR THE COMMANDER


W. C. ARNTZ
CPTAGC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
HQ 5th SFG

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GPOP-DT (15 Aug 68) 2d Ind (C)
SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 5th Special Forces Gp
(Abn) for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS
CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 2 DEC 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development,
Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsement and concurs in the report as indorsed.

2. (C) Reference (page 91) paragraph 1n(1)(b):

a. In view of the PEMA fund management problems encountered by USACISO, this headquarters in February 1968 proposed to DA to change the Operation Switchback PEMA funding and accounting procedures. Proposal was not favorably considered by DA due to current interpretation of legal restraints by various government agencies.

b. This headquarters in October 1968 recommended that DA continue its effort toward elimination, beginning with FY 70, PEMA field financing for the Switchback Program.

c. DA indicated that two possible solutions are now being considered, i.e., free issues of PEMA items or improved billing procedures to include direct billing from 1st Logistical Command to USACISO.

d. Proposed changes in funding and issue procedures are now being studied by the DA Switchback team now visiting PACOM area (3 November - 3 December 1968).

3. (C) Reference (page 92) paragraph 1n(2): On 15 October 1968, DA announced the OSD action concerning the proposed increases to the FY 69 and FY 70 Switchback Program.

4. (C) Reference (page 102) paragraph 2c(1): This headquarters recommends that the POI at the Special Warfare School be revised to stress the CIDG Program as opposed to preparing the SF for unconventional warfare.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 5th Special Forces Gp
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5. (C) Reference (page 103) paragraph 2c(2): Personnel who attend the one-year course at the Defense Language Institute can speak Vietnamese fluently. Those personnel who attend the "short courses" in Vietnamese are limited to a few phrases. As a minimum, the detachment Intelligence Sergeant should be a graduate of the one-year course.


FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

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5TH SFGA ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE



DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
 DOD DIR 5200.10

Incl 1 to 5th SFGA ORLL for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968

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TROOP DISPOSITION LIST - I CTZ

DET	LOCATION	COORD	DATE	OPENED	NO	CSF	RF	NO	FF	NO	MSF	ETHNIC
E-1	Denang	BT07527193	May 68	286	671	204	560					CHINESE
B-16	Denang	BT07527193	Sep 68	215								CHINESE
A-101	Mat Loo	BT07527193	Jun 68	286	671	204	560					CHINESE
A-102	Tien Phao	BT07527193	Nov 65	576	576	203	207					CHINESE
A-103	Ola Vac	BT07527193	Feb 63	576	576	203	207					CHINESE
A-104	Ha Thanh	BT07527193	Apr 65	576	576	203	207					CHINESE
A-105	Ha Thanh	BT07527193	Jun 68	237	237	121	202					CHINESE
A-106	Ha Thanh	BT07527193	Mar 65	429	429	121	202					CHINESE
A-107	Da To	BT07527193	Mar 65	487	487	104	175					CHINESE
A-108	Da To	BT07527193	Mar 65	486	486	104	175					CHINESE
A-109	Thang Duc	BT07527193	Apr 66	577								CHINESE

TOTALS: 4510 632 1556 947

II CTZ

C-2	Pleiku	AR76515021	Oct 62	200								CHINESE
B-20	Pleiku	AR76515021	Nov 67	434								CHINESE
B-22	Qui Nhon	CR09912281	Jan 65	27								CHINESE
A-221	Cung Son	BQ80104346	Jan 66	594								CHINESE
A-222	Dong Tre	BQ90957425	Jun 63	749								CHINESE
A-223	Qui Nhon	CR07652110	Mar 68									CHINESE
A-224	Phu Tuc	BQ50405965	May 65	630	201	229						CHINESE
A-227	Ha Tay	BR79908301	Jun 67	589								CHINESE
A-120	Vinh Thanh	BR61586052	Oct 65	638								CHINESE
B-23	Ban de Thuo	AR78004000	Nov 64	204								CHINESE
A-231	Tieu Atar	ZV02206235	Dec 67	591								CHINESE
A-232	Tan Rai	ZT09958765	Jan 66	366								CHINESE
A-233	Trang Phuoc	ZV03662671	Sep 66	561								CHINESE
A-234	An Lac	AP86474847	May 65	587								CHINESE
A-235	Nhon Co	TU80402505	May 66	452								CHINESE
A-236	Bu Prang	TU48895610	Oct 67	412								CHINESE
A-237	Laong Son	BN12503850	Jan 66	617								CHINESE
A-238	Buon Biech	BQ00785942	Jul 66	617								CHINESE
A-239	Duc Lap	TU91327513	Nov 66	475								CHINESE
B-24	Kontum	AR27318891	Jan 66	146								CHINESE
A-241	Polei Kleng	ZA03269330	Mar 66	449								CHINESE
A-242	Dak Pek	TR94976842	Nov 62	614								CHINESE
A-243	Plateau Q1	BS08651555	Jan 65	400								CHINESE
A-244	Ben Het	TB87242566	May 68	759								CHINESE

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Incl to 5th SFGA ORLL for Period Ending 31 Jul 68

DOWNGRADE AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
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TROOP DISPOSITION LIST - II CTZ (CONT)

UNIT	LOCATION	COORD	DATE OPENED	NO CSF	NO RF	NO PF	NO MSF	MISSION	ETHNIC GROUPS
A-245	Dak Seang	YB89594051	Jul 66	119				CSF/BS	VN/MONT
A-246	Hang Buk	AS98111180	Jul 64	146				CSF	MONT
A-251	Plei Doreng	YA87154590	Dec 66	120				CSF	MONT
A-253	Plei Mreng	ZAL1256700	Nov 62	648				CSF	VN/MONT/LAOS/CHINESE
A-253	Duc Co	YA84602493	Jun 62	538				CSF/BS	VN/MONT
A-255	Plei Me	ZAL6240592	Oct 63	562				CSF/BS	VN/MONT
TOTAL:				14020	201	229	1602		

III CTZ

C-3	Bien Hoa	YT00901270	Nov 64	76				C&C	CAMB
A-301	Trang Sup	YT16885550	Feb 63	158				CSF/TC	VN/CAMB
B-32	Tay Ninh	YT20455087	Dec 67	210				C&C	VN/MONT/CAMB/CHI
A-136	Ben Soi	XT09234756	Mar 65	728				CSF/BS	VN/MONT/CAMB/CHI
A-322	Katun	XT32998977	Feb 68	527				CSF/BS	VN/MONT/CAMB
A-323	Thien Ngon	XT08698162	Feb 68	700				CSF/BS	VN/CAMB
A-324	Nhi Ba Den	YT28105820	Jul 64					RR	VN
B-33	Hon Quan	YT73858770	Mar 68	200				C&C	VN/MONT/CAMB
A-331	Loc Ninh	XU73140823	Dec 66	653				CSF/BS	VN/MONT/CAMB/CHI
A-332	Hinh Thanh	XT64356682	Feb 64	350				CSF	VN/MONT/CAMB
A-333	Chi Minh	XT91607350	Jan 67	111				CSF	VN/MONT/CAMB
A-334	Tung Le Chon	YT62228103	May 67	395				CSF/BS	VN/MONT/CAMB
B-34	Song Be	YU17600910	Nov 67	200				C&C	VN/MONT/CAMB
A-341	Bu Dop	YU97152939	Nov 63	437	101	261		CSF/BS/SS	VN/MONT/CAMB
A-342	Dong Loai	YT07647597	Jun 65	150	119	200		CSF/SS	VN/MONT/CAMB
A-343	Duc Phong	YU43750495	Apr 66	116	101	207		CSF/SS	VN/MONT/CAMB
A-344	Bunard	YT27018877	Apr 67	129				CSF	VN/MONT/CAMB
B-35	Duc Hoa	XS60009625	Dec 66	167				C&C	VN/CAMB
A-351	Duc Hua	XT32000900	Nov 67	119				CSF/BS	VN/CAMB/CHI
A-352	Tra Cu	XS47759816	Jan 67	391				CSF/BS	VN/CAMB
B-36	Long Hai	YS43845122	Sep 67				1587		VN/MONT/CAMB/CHI
TOTAL:				7617	321	668	1587		

IV CTZ

C-4	Can Tho	WS84301160	Jan 63	182				C&C	VN/CAMB/CHI
B-40	Can Tho	WS84301030	Mar 68					C&C	VN/CAMB/CHI
A-401	Dong Phuc	WT51300100	Oct 67				358	MSF	VN/CAMB/CHI
A-402	Moc Hoa	XS02828995	Mar 63				116	MSF	VN/CAMB/CHI
A-403	Can Tho	WS84301030	Mar 68				423	MSF	VN/CAMB/CHI
A-404	Moc Hoa	XS02828995	Mar 63				229	MSF	VN/CAMB/CHI

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TROOP DISPOSITION LIST - IV CTZ (CONT)

DET	LOCATION	COORD	DATE OPENED	NO CSF	NO RF	NO PF	NO MSF	MISSION	ETHNIC GROUPS
B-41	Hoc Hoa	XS03059091	Feb 65	613	801	82		C&C/S/SS	VN/CAMB
A-411	My Phuoc Tay	XS20065984	Feb 67					CSF	VN/CAMB
A-412	Kinh Quan II	WS97657585	Oct 65	660	495			CSF	VN/CAMB/CHI
A-413	Binh Thanh Thon	WT86180331	May 65	501	118	276		CSF/SS/BS	VN/CAMB
A-414	Thanh Tr-1	XS05759953	Mar 68	443	405	378		CSF/BS	VN/CAMB/MONT/CHI
A-415	Nguyen Nhon	XS27877758	Apr 65	561	120	88		CSF/SS/BS	VN/CAMB
A-416	My Dien II	XS36506050	Jan 68	535				CSF	VN/CAMB
B-42	Chau Doc	WS13208410	Mar 65		901	1285		C&C/S/SS	VN/CAMB
A-421	Ba Ioi	VS95596279	May 66	908				CSF/BS	VN/CAMB
A-419	Vinh Oia	VS76226090	Aug 64	739				CSF/BS	VN/CAMB
B-43	Gao Lamh	WS69515616	Feb 67		289			C&C/S/SS	CAMB
A-431	Cai Cai	WT56160750	Apr 65	759				CSF/BS	VN/CAMB
A-432	Thoung Thoi	WS31409505	May 65	613	353	1199		CSF/SS/BS	VN/CAMB/MONT/CHI
A-433	My Da	WS99886205	Mar 67	849				CSF/SS	VN/CAMB
A-442	To Chau	VS45604552	Feb 67	241				TC	VN/CAMB/CHI
TOTALS:				7604	3482	3308	1426		

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SEPARATE DETACHMENTS


B-51	Dong Ba Thm	CP04002900
B-52	Nha Trang	CP03105180
B-55	Nha Trang	CP03105180
A-502	Trung Dung	BP93705571
Recondo	Nha Trang	CP03105180
HHC	Nha Trang	CP03105180
CO E	Nha Trang	CP03105180
VNSF/HG	Nha Trang	CP03105330
CID	Salgon	IS85309295

LEGEND: CSF - Camp Strike Force
RF - Regional Force
PF - Popular Force
MSF - Mobile Strike Force
BS - Border Surveillance
S/SS - Sector Sub-sector

VN - Vietnamese
CAMB - Cambodian
MONT - Montagnard
CHI - Chinese
C&C - Command and Control
TC - Training Center

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
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
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INCLOSURE 4 TO OPERATIONAL REPORT
FOR QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDING 31 JULY 1968

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STATISTICAL DATA

	I CTZ	II CTZ	III CTZ	IV CTZ	TOTAL
1. (C) Missions:					
a. Squad.	4262	8862	5427	13385	31936
b. Platoon	1180	2486	1496	8122	13284
c. Company or Larger	254	569	522	1647	2992
2. (C) Contacts:					
a. Contacts resulting from Friendly Offensive Action:	171	388	233	277	1069
b. VC attacks on installations and convoys:	105	46	241	99	491
c. Incidents:	28	30	8	136	202
3. (C) Confirmed VC Losses:					
a. KIA	390	549	431	591	1961
b. CPTR	29	36	38	168	271
c. Quarterly Comparison of Confirmed VC Losses Country-wide:					
	KIA	CPTR			
3d Quarter 67	1624	291			
4th Quarter 67	2041	228			
1st Quarter 68	2492	457			
2d Quarter 68	1961	271			
4. (C) USASF Losses:					
a. KIA	3	7	8	8	26
b. WIA	32	20	23	23	98
c. MIA	2	1	0	0	3
d. Quarterly comparison of USASF casualties country-wide:					
	KIA	WIA	MIA	TOTAL	
3d Quarter 67	16	92	1	109	
4th Quarter 67	37	146		183	
1st Quarter 68	17	174	1	283	
2d Quarter 68	25	98	3	127	

Info 5 for JCR EFGA ORLL for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1968

DECLASSIFIED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS

DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS

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STATISTICAL DATA (CONT)

	I CTZ	II CTZ	III CTZ	IV CTZ	TOTAL
5. (C) VNSF Losses:					
a. KIA		3	3	1	7
b. WIA	6	8	13	5	32
c. MIA	1			1	2
d. Quarterly comparison of VNSF casualties Country-wide.					
	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
3d Quarter 67	2	16			18
4th Quarter 67	7	26	2		35
1st Quarter 68	13	31	6		50
2d Quarter 68	7	32	2		41
6. (C) CIDG Losses:					
a. KIA	94	120	138	196	548
b. WIA	231	458	654	325	1668
c. MIA	5	30	13	10	58
d. Quarterly comparison of CIDG casualties country-wide.					
	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
3d Quarter 67	260	1012	28		1300
4th Quarter 67	421	1254	104		1779
1st Quarter 68	430	1477	237		2144
2d Quarter 68	548	1668	58		2274
7. (C) RF/PF Losses:					
a. KIA	62	4	1	40	107
b. WIA	12		5	183	200
c. MIA					
d. Quarterly comparison of RF/PF casualties country-wide.					
	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>
3d Quarter 67	56	167	1		224
4th Quarter 67	136	371	28		535
1st Quarter 68	221	414	105		740
2d Quarter 68	107	200			307
8. (C) Weapons					
a. Friendly Weapons Lost	228	158	97	176	659
b. Enemy Weapons Lost	211	321	161	785	1478

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Security Classification

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